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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL MARKETS
Chenying Zhang
Franklin Allen
My dissertations aim at understanding the different aspects of the Chinese financial markets. It
includes three chapters.
The first chapter studies how firm level political connections affect a firm's decision of going to
court and the trial outcomes, using hand-collected data on Chinese listed firms. We found that
connected firms have a win rate that is 8.6% higher than unconnected firms have. The higher win
rate is most significant in cases with straightforward facts, in provinces where the local legal
institutions are weak, and in cases tried in politically-connected firms' home provinces. The
empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the difference in the win rates is caused
by judicial bias. We show that trial outcomes have real impacts on firms' stock prices.
In the second chapter, I examine the effectiveness and cost of monetary sterilization in China.
The study adapts a 2SLS method to estimate the extent of China's sterilization. It also compares
the sterilization cost with the central bank's income from investing foreign exchange reserves. I
conclude that the sterilization has been highly effective to date. Moreover, so far the sterilization
cost of the central bank can be fully covered by the income from foreign reserve investment.
The third chapter provides a comprehensive review of China’s financial system, and explore
directions of future development. First, the financial system has been dominated by a large
banking sector. Second, the role of the stock market in allocating resources in the economy has
been limited and ineffective. Third, the most successful part of the financial system is a nonstandard sector that consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and
institutions. Finally, among the policies that will help to sustain stable economic growth in China
are those that reduce the likelihood of damaging financial crises, including a banking sector crisis,
a real estate or stock market crash, and a “twin crisis” in the currency market and banking sector.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ........................................................................................... III
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. IV
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. VII
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................... IX
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Legal Reform, Political Ties and Judicial Bias: A Review of China ..................................... 6
1.3 Data Description ............................................................................................................................ 9
1.3.1 Variable of Interests ..........................................................................................................................9
1.3.2 Control variables .............................................................................................................................15
1.4 Empirical Results......................................................................................................................... 18
1.4.1 Judicial Bias and Case Merits ..........................................................................................................19
1.4.2 Judicial Bias and Legal Environments .............................................................................................30
1.4.3 Judicial Bias and Local Connections ................................................................................................37
1.4.4 Self-Established Political Connections by Non-SOE and Judicial Bias ............................................41
1.4.5 Self Established Political Connections vs. State Ownership ..........................................................48
1.4.6 Effect of Litigation Outcomes on Stock Performances ..................................................................48
1.5 Robustness Check ...................................................................................................................... 53
1.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 54
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 55

CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................................................... 59
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 59
2.2 Overview of foreign exchange reserves and sterilization tools in China .......................... 65
2.2.1 China's foreign reserves management and evolution ...................................................................65
2.2.2 Major sterilization tools ..................................................................................................................71
2.3 Sterilization coefficient estimation: data, methodology and empirical results ................ 78
2.3.1 2SLS description ..............................................................................................................................78
2.3.2 Data and Empirical results ..............................................................................................................82

v

2.4 The Sterilization cost born by the PBC ................................................................................... 92
2.4.1 Comparison of the sterilization cost and the PBC's investment income .......................................93
2.4.2 Linear Projections ..........................................................................................................................100
2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 103
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 105

CHAPTER 3 ......................................................................................................... 108
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 108
3.2 Overview of China’s Financial System .................................................................................. 112
3.2.1 A Brief Review of the History of China’s Financial System ..........................................................112
3.2.2 Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banks, Markets, and Alternative Finance..............119
3.3 The Banking and Intermediation Sector ................................................................................ 123
3.3.1 Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans ........................................................................124
3.3.2 An Analysis of NPLs and Further Reform of the Banking Sector..................................................127
3.3.3 Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries.............................................................................146
3.4 Financial Markets ...................................................................................................................... 150
3.4.1 Overview of Stock Markets ...........................................................................................................151
3.4.2 Overview of Bond Markets ...........................................................................................................155
3.4.3 Evidence on the Listed Sector .......................................................................................................157
3.4.4 Real Estate Market ........................................................................................................................164
3.4.5 Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries ...........................................172
3.4.6 Asset Management Industries ......................................................................................................174
3.4.7 Further Changes in Financial Markets ..........................................................................................177
3.5 The Non-standard Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector Firms ................... 184
3.5.1 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors ..........................................................185
3.5.2 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors ..........................................................188
3.5.3 Discussion on How the Non-standard Financial Sector Works ....................................................189
3.6 Financial Crisis .......................................................................................................................... 195
3.6.1 Banking Crises and Market Crashes ..............................................................................................197
3.6.2 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion ...................................199
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks....................................................................................... 207
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 209

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Distribution of suit types.......................................................................................... 14
Table 2 Summary statistics ................................................................................................... 16
Table 3 Judicial bias and information asymmetry on case merit ........................................ 28
Table 4 Judicial bias and legal institutions ........................................................................... 33
Table 5 Judicial bias and local connections .......................................................................... 40
Table 6 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and case merit information asymmetry .......... 43
Table 7 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and legal institutions ........................................ 45
Table 8 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and local connections ....................................... 47
Table 9 t-test on CAR(1,5) ..................................................................................................... 50
Table 10 Regression analysis on CAR(1.5) ............................................................................ 52
Table 11 Balance Sheet ......................................................................................................... 61
Table 12 Huijin's investment................................................................................................. 66
Table 13 CIC's incomplete list of investment ....................................................................... 68
Table 14 Sterilization process ............................................................................................... 72
Table 15 ADF test result ........................................................................................................ 83
Table 16 Summary statistics of the variables. ...................................................................... 84
Table 17 Regression results. ................................................................................................. 86
Table 18 Interest rate of required and excess reserves ....................................................... 95
Table 19 Comparing financial systems: Banks and Markets (average 2001-2007) ........... 120
Table 20-A Comparisons of Total Savings and Deposits (in US$ billions)......................... 125
Table 20-B Breakdown of Bank Loans (end-of-year figures in RMB billions)................... 126
Table 21-A A Comparison of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and Government Debt ....... 134
Table 21-B Liquidation of NPLs by Four Asset Management Companies (RMB billion) .. 135
Table 22-A Chinese Banks’ IPOs and Comparison with Other Banks ............................... 144
Table 22-B State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion).................................. 147
vii

Table 22-C Comparison of Assets Held by China’s Non-Bank Intermediaries (RMB billion)
..................................................................................................................................... 149
Table 23- A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World (01/01-12/31, 2010)
..................................................................................................................................... 152
Table 23-B China’s Bond Markets: 1990 – 2009 (Amount in RMB billion) ....................... 152
Table 24-A Types of Common Stock Issued in China......................................................... 159
Table 24-B Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China’s Listed Companies .................. 160
Table 25 Trading Volume of National Interbank Market ................................................... 205

viii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 Number of cases per million population, national average .................................... 8
Figure 2 Average Producer Property Rights Protection Index, 1997-2007.......................... 31
Figure 3 Foreign Exchange reserves flows and stocks ......................................................... 60
Figure 4 Balance of Payment of China .................................................................................. 70
Figure 5 reserve money and the broad money supply in China, ......................................... 71
Figure 6 Issuance of PBC bill.................................................................................................. 74
Figure 7 Bond outstanding as % of foreign reserves from Balance sheet of PBC ............... 74
Figure 8 required reserve ratio ............................................................................................. 77
Figure 9 Quarterly Change in Net Foreign Reserve and Net Domestic Reserve of Central
Bank of China................................................................................................................. 77
Figure 10 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression Perfect foresight .................... 88
Figure 11 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression Static Expectations ................ 89
Figure 12 Change in NFA VS. CPI ........................................................................................... 91
Figure 13 VAR: Impulse Response Function ......................................................................... 92
Figure 14 PBC bill: weighted monthly average..................................................................... 94
Figure 15 PBC's income VS. Sterilization Cost, long term bonds ......................................... 99
Figure 16 PBC's income VS. Sterilization Cost, medium term bonds................................... 99
Figure 17 Linear projection (projected exchange rate) ...................................................... 101
Figure 18 Overview of China’s Financial System ................................................................ 118
Figure 19-A Sources for Bank Deposits in China................................................................ 124
Figure 19-B Comparing Total Bank Credit extended to private/hybrid sectors ............... 125
Figure 19-C A Comparison of Assets Under Management of Insurance Companies ....... 147
Figure 20 A Comparison of Performance of Major Stock Indexes ..................................... 153
Figure 21-A Total Real Estate Investments and their sources (1996-2009)...................... 165
Figure 21-B Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China ............................................ 166
ix

Figure 21-C Growth Rats in Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China ................... 166
Figure 22-A: Comparing the growth of National Housing Prices and Disposable Household
Income ......................................................................................................................... 168
Figure 22-B: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Beijing .... 168
Figure 22-C: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shanghai 169
Figure 22-D: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shenzhen
..................................................................................................................................... 169
Figure 22-E: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Guangzhou
..................................................................................................................................... 170
Figure 23 Growth in China’s Mutual Fund Industry (1998-2009) ...................................... 175
Figure 24-A Comparing the Sectors – Industrial Output ................................................... 187
Figure 24-B Comparing the Sectors – Employment........................................................... 187
Figure 25-A Trends of Exchange Rates (US$, RMB, and HK$) ........................................... 202
Figure 25-B China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves ................................................................ 202

x

CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND JUDICIAL BIAS:
EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE CORPORATE LITIGATIONS
Haitian Lu
The Polytechnic University
Hong Kong

Hongbo Pan
Wuhan University
China

Chenying Zhang †
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania

1.1 Introduction
There has been increasing economic interest in the significance of political connections in
corporations, particularly in the context of emerging markets (Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, Khwaja
and Mian 2005, Fan et al. 2007). However, little of the work has paid attention to the
relationships between a firm’s political ties, its decision to seek protection from the judiciary,
and litigation outcomes. There are a number of reasons why trial outcomes matter for
corporations. In a market economy, courts serve as an important protective mechanism for
entrepreneurs to secure property rights and enforce contracts (McMillan and Woodruff 1999,
Frye and Zhuravskaia 2000). Litigation also has direct impacts on firms' shareholder wealth. Both
Bhagat et al. (1993) and Firth et al. (2010) concluded that defendant firms suffer losses upon
litigation announcements due to the potential of financial distress. Litigation is thus a direct yet
undocumented channel in the literature through which political connections may affect firm
values.

†

Corresponding author: Finance Department, the Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania,
3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Phone: 617-412-0955, E-mail: chezhang@wharton.upenn.edu.
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In this paper, we investigate how political connections affect trial outcomes based on
hand-collected data from 3,323 court rulings that include all litigations involving Chinese listed
companies during 1998-2010. More than 50% of our cases are loan related, making our findings
directly relevant to firms' financing decisions. Taking state ownership as a natural form of
political connection, we find that listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 1 (either as plaintiffs or as
defendants) win 8.6% more often at trial than non-SOEs. Using the personal ties of the top
managers in the non-SOEs as a second proxy for political connections, we show that connected
non-SOEs fare better than the unconnected ones in court rulings by 8.9%. However, personal
political ties do not serve as a perfect substitute for state ownership. We find that the
connected non-SOEs are still at a disadvantage compared to the SOEs.
If the politically connected firms have a higher win rate, then a potentially more
important question is through what channel do the political connections take effect. There are
two possible explanations: (1) connected firms are better able to acquire information about the
intrinsic merits of the case, which enables them to bring stronger cases to trial or (2) connected
parties play a direct role in setting the decision standard of the court. In the latter case, the
judge may overlook the case facts to rule in favor of the connected party, resulting in what we
define as judicial bias. The term judicial bias is used loosely here to refer to the judge exerting
varying levels of discretion over a case verdict that is not solely based on merits, and does not
necessarily indicate any unlawful activity. Nevertheless, political connections undermine the
base of the judicial dispute resolution in this situation, for the judge is no longer impartial.

1

As will be explained later, here we define SOE as a firm with the government as its ultimate shareholder.
These SOEs are publically listed companies whose stocks can be traded .

2

Empirically, it is hard to disentangle these two explanations since we cannot observe all
of the characteristics of a case. This paper represents a first attempt in the literature to
distinguish between those two possibilities. First, we argue that if the connected firms win more
often due to better information about case merits, their advantages should diminish among
cases with straightforward merits because it is equally easy for both the connected and
unconnected firms to discover the facts in those cases. However, using the types of suits 2 as a
proxy for the straightforwardness of case facts, we show that the connected firms win most
often in cases with simple facts, suggesting the influence of judicial bias but not information
asymmetry about merits.
Next, we find that better legal environments in a province lead to a lower win rate of
connected firms. We use whether a Chinese province was opened as a leased territory or treaty
port to foreign countries in the late Qing dynasty as an exogenous proxy for better local legal
environments to address the reverse causality concern. Since the leased territories and treaty
ports were set up more than a hundred years ago, their establishment should not affect a
judge's ruling today. However, the establishment of the leased territories and treaty ports is
likely to have a long-term positive impact on the local legal institution development by
introducing the Western-style laws at an early stage. Similarly, using the exogenous local
governor turnovers caused by circumstances such as sudden death as a proxy for periods of
weakened local political connections, we show that weaker connections also lower the win rate
for connected firms. Moreover, the win rate of locally connected firms is higher when the case is
tried in their home province. These findings suggest that the higher win rate of connected firms
can be attributed to biased courts.
2

I.e., loan suits, sales and purchase contract suits, tort suits, and others.
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The higher win rate of connected firms has a real impact on shareholder wealth. Using an
event study, we find that a winning firm has a five-day average market-adjusted cumulative
abnormal return that is 50 basis points higher than that of a losing firm. Because an adverse
verdict is often associated with future financial losses, the markets react upon receiving the
news.
We see three contributions of this research. First, our work belongs to an increasing
volume of literature on the impact of political connections on firm performance. It has been
documented that corporations enjoy various benefits associated with political connections,
including favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001, Morck et al. 2005) and
access to resources such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian 2005, Faccio 2006), which ultimately
increase firm values (Roberts 1990, Fisman 2001, Claessens et al. 2008, Johnson and Mitton
2003). On the other hand, Fan et al. (2007), Yuan (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2008) found that
political connectedness may destroy firm values. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
prior study has demonstrated direct evidence of how political connections play a role in court
decisions; nor have we seen a connection between litigation outcomes and shareholder wealth.
This paper adds to the literature by offering a missing channel through which political
connections can increase firm values.
Second, our study adds new evidence on formal and informal institutions that secure
property and contractual rights. It draws from the emerging law and finance literature on the
role of political connections in a transitional economy (La Porta et al. 1997, Allen et al. 2005, Fan
et al. 2007). In countries with fewer constraints on politicians and elites, the government is
more likely to violate the property rights of private producers and seek benefits for the interest
4

groups (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Political ties then become necessary for companies to run
businesses when they cannot rely on the legal system to secure property rights (Li et al. 2008).
This paper provides evidence that though SOEs receive favorable rulings in court, the judicial
bias against non-SOEs can be partially corrected by the personal political ties of their top
managers.
Our work also extends the large body of literature on the economic analysis of litigation
behavior by incorporating the often-neglected judicial bias factor to the well-cited Priest/Klein
framework (Priest and Klein 1984), which assumes that the decision between settlement and
litigation is solely based on information asymmetry about case merits. In the Priest/Klein model,
it is suggested that two parties take a case to court because they have divergent information on
case merits. Where parties are symmetrically informed about merits, they tend to settle instead
of litigate. Built on this hypothesis, Hylton (1993, 2002) argued that when parties are not
symmetrically informed about the case merits, the party with informational advantage will have
a more precise estimate about the likelihood of success at trial. Consequently a higher-than-50%
win rate should be observed for the party with an informational advantage if the dispute finally
goes to trial 3. Our paper builds on this literature by analyzing litigation outcomes in a large,
emerging market, proposing that the determinants of court outcomes should not be confined
only to the parties’ respective perceptions of the case merits, but also incorporate at least their
prediction on the direction and extent of judicial bias. We present empirical evidence that
judicial bias alone leads to a higher win rate of the favored party.

3

Empirical evidence on this is mixed. Kessler et al. (1996) gave a review of the findings from the U.S.
courts. Evidence outside the U.S. has been limited (Ramseyer and Nakazato 1989).

5

Though we use China as a case study in this paper, our findings are relevant to other
countries, especially those with a socialist and civil law origin. The proposed tests to distinguish
judicial bias from information asymmetry about case merits can be readily applied under other
legal systems. Finally, the judicial bias we document imposes an additional litigation risk on the
multinational companies participating in the Chinese market, which are of increasing
importance as globalization accelerates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides the institutional
background of the legal reforms in China. Section 1.3 presents the data. Section 1.4 outlines
the empirical methodology and displays the results. Section 1.5 further supports our results with
robustness checks, and Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2 Legal Reform, Political Ties and Judicial Bias: A Review of China
The Chinese legal reforms have been the subject of intense scholarly interest in the West.
Existing legal studies have mainly covered the administrative cases (Pei 1997) and economics
cases (He 2007), most of which focused on historical reviews of the evolution of the related law
and its implementation. Quantitative evidence remains scarce. The reforms started in 1978
when Deng Xiaoping emerged as the de facto political leader of China following the death of
Mao Zedong in 1976. The role of the legal system at first was to bring order and stability to
political and social life after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China’s
phenomenal economic development and corresponding rapid social changes have dramatically
increased pressures on courts to cope with the problems that other government agencies have
failed to resolve. Legal reform became a government priority in the 1990s as a result of the
6

increasing global exposure. To provide a trust worthy legal environment for the incoming
foreign investments, the government has devoted enormous resources to revamp its legal
institutions, putting major efforts in the rationalization and strengthening of the legal structure.
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided at the Fifteenth Party Congress to
“promote judicial reform” in 1999, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced a five-year
reform plan to build a “fair, open, highly effective, honest, and well-functioning” judicial system.
“Fairness” was highlighted as the “essence” of judicial reform and has been the central theme
since then. The SPC completed the second five-year plan between 2004 and 2008. During that
time, documents were issued by the SPC demonstrating a cautious awareness of the importance
of bringing greater professionalism, independence, and integrity to the judiciary.
Improvements resulting from the legal reform are obvious. New Western-style laws
were introduced, and existing laws were amended for more comprehensive and fair coverage.
For example, the 1994 Administrative Procedure Law was introduced to allow citizens to sue
officials for abuse of authority or malfeasance. The trademark law has been modified and used
more extensively as a result of increasing concerns over violations of intellectual property rights
of foreign corporations in the early 1990s. In late 2005 a largely rewritten Company Law was
adopted, radically increasing the role of courts. A new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was
promulgated in 2006, which in many aspects resembles the modern bankruptcy law in
developed countries. As of 2008, China has roughly 200,000 judges, 160,000 procurators
(prosecutors), and 150,000 lawyers. Over 600 law departments and law schools send out several
hundred thousand graduates 4 every year. There is a development of a legal services market as

4

Thirty Years of Chinese Legal Reform, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4th, 2008.
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well. Foreign lawyers have accompanied foreign capital and their clients to China, which has had
an immense influence on the promulgation of new Chinese laws, especially in regard to
intellectual property, and corporate and securities laws.
The reform also has awakened citizen’s inherent demand for court services. This change
in China can be described as a transformation from a former “acquaintance society” (Fei 1948)
to an arm’s length one. In an acquaintance society, the courts play a less important role as
networks and reputations play a dominant role in directing economic activities. However, the
use of courts as a forum for dispute settlement increases as a result of the prevalence of
impersonal and contractual relations (Vago 2006). Figure 1 shows the number of civil, criminal
and administrative cases filed in China has been increasing from 1990 to 2008 on a per million
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Figure 1 Number of cases per million population, national average

This figure shows how the number of cases per million population changes across the years. The left hand side y-axis
is for the number of civil and commercial cases, and criminal cases. The right hand side y-axis is for the number of
administrative and criminal cases.
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Source: The Law Yearbook of China (1990-2009), published by China Law Society

Despite the growing demand for court services, court impartiality is still a primary
concern of the public, especially when citizens are acting against the government or its affiliated
enterprises (Chen 1995). Lubman (1999) indicated that the laws and court systems in China still
serve more as a top-down instrument of Party control than as a framework to facilitate private
transactions. Howson (2010) reviewed more than 1000 Company Law-related disputes between
1992 and 2008 in Shanghai and concluded that there is significant momentum toward the
competence and autonomy of the People’s Courts. However, the path toward autonomy is
inconsistent; sometimes a development is followed by setbacks. As of today, litigation is still
hampered by local governments and judicial corruption 5. It is not clear whether the legal system
has achieved its goal of fairness at the completion of the second five-year program.

1.3 Data Description
1.3.1 Variable of Interests
The obligation of Chinese listed companies to disclose their involvements in the lawsuits
and arbitrations is stipulated in Chapter 11.1 of the Listing Rule of the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange, respectively 6. The WIND database, a leading Bloomberg-style data provider in

5

In March 2004, the Procurator-General Jia Chunwang admitted, "the procurators at all levels had not done
enough to check the problems of unfairness in the implementation of laws " (Firth et al. 2010).
6
According to the Listing Rule, a company must disclose its involvement in litigation/arbitration if the
litigation/arbitration stake (of a single case or accumulative cases within 12 month) is over RMB 10 million
($1.54 million) and over 10% of the company’s net assets, based on the company’s last audited report. For
litigations/arbitrations whose stake amount below the above threshold, the Board should also disclose if in
their opinion such case would have a significant impact on the company’s securities. See Chapter 11.1 of

9

China, collects information on all Chinese listed firms that have reported their involvements in
the lawsuits, either as plaintiffs or as defendants, by reproducing the original unprocessed texts
from the companies’ disclosure reports. We read through all of the case reports and hand-code
useful information such as the nature of the disputes (type of suit), the parties in question, the
claimed stake, the trial outcomes, the level of the courts, and others. Given that a large
proportion of the appealed cases do not have information on final rulings, We only consider the
verdicts from the first rulings 7. Our final sample consists of 4,089 cases filed by listed firms
between 1998 and 2010 8.
Another variable of major interest in this study is the political connection status of a
company. Previous literature has proposed different measures for connections, including the
chief executive officer (CEO)'s contribution in an election (Khwaja and Mian 2005, Claessens et
al. 2008), firms' affiliations to large business groups (Fisman 2001), and whether the board has
current/past politicians as members (Faccio 2006, Fan et al. 2007, Boubakri et al. 2008, Li et al.
2008). In China's case, one analogous aspect to consider is whether the firm has the government
as its controlling shareholder. State ownership creates a natural connection with the
government for the company and provides benefits such as immunity from bankruptcy. The
heads of the SOEs are often important members in the communist party, which characterizes
them as politicians. Though the privilege of SOEs may have been restricted due to a series of
financial and legal system reforms in China, anecdotal evidence suggests that SOEs enjoy
Listing Rule of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (1998) and Listing Rule of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(1998).
7
In China, the success rate of appeal is extremely low. The lower level of courts tend to report and “seek
opinion” from their upper courts in making decisions in the first instance, especially when the stake of a
case is significant. Therefore, even if the case is appealed, the upper court will generally not alter the
decision of the lower court.
8
We choose 1998 as the starting year because this is when the listing rules requiring mandatory disclosure
of litigations were promulgated, both on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.
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advantages over non-SOEs when dealing with the government 9. For our purposes, we define a
listed company to be an SOE if the ultimate holder of the company is the local (at least at a city
level) or central government as recorded in CSMAR, another leading Chinese data provider.
For non-SOEs, closer bonds to the authority may be established by hiring CEOs or
directors who formerly held positions in the local or central governments (See Calomiris, Fisman,
and Wang 2009 and Fan et al. 2007 for documentations on politically connected CEOs). We thus
argue that for non-SOEs, CEO or directors' personal ties with the government can serve as an
alternative measure for the firm's political connection.
To test this, we collect data on CEO or directors' previous employment histories of the
non-SOEs. We consider a non-SOE as politically connected if the company’s CEO or director is or
was a government official (at least a leading official of a division, i.e., Ke Zhang) or a leader of
the People’s Congress, or the People’s Political Consultative at either the national or regional
level. We first use the firm's annual reports to identify its top managers, and then we refer to
the WIND database, which has some records on whether the top manager of a listed firm has
held positions in the government or in the communist party. For those CEOs/directors whose
information is missing, we search on internet. If there is no evidence suggesting that the
CEO/director was previously connected to the government, we then conclude that the
CEO/director is not politically connected. Sometimes, especially for CEOs/directors who are
recently appointed, the information is harder to trace because they tend to hide their previous

9

For instance, in 2011, China started a reform in the steel industry with the target to "increase the global
competitiveness of the steel industry." The reform plans to shutdown less efficient steel productions to
solve the long standing problem of excess production capacity in China. In reality, however, the reform
simply leads to massive acquisitions of non-state-owned steel companies by large SOEs such as Bao Gang
and An Gang. The small scale non-SOEs, which may not necessarily be less efficient, have virtually no
other choice but being acquired by a large SOE.
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relationship with the government to avoid undesired publicity. Under other circumstances,
government officials may not sit on the board, but instead would have someone act on their
behalf. We are aware of the potential selection bias here: it is possible that some CEOs/directors
are actually connected but successfully hid the information from the public. However this bias
makes it harder for us to detect whether the politically connected CEOs have a positive impact
on the firm's win rate. If we can correct for the bias, our results will only be stronger.
Finally we collect financial and stock data for each company from CSMAR and WIND,
and match the financial data at the end of the last year to the cases that are tried in this year.
Since a majority of the counterparties in the suits are not listed, their financial information
cannot be retrieved. We do, however, include a variable for the ownership statuses of the
counterparties wherever available, which we obtain from the internet. Since the status of
political connection of a firm is the core of our paper, not controlling the counterparty’s state
ownership status would be an important miss. We further exclude the following five types of
cases from our sample: (1) cases which were not tried in the Chinese courts, including cases
heard by foreign courts and arbitration, (2) non-civil cases, including criminal and administrative
cases, (3) cases which were withdrawn by the plaintiffs in the first trial, (4) cases which were
settled during the first trial, and (5) cases for which court judgments were not disclosed.
Matching the litigations, political connections and financial data reduces our final
sample size to a total of 3,323 cases, including 2,004, or 60% cases involving SOEs. Our sample
has 714 distinct firms, with 502, or 70% SOEs. Many firms are repeated players in court,
generally for similar reasons, such as loan disputes. Banks, in particular, may repeatedly sue
other firms for over-due loans. We control for this factor in our later regression. In terms of the
12

geographical distribution, the cases are widespread across the regions. Guangdong and
Shanghai are the two provinces with the largest total number of cases between 1998 and 2010,
while Shanghai and Hainan have the highest litigation rate on a per million person basis.
Panel A of Table 1 gives a summary of our final sample on the number of litigations each
year, classified by suit types. We divide the suits into four types: (1) bank loans, (2) non-bank
loans (3) sale/purchase and other contracts, (4) right infringement and other tort cases10. Cases
related to loan and debt payment account for the majority of the litigations, but we see a variety
of types of suits.
The number of tried cases reached its peak in 2005, and then dropped to a low level in
2010. This can be attributed to the banking reform propelled by the Chinese government in
2004, in which the big state banks launched their IPOs. The banks must write off the nonperforming loans on their balance sheets to meet the listing criteria, leading to an increased
number of the loan suits. Since 2007, the government started implementing several reforms on
the financial market, including the stock reform that completes the conversion of all the nonfloating shares to floating ones, and a new accounting standard that is enforced on listed firms.
The number of litigations drops during the transition period. Moreover, the Chinese government
has been actively advocating the idea of building a "harmonious society" since 2005 under the
Hu Jintao administration. The ideology pursues a society with balance and harmony, resulting in
a significant drop in the number of litigations after 2005.

10

A loan case here does not necessarily involve only the lender and the borrower. Disputes between a loan
guarantor company and the borrower are also categorized under type 1 or 2. Type 4 includes torts such as
civil tort on false statements in the securities market, disputes over trust management contract, and assets
transfer and product liability.
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Table 1 Distribution of suit types
This table presents the distribution of different type of cases. Cases are divided into four types: (1) bank
loans, (2) non-bank loans, (3) sales/purchase and other contracts, and (4) right infringement and other
torts.

Panel A: Number of cases by suit types
The panel presents distribution of different type of cases across between 1998 and 2010. The numbers in
bold are the numbers of the cases of a particular suit type as percentage of the total cases in a year.
Suit
type
1
2
3
4

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Total

16
38.1
6
14.3
12
28.6
8
19.0

36
32.4
22
19.8
40
36.0
13
11.7

106
45.7
44
19.0
79
34.1
3
1.3

76
35.8
47
22.2
87
41.0
2
0.9

92
41.3
38
17.0
83
37.2
10
4.5

90
39.3
47
20.5
85
37.1
7
3.1

184
46.6
73
18.5
128
32.4
10
2.5

275
55.9
44
8.9
160
32.5
13
2.6

228
54.4
65
15.5
111
26.5
15
3.6

167
39.7
70
16.6
158
37.5
26
6.2

56
25.9
31
14.4
101
46.8
28
13.0

58
23.6
34
13.8
118
48.0
36
14.6

24
28.2
16
18.8
35
41.2
10
11.8

1408
42.4
537
16.2
1197
36.0
181
5.4

42

111

232

212

223

229

395

492

419

421

216

246

85

3323

Total

Panel B: Distribution of cases across ownership
The panel presents the distribution of different types of cases across SOEs and non-SOEs. P/D ratio is the
ratio of the number of plaintiffs over the number of defendants..
Suit type

SOE

non-SOE

Total

1
2
3
4

Plaintiff
2
119
452
66

Defendant
673
201
428
63

P/D ratio
0.30%
59.20%
105.61%
104.76%

Plaintiff
3
46
80
30

Defendant
730
171
237
22

Combined
0.41%
26.90%
33.76%
136.36%

Total

639

1365

46.81%

159

1160

13.71%

1408
537
1197
181
3323

Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of cases, classified by state ownership status.
The SOEs tend to be plaintiffs more often, and non-SOEs are more likely to be involved in the
loan suits as defendants. We see good presences of both SOEs and non-SOEs in each suit type.
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1.3.2 Control variables
Our choice of control variables follows the literature convention. The control variables
include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profitability as measured by operating
profit (EBIT), whether the disclosing firm was the plaintiff, whether the disclosing firm was
involved in more than four other litigations in our sample, whether the case was tried at a
higher level court, and the disputable amount.
Larger firms may have more abundant resources, such as better legal staff to help them
win the case. Leverage ratio and cash ratio are used as proxies for the firms’ solvency. Cutler and
Summer (1988) and Bhagat (1994) both concluded that the risk of financial distress may be
exacerbated around the time of litigation. Profitability is controlled because the court may favor
firms that make pivotal contributions to the regional economy. A plaintiff dummy is included
because previous literature (Klein and Priest 1994, Hylton 1993, 2002) indicated that the
plaintiff usually has an information advantage in case merits, which leads to a higher probability
of winning. We control for whether the firms are repeated players in court because we want to
make sure that our result is not driven by the firms’ familiarity with the legal procedure. The
choice of four repetitions is somewhat arbitrary. Using ten as the threshold does not change our
results.
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Table 2 Summary statistics
This table gives summary statistic of the main variables in the paper. Win is a dummy which equals 1 if the
disclosing firm wins the case. Plaintiff is a dummy that equals 1 if the disclosing firm is the plaintiff.
Ln(asset) is the natural log of the firm's total book asset as measured in RMB. Leverage is the leverage
ratio calculated by total leverage/total asset. Cash ratio and operating profit are measured likewise.
Otherparty_nonSOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the counterparty is a non-SOE. Repeated_player is a
dummy that equals 1 if the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations. High court is a
dummy that equals 1 if the case is tried at a higher level court. Amount is the disputed amount measured
in 10,000 RMB.
*The maximum and minimum of the dummy variables are not presented here since it is always 1 and 0.
Full Sample

number of observation

Non-SOE subsample

SOE

non-SOE

connected
CEO/Director

Unconnected
CEO/Director

2004

1319

1020

299

Win

Mean
Stdev

0.37
0.48

0.18
0.18

0.19
0.39

0.17
0.38

Plaintiff

Mean
Stdev

0.32
0.46

0.14
0.35

0.10
0.36

0.30
0.35

Mean
Max

20.79
24.87

20.15
22.80

20.19
22.41

20.14
22.80

Ln(asset)

Leverage

Cash Over Asset
Ratio

Operating Profit
Over Asset

Min

14.94

12.31

17.36

12.31

Stdev

1.00

0.99

0.82

1.04

Mean
Max

0.93
8.50

2.54
82.55

1.77
43.08

2.82
82.55

Min

0.02

0.05

0.05

0.07

Stdev

0.96

2.63

3.46

28.82

Mean
Max

0.10
0.64

0.07
0.59

0.07
0.54

0.07
0.59

Min

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Stdev

0.09

0.82

0.08

0.08

Mean
Max

0.002
0.75

0.01
1.06

0.006
0.45

0.006
0.64

Min

-0.22

-2.51

-0.54

-0.25

Stdev

0.61

0.16

0.10

0.17

Otherparty_nonSOE

Mean
Stdev

0.40
0.49

0.35
0.48

0.40
0.49

0.34
0.47

Repeated_Player

Mean
Stdev

0.69
0.50

0.62
0.48

0.64
0.48

0.53
0.50

High Court

Mean
Stdev

0.15
0.33

0.12
0.32

0.09
0.28

0.12
0.33

Disputable Amount

Mean
Max

3635.71
1197464

3095.56
152000

3059.02
152000

3291.94
150000

Min

0.06

1.00

2.58

1.00

Stdev

30702.42

8111.62

7344.23

11407
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A variable for the higher level court is included because the court level is associated with
unobserved case characteristics. For a similar reason, the disputable amount of a case is
included. Under the Chinese law, cases involving high monetary damages, or cases deemed as
influential or complicated are stipulated to be tried at a higher level court. A case can be
considered "complicated” for many reasons, such as the involvement of a sensitive industry or
firms located in multiple cities. We also include the ownership status of the counterparty in the
litigation. If there is judicial bias, then the disclosing firms are more likely to win if they face a
non-SOE. To control for the regional development, we include the fixed effect for provinces
where the trial takes place. Finally, we control for the fixed effects for industry, year, and suit
types.
Table 2 shows summary statistics of SOEs and non-SOEs in the first two columns. Our
sample consists of more SOEs than non-SOEs. Consistent with the conventional belief, SOEs are
of slightly larger size, but the difference in size is not significant. The average firm size as
measured by book asset is 152 million USD in our sample, which is also the average size of listed
firms in China during the sample period. Not surprisingly, SOEs have a higher win rate, and are
more likely to be plaintiffs. They are also more likely to be repeated players in courts, probably
due to their comfort with the legal system. Non-SOEs have higher leverage, lower cash-to-asset
ratios, and higher profits. Finally, SOEs are more likely to face a non-SOE counterparty in the suit,
and are slightly more likely to have their cases tried at a higher level court with larger disputable
amount. Neither of the above two discrepancies is statistically significant.
The last two columns of Table 3 divide the non-SOE subsample to firms with and
without politically connected CEOs/directors. Less than 20% of non-SOEs do not have a
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connected CEO/director. The proportion of connected CEOs/directors in our sample is higher
than that reported in Fan et al. (2007). The discrepancy can be explained by a different sample
period and different set of firms covered by the study. Moreover, Fan et al. (2007) only
considered the political connection of the CEOs, while our data include the directors as well. In
our sample, the unconnected non-SOEs are comparable to the connected ones in most financial
measures, except that they have higher leverage ratios. Firms with politically connected
CEOs/directors have a higher win rate, and are more likely to be repeated players. However the
average win rate of non-SOEs with politically connected CEOs/directors is still lower than the
average win rate of SOEs.

1.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we first use the state ownership as a proxy for political connections to
show that connected firms have higher win rates than unconnected ones. We apply several tests
to draw the conclusion that the difference in the win rates is driven by court’s political bias
rather than parties’ information asymmetry about case merits. We find that the advantage of
the connected firms diminishes if the case is tried in provinces with better local legal
environments. The local SOEs owned by the provincial governments receive additional benefits
in court if they have the cases tried locally, and suffer a drop in the win rate if the cases are tried
during periods of weak local connections. Using the subsample of non-SOEs, we then illustrate
that our results hold when the personal political ties of CEOs/top directors are used as an
alternative measure of political connections. However, the personal connections of
CEO/director cannot serve as a perfect substitute for state ownership. Finally, we demonstrate
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that winning firms enjoy higher cumulative abnormal stock returns than losing firms when the
verdict is announced.

1.4.1 Judicial Bias and Case Merits
This subsection uses state ownership as a proxy for political connection. We first
examine whether political connections are associated with higher win rates, using state
ownership as a proxy for political connections. We regress the trial outcome on the ownership
status of the firm. Though the dependent variable is binomial, we choose a linear model over a
logit model, because the linear model is unbiased and imposes much fewer restrictions on the
data structure. More importantly, a linear model enables us to get a clear interpretation of the
coefficients of interaction terms, while a logit model would not allow us to measure the average
marginal effect of a variable in the interaction term (Norton et al. 2004).
Our base line regression is:

Wini = α + β1SOEi + β ' Controlsi + ε i

(1)

where i is the unique case id number. ε is the noise term estimated using clustered standard
error at a province level. Win is a dummy variable that equals one when the disclosing firm wins.
We define plaintiff winning as the plaintiff firm getting the full or partial amount of the
compensation it requests 11. SOE is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm's ultimate
owner is the government. The control variables have been discussed in the previous section. The

11

We define defendants winning when the plaintiff loses the case. There are very few partial compensation
cases.
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coefficient β1 measures the average difference in the win rates between the SOEs and the nonSOEs.
Table 3, Panel A presents the regression result in the first column under Model 1. The
main finding is that SOEs have a win rate that is 8.6% higher than non-SOEs, confirming our
conjecture that SOEs enjoy a higher probability of winning in courts than non-SOEs.
The results on control variables are mostly in line with our expectations. Larger firms
and plaintiff firms are more likely to win. Leverage ratio enters insignificantly. Firms with a high
cash-to-asset ratio or profitability have a higher winning probability, since the court may want to
favor the firms which make significant contributions to the regional economy. Interestingly,
repeated players have a lower probability of winning, for they may bring weaker case to court
due to their comfort with the legal system or their over-confidence in favorable trial results.
Whether a case was appealed, the court level, and the disputable amount have no impact on
the win rate. A final important observation is that the disclosing firm is more likely to win if the
counterparty is a non-SOE, further confirming the claim that non-SOEs are at disadvantage in
court.
Having established that SOEs win more often, we need further evidence that the higher
win rate of SOEs are pursuant to the political preference of courts. The major challenge is to
distinguish the claim of judicial bias from the alternative explanation that the SOEs bring
stronger cases to court. When a firm is faced with a potential dispute as a plaintiff or as a
defendant, it has the choice to settle. If the SOEs can choose the best cases based on case merits
to take to court and settle the rest while the non-SOEs cannot, then the SOEs will have a higher
win rate in the absence of the judicial bias. Indeed, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the
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distribution of suit types is different across SOEs and non-SOEs, implying that the choice of tried
cases is not random. An ideal way to deal with that is controlling for every aspect of case
characteristics, which are often unobservable. Hence, we propose an alternative test to
distinguish the story of judicial bias from the explanation that the SOEs are more capable of
spotting the stronger cases.
Specifically, we investigate judicial bias on cases with different levels of potential
information asymmetry about merits. A case is only taken to trial if the two conflicting parties
have a big enough divergence in the expectations on the trial outcome. Without judicial bias,
the divergence in expectation stems from information asymmetry about the case merits
between the two parties. Namely, the two parties possess different information or different
interpretations of the information on case facts, which leads to their divergent expectations
over a ruling. Some firms may have a superior ability to collect and process information to
others, which enables them to predict the trial outcomes more precisely. On the other hand,
firms will only agree to go to trial if they think there is a reasonable chance of winning. If the
SOEs have better information on case merits in general, they can present a higher proportion of
favorable cases to the court, resulting a higher win rate in the absence of judicial bias. Moreover,
this difference in the win rates caused by an information advantage should be the greatest on
cases whose facts are complicated and hard to retrieve, for a superior ability to acquire
information would make the greatest difference in those cases. On the other hand, the
difference in the win rates should diminish when the case merit is straight-forward, which does
not require either party to devote resources in information collection. In fact, in the absence of
judicial bias, if parties have little information asymmetry on the case merit, they would settle
instead of litigate, as in the Priest/Klein model. Cases with clear-cut facts tend to be settled
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before they reach the court.
Judicial bias, however, has drastically different implications. When judicial bias is
present, cases may be taken to court due to different information over case merits, or different
expectations over a judge's bias. If the two parties are not symmetrically informed on the
direction and degree of judicial bias, the party with informational advantage on judicial bias will
have a more rational estimate about the likelihood of success at trial, and consequently has a
higher chance of winning than the opposite party does. Especially for those cases with clear-cut
facts, the only reason to bring such a case to court instead of settling is that one party is relying
on the judge's bias to get a ruling in its favor, while the other party does not fully realize the
existence or the extent of the judicial bias. On the other hand, even when there is no judicial
bias, a complicated case may still be brought to court purely because of the divergent
information on intrinsic case merits. Empirically, this means that among all of the cases that are
taken to trial, we should observe judicial bias to be more prevalent among cases with more
straightforward case merits.
The existing law and economics literature has attributed the types of suit (e.g., property
rights, contract, tort, etc.) to the extent of information asymmetry between parties on case
merits (Waldfogel 1995, Shavell 1996, Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999). Parties may
systematically have different information about facts of a dispute, in ways that vary across suit
types. For example, it is commonly argued that information asymmetry on infringements case is
large because defendants know their own actions, while plaintiffs do not. This type of
information asymmetry makes less sense in a contracts case, since the relevant actions by the
defendant are typically observed by both parties. Following this strand of thought, we propose
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to use the types of suits as a proxy for the levels of potential information asymmetry about
intrinsic case merits. For the empirical test, we first eliminate the 67 cases in the sample that
involve countersuing, because those cases may have specific complications that are
independent of the suit type. This leaves us with a sample of 3,256 suits.
We then categorize the four types of suits into three case levels, according to how
straightforward the case facts are or, in other words, according to the level of potential
information asymmetry about case merits. The contract-based cases (suit types 1-3) in general
have less information asymmetry about merits than the tort cases (suit type 4). Unlike a tort
case, in a contract case, the two parties involved in contracts must have had previous
interactions with each other before the trial. There is also more hard information available for
inspection, such as the content of the contract, the balance sheets of the firms, and product
certificates. Among the contract cases, we define suit type 1 and 2, the loan cases as Case Level
1, which are the cases with the most straightforward case facts. In the loan cases, the obligation
of repayment only falls on one party. The performance of repayment is clearly defined and easy
to prove. Both parties know exactly what happened, and there is little room for unknown
information.
We define suit type 3, the purchase/sale and other contract cases, as Case Level 2. The
potential level of information asymmetry of this category falls between the loan cases and right
infringement cases. Other types of contracts are usually less complete than a loan contract.
They may involve agreements on different aspects of the product quality, or the maintenances
of an office building, which cannot be specified comprehensively. Moreover, in those cases
obligations fall on both parties. One party's fulfillment of obligation is dependent on the other
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party's performance of the contract. There is usually more hidden information compared with a
loan case.
Finally, we define right infringement and other tort cases (suit type 4) to be Case Level 3
with the largest potential information asymmetry about case merits. The tort cases involve a
breach of civil duties, but not contract duties. It requires the proof that the existence of duty is
reasonable, and that the causation between the duty and the damage is direct. Without explicit
contracts, the implicitly assumed duties are hard to prove and open to interpretation. Moreover,
a major proportion of tort cases in our sample are right infringement cases. Those cases are
often the so-called "stranger" cases in the sense that the plaintiffs usually do not have any
interaction with the defendant until the dispute arises. It is hard for the plaintiffs to retrieve
information on what the defendant did, or for the defendant to retrieve information on what
the plaintiff is able to prove, especially given the fact that most of the information is internal.
Without judicial bias, information advantage on intrinsic case merit would make a significant
difference in predicting the trial outcomes for Case Level 3. We also control for whether the
case was appealed, since the decision to appeal for a case is related with the potential
complication of the case facts.
Applying our previous argument, we expect to observe that cases with clear-cut facts to
exhibit higher judicial bias, which is positively correlated with the favored party’s win rate. On
the other hand, if the difference in the win rates is caused by information asymmetry on case
merits, we should see the information advantage to be magnified on cases with more
complicated facts. To test the hypothesis we run the following regression:
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Wini = α + β1SOEi + β 2 Case _ level _ 2i × SOEi + β 3Case _ level _ 1i × SOEi
+ β 4Case _ level _ 2i + β 5Case _ level _ 1i + β ' Controlsi + ε i

(2)

where Case_level_1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the case is of Case Level 1.
Case_level_2 is defined likewise and Case_level_3 is omitted.

β1 measures the average

difference in the probability of winning between the SOEs and the non-SOEs for the cases with
the most potential information asymmetry on case merits. β 2 and β 3 measure how the
difference in the win rates is affected when we switch from Case Level 3 to Case Level 2 and
Case Level 1, respectively. If the story of judicial bias is true, both

β 2 and β 3 are expected to

be greater than 0.
In Table 3, Panel A, Model 2, we present the result corresponding to Equation 2. Both
Case_level_2 and Case_level_1 have positive coefficients when they are interacted with SOE. By
switching from tort cases to contract cases, the difference in the win rates between the SOEs
and the non-SOEs has an additional increase of 2.4%. The additional bias associated with
switching from tort cases to loan cases is even larger at 5.1%. A t-test on the coefficients of the
interaction terms finds that their difference of 2.7% is statistically significant at a 5% level. The
SOEs enjoy larger advantages on cases with less potential information asymmetry about merits,
which supports the story of judicial bias and goes against the alternative explanation that SOEs
are better at identifying strong cases based on case merits. The control variables keep the same
signs as in Table 3 Panel A, Model 1.
There is the legitimate concern that the above result is driven by the lender
characteristics in the loan suits, since the loan suits account for the majority of the sample. If the
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lenders tend to win regardless of the judicial bias, and our sample consists of mostly state
owned banks which are lenders, then we would observe a higher win rate of SOEs for Case Level
1. To rule out this possibility, we run the same regression with the subsample of only defendant
firms, and include a bank dummy that equals one if a bank is involved in the suit. Since lenders
are almost always on the plaintiff side, using the defendant subsample ensures that our result is
not driven by state-owned lenders winning the case.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3, Panel A present the results. Again, the SOEs have a higher
win rate than the non-SOEs. The bias is more prominent on cases with less potential information
asymmetry about merits. The difference between the coefficients of Case_level_1*SOE and
Case_level_2*SOE is positive and statistically significant.
Another related concern is that bank loans may have special characteristics. For example,
if some of the bank loans are policy loans made to support certain SOEs, those SOEs may get
preferential treatments in courts. To deal with the problem, we eliminate all the bank loans and
repeat the same test. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3, Panel A present the result. Our main findings
from the full sample stay unchanged. The SOEs have an average win rate that is 8% higher than
the non SOEs. The advantage of the SOEs is the largest on the loan cases, creating a difference in
the win rates of more than 10% (calculated as 0.062+0.042).
Finally, we refine the case categories to get clearer contrasts on the level of potential
information asymmetry about case merits. Based on our four suit types, we further divide the
loan cases into cases that only involve banks either as lenders or borrowers (very rarely), and
cases involving guarantor companies or loan cases between two non-bank companies. The
lender-borrower cases involve the simplest type of obligations, and bank loans have well26

defined repayment schedules. A case with guarantor companies may be more complicated
because it involves a third party other than the lender or the borrower.
We then exclude all of the tort cases that are not infringement cases from Case Level 3,
because the infringement cases are more likely to be "stranger" cases in which there is no
previous interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. On the other hand, in a tort case
such as a trade secret leakage case by a former employee, the two parties have some past
relationships, and it is less clear whether those cases are exposed to more information
asymmetry on case merits than the contract cases.
Using refined Case Level 1 to include only bank loan cases and refined Case Level 3 to
include only infringement cases and leaving the Case Level 2 intact, we run the regression
specified in Equation 2 again with a bank dummy. The results are presented in Table 3, Panel B.
The SOE still has a positive and significant coefficient. The two interaction terms between the
case categories and SOE are of larger magnitudes as compared to the coefficients in Panel A. In a
bank loan case, an SOE can have a win rate which is 17% higher than that of a non-SOE. One
factor that might have contributed to such a significant discrepancy is that banks are more
reluctant to fight an SOE due to its connection to the government. As we refine the case
categories, the message from the previous regressions stay the same.
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Table 3 Judicial bias and information asymmetry on case merit
The two panels report how the state ownership affects the trial outcomes. The dependent variable is the trial
outcome, which equals 1 if the disclosing firm wins. SOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is state owned.
Case_level_n (where n=1, 2, or 3) is a measure for the potential information asymmetry on case merits. Case_level_1
consists of loan cases. Case_level_3 consists of tort cases which has the highest level of potential information
asymmetry. Case_level_2 consists of other contract cases. The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit:
RMB), leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profit ratio, whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is
involved in more than 4 other litigations (Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the
disputable amount. We also include dummies for appeal, whether the counter-party is a non-SOE
(Otherparty_nonSOE), the fixed effects of province, industry, year, and suit types. We estimate the robust standard
errors clustered by the provinces.

Panel A

SOE

Full Sample
Model 1
Win
0.086***
(0.014)

Case_level_2*SOE
Case_level_2
Case_level_1*SOE
Case_level_1
Bank Dummy
Ln(asset)
Leverage
Cash ratio
Operation profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Appeal
Otherparty_nonSOE
Suit type
Other controls*
Observation
R-square

--0.036**
(0.006)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.575***
(0.054)
0.109***
(0.041)
0.447***
(0.014)
-0.073
(0.013)
0.039
(0.027)
0.195***
(0.013)
Yes
X
3323
0.38

Model 2
Win
0.050***
(0. 016)
0.024***
(0.007)
0.016
(0.029)
0.051***
(0.016)
-0.054*
(0.029)
--0.018***
(0.006)
0.0000
(0.0004)
0.594***
(0.078)
0.098***
(0.041)
0.331***
(0.013)
-0.049***
(0.014)
0.004
(0.807)
0.152***
(0.016)
No
X
3256
0.42

Defendant subsample
Model 3
Model 4
Win
Win
0.052***
0.039***
(0.014)
(0.019)
0.063***
(0.014)
-0.296*
(0.140)
0.083***
(0.014)
-0.221*
(0.117)
-0.163
-0.060
(0.169)
(0.149)
0.005
0.005
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.0001
-0.0001
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
0.418***
0.355**
(0.085)
(0.084)
0.025
0.056
(0.038)
(0.039)
-----0.073
0.017
(0.013)
(0.014)
0.049**
0.024
(0.024)
(0.016)
0.094***
0.045***
(0.017)
(0.017)
Yes
No
X
X
2528
2496
0.18
0.19
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Non-bank loan subsample
Model 5
Model 6
Win
Win
0.084***
0.062**
(0.032)
(0.018)
0.027**
(0.013)
-0.034
(0.047)
0.042***
(0.006)
0.004
(0.043)
----0.015**
0.019*
(0.008)
(0.011)
-0.0001
-0.0002
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
1.022***
0.669***
(0.076)
(0.189)
0.034
0.021
(0.036)
(0.093)
0.575***
0.390***
(0.021)
(0.020)
-0.041*** -0.042***
(0.015)
(0.017)
-0.038
0.019
(0.027)
(0.016)
0.117***
0.113***
(0.018)
(0.031)
Yes
No
X
X
1897
1863
0.44
0.38

Panel B Subsample with refined case categories
This panel refines the three case categories presented in panel A. Case_level_1_R consists of loan cases only involving
banks as either the lenders or the borrowers. All the cases that involve guarantor companies are deleted.
Case_level_2_R consists of other contract cases. Case_level__3_R consists of infringement cases only. Case_level_3_R
is omitted. The rest of the variables are defined as in Panel A.

SOE

Model 1
Win
0.061***
(0.017)

Case_level_2_R*SOE
Case_level_2_R
Case_level_1_R *SOE
Case_level_1_R
Bank Dummy
Ln(asset)
Leverage
Cash ratio
Operation profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Appeal
Otherparty_nonSOE
Suit type
Other controls*
Observation
R-square

0.073
(0.121)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.870***
(0.073)
0.101***
(0.041)
0.458***
(0.021)
-0.042***
(0.015)
0.027
(0.018)
0.136***
(0.019)
Yes
X
2768
0.36

Model 2
Win
0.058**
(0.029)
0.091*
(0.049)
-0.083*
(0.045)
0.110*
(0.061)
-0.061
(0.047)
0.036
(0.113)
0.019**
(0.008)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.828***
(0.074)
0.101***
(0.041)
0.291***
(0.016)
-0.039***
(0.015)
0.037
(0.028)
0.148***
(0.019)
No
X
2768
0.37

In both panels, ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered
standard errors.
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1.4.2 Judicial Bias and Legal Environments
In the following sections we go beyond each case idiosyncrasy to present more
empirical evidence in support of our claim of judicial bias. The first set of tests we run are
concerned with the development of provincial-level legal institutions. We conjecture that the
local legal institutions affect the extent of judicial bias against unconnected firms, because poor
property rights protection is the fundamental reason that the SOEs enjoy unjustified benefits. If
the difference in the winning probability is caused by a bias against non-SOEs, then it should be
less prominent when the case is tried in a region with a better legal environment. Moreover, the
alleviation of the judicial bias should be more significant on cases with more straightforward
case facts, as those are the cases with the largest potential for judicial bias.
To our advantage, China’s economic reform in the past 30 years has necessitated the
establishment of an almost entirely new set of economics institutions. These institutions have
been developed at a varying pace across different regions of China (Xu 2009, Ayyagari et al.
2010), partly due to divergent regional economic policies and the significant autonomous power
of the local governments. Such heterogeneities in the legal institution developments across time
and regions in China have offered unique opportunities for us to examine the connection
between legal institutions and judicial bias in a panel-like setting 12.
The variable we use to measure the development of the local legal institutions is the
Producer Property Rights Protection Index at the provincial level taken from the Marketization
Index for China’s Provinces. It is a widely used index that measures province-level market and

12

Technically speaking, we do not have a panel data set here; we only have observations of firms which are
involved in litigations. There are multiple observations in each province each year, but a particular firm
may only appear once.
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legal developments and is jointly published by the National Economic Research Institute and
China Reform Foundation annually. The Producer Property Rights Protection Index is
constructed based on three components: the number of economics cases filed every year
normalized by the regional GDP, the extent to which the local regulations emphasize the
protection of non-SOEs, and some firm level survey evidences. A high score in the index
indicates a better regional legal environment. We choose this specific measure instead of the
more widely used overall marketization measure because our study puts an emphasis on the
court’s discrimination based on the ownership status of the firm. In regions of better property
rights protection, the non-SOEs face less government exploitation, which might translate to a
more fair court system.

12

Prpperty right index
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Figure 2 Average Producer Property Rights Protection Index, 1997-2007
This figure gives a summary of the Producer Property Rights Protection Index across the provinces. A higher index
score means the province has better property rights protection.
Source: Marketization Index for China's Provinces (1997-2008), published by National Economic Research Institute
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The most updated Marketization Index covers all of the provinces from 1997 to 2007.
We match the cases after 2008 with the index value of 2007. Using the average index value
between 1997 and 2007 instead does not have a significant impact on our results. Figure 2 gives
a summary of the average Producer Property Rights Protection Index across the provinces.
There is regional heterogeneity even within the more developed regions. Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangdong have high Index scores while places like Chongqing have a low score, consistent with
the anecdotal evidence that the Chongqing autonomous city has suffered from abuse of
administrative power.
We match the Producer Rights Protection Index from the previous year to the year
when the case was tried and the province where the case was tried 13, and run the following
regressions:

Wini = α + β1 SOEi + β 2 Lag _ legali + β 3 SOEi × Lag _ legali + β ' Controlsi + ε i

(3.1)

2

Wini = α + β1 SOEi + β 2 Lag _ legali + ∑ β n+ 2 SOEi × Lag _ legali × Case _ level _ ni
n =1

2

2

+ ∑ β n+ 4 SOEi × Case _ level _ ni + ∑ β n+6 Lag _ legali × Case _ level _ ni
n =1

n =1

2

+ β 9 SOEi × Lag _ legali + ∑ β n+9 Case _ level _ ni + β ' Controlsi + ε i

(3.2)

n =1

where lag_legal is the lagged Producer Rights Protection Index from the province where the
case was tried. In Regression 3.2, our variable of main interest is the triple interaction term of
SOE, lagged legal index, and case category, which allows us to test whether the alleviation of
bias varies with different levels of potential information asymmetry on case merits.
13

Under most circumstances it's the location of the defendant. Sometimes the plaintiff may be able to have
the case tried in its home province.
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Table 4 Judicial bias and legal institutions
This table reports how the local legal institutions affect the win rate of the SOEs. The dependent variable is the trial
outcome. SOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is state owned. Case_level_n (where n = 1, 2, or 3) is a measure for
the potential information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_1 consists of cases with the lowest level of potential
information asymmetry. We use two proxies for local legal environments (the legal variable). In the first two columns,
we use Lag_legal, which is the lagged producer rights protection index. In the last two columns, we use port_lease,
which is a dummy that equals 1 if a province was forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or leased territory.

SOE
legal
SOE* legal
Case_level_2*SOE
Case_level_2
Case_level_1*SOE
Case_level_1
Case_level_2* legal
Case_level_1* legal
Case_level_2* Legal*SOE
Case_level_1* Legal*SOE
Ln(asset)
Cash ratio
Operating profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Otherparty_nonSOE
Suit type
Province fixed effects
Other Controls*
Observation
R-square

legal proxy 1: Lag_legal
Model 1
Model 2
Win
Win
0.073***
0.063**
(0.014)
(0.026)
0.042
0.061
(0.045)
(0.040)
-0.019*
-0.021
(0.008)
(0.018)
0.034**
(0.014)
-0.077
(0.132)
0.041**
(0.017)
-0.041
(0.168)
0.015
(0.024)
-0.016
(0.029)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.009**
(0.003)
0.021***
0.019*
(0.007)
(0.010)
0.795***
0.631***
(0.065)
(0.187)
0.118***
0.036
(0.046)
(0.092)
0.488***
0.396***
(0.017)
(0.018)
-0.062***
-0.045***
(0.014)
(0.019)
0.177***
0.106***
(0.015)
(0.031)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
X
X
3323
3256
0.41
0.40
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legal proxy 2: port_lease
Model 3
Model 4
Win
Win
0.057**
0.024*
(0.024)
(0.013)
0.011
-0.021
(0.039)
(0.025)
-0.043*
-0.055**
(0.024)
(0.025)
0.006
(0.041)
0.093
(0.078)
0.013
(0.013)
-0.048
(0.050)
-0.011
(0.105)
-0.058
(0.104)
-0.021*
(0.011)
-0.043
(0.031)
0.033***
0.027***
(0.008)
(0.010)
0.317***
0.660***
(0.058)
(0.179)
0.123***
0.013
(0.046)
(0.009)
0.471***
0.394***
(0.017)
(0.019)
-0.052***
-0.039**
(0.014)
(0.018)
0.136***
0.111***
(0.016)
(0.030)
Yes
No
No
No
X
X
3323
3256
0.41
0.42

The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit: RMB), leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profit ratio,
whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations
(Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the disputable amount. We also include
dummies for appeal, whether the counterparty is a non-SOE (Otherparty_nonSOE), and the fixed effects of industry,
year, suit types, and province (or regional GDP). We estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces.
***, **,* are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The numbers in parenthesis are clustered standard errors.

We use the lagged index to mitigate the concern of reverse causality. Even though our
measure of the legal index does not explicitly take into account judicial bias at the court level, it
is possible that the behaviors of the courts may have an impact on the regional legal index. For
instance, if the court becomes unbiased, the SOEs may be more reluctant to bring up a suit,
because they are less confident of winning. The number of economics cases would drop as a
result, which affects the legal index. We do not claim to completely solve the issue of reverse
causality by using the lagged index. We argue that, as the main purpose of this paper is to prove
that the high win rate by the SOEs is caused by the bias, the reverse causality here is not our
major concern. The fact that a smaller win rate of the SOEs may have translated into a better
legal index but not the other way around still lends support to our claim that the high win rate
of the SOEs is associated with court bias. Nevertheless, we will tackle the problem of reverse
causality directly later in the section.
The first two columns in Table 4 present the regression results. Model 1 corresponds to
Equation 3.1. As we expected, the SOEs have less chance of winning if the case is tried in
provinces with higher Producer Property Rights Index scores. The interaction term has a
significant coefficient of -1.9%, indicating that the difference in the winning probabilities
between the SOEs and the non-SOEs decreases by 1.9% if the trial province’s legal environment
index increases by 1, which is the difference between Guangdong province and Heilongjiang
province, and is slightly smaller than one standard deviation of the legal environment index
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across provinces. As the legal environment improves, the court becomes more independent in
decision making, which in turn alleviates the discrimination against unconnected firms. The
negative bias on the non-SOEs is less prominent in the regions with better legal environment,
though it is not fully corrected. Moreover, Model 2 shows that the drop in the win rate is more
prominent for cases with straightforward case merits, further distinguishing our story of judicial
bias from the competing explanation of information asymmetry about case merits.
To formally address the problem of reverse causality, we employ an exogenous proxy
for the local legal environments inspired by Fan, Wang, Zhang (2010): whether a province was
forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or a leased territory after the first Opium War in
the Qing dynasty. After the first Opium War in 1842, China was forced to sign several treaties
with foreign countries to establish treaty ports or setup leased territories in some of its
provinces 14. The setup of the treaty ports and leased territories increased China’s openness and
promoted business contact with the rest of the world. Foreign courts were set up in those areas
to handle disputes involving foreigners, and the local court’s jurisdiction was restricted. Since
these treaty ports and leased territories were opened over 100 years ago, how a court rules an
individual case now cannot have had any direct relation to their creation. However, as Fan,
Wang, and Zhang (2010) argued, the establishment of these ports and territories is likely to have
long-term impacts on the local legal institution development.
We create a dummy variable port_lease that equals one if the province was forced to

14

The treaty ports are located in Anhui, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hubei, Jiangsu,
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Xinjiang, Zhejiang. The locations of the leased territories
include Tianjin (1860), Shanghai (1845), Jiangsu (1863), Zhejiang (1896), Anhui (1877), Jiangxi (1861),
Fujian (1861), Shandong (1889), Guangdong (1857), Chongqing (1901) and Hubei (1861). (Taken from Fan,
Wang, and Zhang 2010).
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open as a port or became a leased territory, and use the port_lease dummy directly in place of
the legal index by running the regression:
2

Wini = α + β 1 SOE i + β 2 port _ leasei + ∑ β n + 2 SOE i × port _ leasei × Case _ level _ ni
n =1

2

2

+ ∑ β n + 4 SOE i × Case _ level _ ni + ∑ β n + 6 port _ leasei × Case _ level _ ni
n =1

n =1

2

+ β 9 SOE i × port _ leasei + ∑ β n + 9 Case _ level _ ni + β ' Controls i + ε i

(4)

n =1

The underling theory is that the opening of the treaty ports and leased territories had a
positive impact on the local legal environment by introducing the Western-style laws at an early
stage. The port_lease dummy has a positive correlation of 0.539 with the legal index. We use
the opening of ports and leased territories as an exogenous positive shock to the regional legal
environments. It is a noisy proxy in the sense that though these provinces on average have
higher legal indices, some of them (such as Xinjiang province) may have relatively poorer legal
environments today due to other historical reasons.
The results are presented in Table 4, Model 3 and Model 4. Here we take out the province
fixed effects because the port_lease dummy is a province-level variable that is not time-varying.
Provincial gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included as a control of regional economic
development. The win rate of the SOEs drops by 4.3% in the provinces that were forced to open
as treaty ports and leased territories. The decrease is larger on cases with more straightforward
case facts, as demonstrated in Model 4. Both of the triple interaction terms between SOE, case
category, and the port/leased territory dummy have the right negative signs. The interaction
term Case_level_2*port_lease*SOE

is

significant,
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but Case_level_1*port_lease*SOE is

insignificant due to the noise. The regression results support our previous argument that the
judicial bias is reduced in regions with better local legal environments.
As a further robustness check, we also employ a two stage least square (2SLS) method.
In the first stage, the Producer Rights Index of a province is regressed on two instruments: the
port_lease dummy, and the latitude of the province. We interact the two instruments with the
SOE dummy and use the variables to instrument for the interaction term of the Producer Rights
Index and SOE. Latitude of a province (measured at the center of the province's capital city) is
included as an instrumental variable to capture the geographic feature of a region, since a
region's latitude has a great effect on its climate and weather. It has been argued that natural
environment puts restrictions on the institution development (Acemoglu 2005). The 2SLS leaves
our findings largely unchanged 15.
1.4.3 Judicial Bias and Local Connections
The second set of tests makes use of the distinction between national SOEs and local
SOEs. A national SOE is owned by the central government, while a local SOE is owned by a
provincial or city level government. There are 1,089 cases involving local SOEs in our sample.
Compared with the national SOEs, the local SOEs’ political connections are constrained by their
geographic locations. A local SOE in one province is likely to be favored by the local court, but
may not necessarily enjoy the same benefit if the trial takes place elsewhere. Thus, we should
observe more bias favoring a local SOE if the case is tried in its home province. The related
regression is:

15

Results are not reported here for conciseness. Tables are available upon request.
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Wini = α + β 1 SOEi + β 2 Home_provincei + β 3 LSOE i
+ β 4 LSOEi × Home_provincei + β ' Controls i + ε i

(5.1)

where LSOE is a dummy variable for local SOE and Home_province is a dummy which equals one
if the case is tried in the home province of the disclosing firm.
Furthermore, the strength of local political connections is likely to be affected when
there is a turnover of the provincial governor. A change in the provincial governor is usually
followed by turnovers of other provincial and city level officials, since new governors would
want to promote people closer to them. The governor turnover thus significantly weakens, if not
destroys, the existing connection a local SOE has with the current local government. During this
period, the control of the old political power has dissolved while the influence of the new
political power has yet to be established. Even if the governor turnover is expected, there are
only limited things a local SOE can do to secure a new connection in advance, since there is
uncertainty over who will be the successor. The national SOEs are less exposed to this problem,
because they can rely on the central government.
Under normal circumstances, such turnovers of governors would again expose us to a
reverse causality problem. The decision of the reappointment of a governor can depend on
various political and economic factors during the governor's tenure. However there are a few
exceptions; sudden death is an obvious one. Moreover, according to the regulation on the
appointment and selection of party leaders in China, provincial governors have a term of 5 years
and can be reappointed only once. By the end of the 10th year in office, governors have to be
transferred to a different position. Another regulation is that government leaders have to step
down once reaching the age of 65. These are the three exceptional circumstances where the
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turnovers can be considered to be exogenous. In particular, we denote that a province has an
exogenous regime shift if its governor or its provincial party secretary leaves the office for the
following reasons: sudden death, reaching the 10th year of tenure, and surpassing the age of 65.
Among the 173 total governor turnovers we document across the provinces between 1997 and
2010, 46 of them are defined as exogenous. There are 255 cases in 14 provinces which
happened during the exogenous regime shifts.
Exogenous reappointment of new provincial leaders represents a shock to the local
political environment. This is a period when the local government has the least interference
over court decisions, and when the local SOEs benefit the least by having the trial in their home
provinces. In fact, the average number of locally tried cases involving local SOEs drops from the
sample average of 6 per year per province to 2.5 per year per province during the exogenous
leader changes, indicating that the local SOEs are indeed more reluctant to participate in
litigations during the governor turnovers. Eliminating the cases which are tried during
endogenous leader changes, we are left with a sample of 2,038 cases to run the following
regressions:

Wini = α + β1SOEi + β 2 LSOEi + β 3 Leader _ changei + β 4 LSOEi × Leader _ changei
+ β ' Controlsi + ε i

(5.2)

Wini = α + β1SOEi + β 2 LSOEi + β 3 Leader _ changei + β 4 LSOEi × Leader _ changei
+ β 5 Home _ provincei × Leader _ changei + β 6 LSOEi × Home _ provincei
+ β 7 LSOEi × Home _ provincei × Leader _ changei + β ' Controlsi + ε i

(5.3)

where LSOE and Home_province are defined as before. The variable Leader_change is a dummy
variable that equals one whenever there is an exogenous province leader change. In Equation
5.3, our main interest is in the triple interaction term of Home_province, LSOE, and
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Leader_change. We test whether the leader switch has a larger detrimental impact on the local
SOEs when the case is tried in the local SOE's home province.
Table 5 Judicial bias and local connections
This table reports the regression results of how the local state-owned enterprises enjoy additional benefits when the
cases are tried in their home provinces. The dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables
include the following: a SOE dummy for state owned firms, a LSOE dummy for firms owned by the provincial or lower
level government. Home_province is a dummy that equals 1 if the case is tried in the disclosing firm's home province.
Leader_change is a dummy that equals 1 whenever there is an exogenous provincial governor turnover.
Model 1
Win
0.064**
(0.029)
0.005
(0.029)
0.028**
(0.014)
-0.016
(0.020)

SOE
LSOE
LSOE*Home Province
Home Province
Leader Change

Model 2
Win
0.038**
(0.019)
0.011
(0.028)

0.017
(0.036)
-0.048**
(0.023)

LSOE* Leader Change
Leader Change*Home Province
LSOE*Home Province* Leader Change
Ln(asset)

0.035***
(0.006)
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.669***
(0.063)
0.124**
(0.042)
0.396***
(0.012)
-0.067***
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.016)
0.195***
(0.014)
X
3323
0.36

Leverage
Cash ratio
Operating profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Appeal
Otherparty_nonSOE
Other controls
Observation
R-square
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0.023**
(0.006)
0.0000
(0.0004)
0.512***
(0.066)
0.098**
(0.042)
0.349***
(0.012)
-0.054***
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.016)
0.196***
(0.017)
X
2038
0.37

Model 3
Win
0.043**
(0.020)
0.031
(0.030)
0.030
(0.026)
0.026
(0.017)
-0.018
(0.051)
-0.053
(0.050)
0.067
(0.053)
-0.047*
(0.025)
0.025**
(0.006)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.107***
(0.047)
0.097**
(0.042)
0.342***
(0.012)
-0.050***
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.016)
0.196***
(0.014)
X
2038
0.38

The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, operating profit, whether the disclosing
firm is the plaintiff, and whether the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations (Repeated_player). We
also include the ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE) and the appeal status of a case. We
estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces. Other control variables include: high court dummy,
disputable amount, type of suits, province dummy, industry, and year controls. None of these are significant.
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.

Regression results are presented in Table 5. Model 1 shows that besides the average
favor a SOE receives, a local SOE enjoys a 2.8% increase in the win rate when the case is tried in
its home province. Model 2 demonstrates that the judicial favor on the local SOEs diminishes by
4.8% as a result of local political regime switches. Model 3 includes the triple difference term
with a negative coefficient, implying that the local SOEs having their cases tried at the local
provinces suffer higher than average drops in the win rates during the provincial leader
turnovers, which is what we would expect if the advantage of the SOE is caused by judicial bias.
The interaction term between LSOE and Home_province is still positive in Model 3. The
interaction term between local SOE and leader change remains negative, but becomes
insignificant. The impact of leader changes on the local SOEs is concentrated on the cases tried
in their home provinces.

1.4.4 Self-Established Political Connections by Non-SOE and Judicial Bias
Up to this point in our research, we have used only the state ownership as a proxy for
political connections and have shown that the non-SOEs suffer discrimination in court decisions.
Facing such a disadvantage, the non-SOEs seek other means to compete with the SOEs. One of
the most widely used methods is to rely on the personal networks of their top managers. To be
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specific, the non-SOEs can hire CEOs or directors who have previously held positions as leading
government officials. This kind of personal tie helps firms establish some insider connections
with the government and gain political advantages, and is commonly observed in emerging
markets. Faccio (2006) studied listed firms in 47 countries and found that political connections
are prevalent among listed firms. Both Cull and Xu (2004) and Li et al. (2008) did work
specifically on China and found that in regions with a less developed market and weaker legal
system, firms are more likely to have connected CEOs/directors.
Based on our previous observations, we conjecture that the non-SOEs with CEO/director
connections have an advantage in court compared with those non-SOEs without connections.
The CEO/director connection here is only defined within the subsample of non-SOEs because
the SOEs are connected by default through their ownership statuses. Tests in this section only
involve the subsample of non-SOEs, proposing an alternative measure of political connections
and at the same time mitigating the potential concern that the difference in the win rates
between SOEs and non-SOEs is caused by some unobserved dissimilarities, but not by political
connections.
We first re-estimate the regressions as in Table 3 using the subsample of all the non-SOEs,
replacing the SOE dummy with a dummy of CEO/director connection, which equals one if the
firm’s top official (CEO or director) is previously affiliated with the government.
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Table 6 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and case merit information asymmetry
This table reports the regression results of how the personal connection in a non-SOE affects the trial outcomes. The
dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables include the following: CEO/DIR connection is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a CEO/director who was previously connected to the government.
Case_level_n (where n = 1, 2, or 3) is a measure for the potential information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_1
consists of loan cases, which has the lowest level of potential information asymmetry. Case_level_3 consists of tort
cases, which has the highest level of potential information asymmetry. Case_level_2 consists of purchase/sales
contract cases which lie in between. Case_level_3 is omitted. We also include the interaction terms of Case_level_n
with CEO/DIR connection. The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset) with asset measured in RMB), leverage
ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profitability, whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more
than 4 other litigations in our sample (Repeated_player), and whether the case was appealed. We also include the
ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE). Other control variables include: high court dummy,
disputable amount, type of suits, province dummy, industry and year controls. None of those are significant.

CEO/DIR connection
Case_level_2
*CEO/DIR connection
Case_level_2

Full sample
Model 1
Win
0.089**
(0.041)

Case_level_1
*CEO/DIR connection
Case_level_1
Bank Dummy
Ln(asset)
Leverage
Cash ratio
Operating profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Appeal
Otherparty_nonSOE
Suit type
Other Controls
Observation
R-square

0.017*
(0.010)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.590***
(0.135)
0.105*
(0.064)
0.489***
(0.027)
0.190
(0.142)
0.057***
(0.024)
0.077***
(0.021)
Yes
X
1319
0.32

Model 2
Win
0.026***
(0.001)
0.065***
(0.026)
0.039
(0.091)
0.137***
(0.024)
-0.067**
(0.024)
0.035
(0.024)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.731***
(0.295)
0.066
(0.131)
0.366***
(0.041)
0.200
(0.141)
0.058***
(0.024)
0.076*
(0.045)
No
X
1304
0.33

Only Defendant
Model 3
Model 4
Win
Win
0.063**
0.039*
(0.028)
(0.020)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.004
(0.010)
0.081***
(0.024)
-0.035
(0.054)
-0.130
-0.140
(0.151)
(0.171)
0.007
0.008
(0.009)
(0.009)
0.000
-0.0000
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
0.033***
0.112**
(0.019)
(0.050)
-0.027
-0.030
(0.051)
(0.050)
-----0.008
-0.001
(0.011)
(0.017)
0.063***
0.065***
(0.019)
(0.020)
0.075***
0.041**
(0.025)
(0.021)
Yes
No
X
X
954
947
0.07
0.08

***, **,* are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.
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Table 6 presents the test results, using the first definition of Case Levels. Non-SOEs with
connected CEOs/directors win with higher probabilities. The bias is more significant on cases
with less potential information asymmetry, which is demonstrated by the positive coefficients of
the terms Case_level_2*CEO/Dir_Connection and Case_level_1 *CEO/Dir_Connection in Model 2.
Model 3 and Model 4 use subsamples of defendant firms. As seen previously, the results in the
first two columns are not driven by the lenders winning the cases. A t-test confirms that
Case_level_2*CEO/Dir_Connection has a coefficient that is smaller than the coefficient of
Case_level_1 *CEO/Dir_Connection in both Model 2 and Model 4. We also perform the test
under the refined definition of Case levels, and the results still hold 16. The control variables keep
the original signs, though some of them become insignificant.
Next we test the implications of local legal environments. As before, we expect the
judicial bias to be alleviated in regions with more developed legal institutions. In the first column
of Table 7, improved legal environment exerts a correcting force on the bias and makes the
connected firms less advantageous, though the magnitude of correction is not as big as in the
full sample case. In Model 2, the decrease in the win rate of the connected firm is the greatest
on cases with the most straightforward case facts (Case Level 1). In Model 3 and Model 4 we
directly add the dummy for the opening of ports or leased territories in place of the legal index
to confirm the results. The difference in the win rates drops by 5.8% in the provinces that were
forced to open as treaty ports or leased territories. We also perform a 2SLS and the results are
largely unchanged. Results are not presented here for conciseness.

16

Results are available upon request.
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Table 7 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and legal institutions
This table reports how the local legal environments affect the connected non-SOEs' win rate. The dependent variable
is the trial outcome. CEO/DIR connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a CEO or a director who
was previously connected to the government. Case_level_n (where n=1,2,or 3) is a measure for the potential
information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_3 consists of cases with the highest level of information asymmetry.
We use two proxies for local legal environments (legal variable). In the first two columns, we use Lag_legal, which is
the lagged producer rights protection index. In the last two columns, we use port_lease, which is a dummy that
equals 1 if a province was forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or leased territory.

CEO/DIR conn.
legal
CEO/DIR conn.* legal
Case_level_2* CEO/DIR conn.
Case_level_2
Case_level_1* CEO/DIR conn.
Case_level_1
Case_level_2* legal
Case_level_1* legal
Case_level_2* Legal* CEO/DIR conn.
Case_level_1* Legal* CEO/DIR conn.
Ln(asset)
Cash ratio
Operating Profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Otherparty_nonSOE
Province fixed effects
Other Controls:
Observation
R-square

legal proxy 1: Lag_legal
Model 1
Model 2
Win
Win
0.011*
0.039*
(0.007)
(0.016)
0.008***
0.009***
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.006***
-0.007**
(0.002)
(0.002）
0.015
(0.016)
0.191
(0.134)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.042
(0.090)
-0.047
(0.041)
0.021
(0.041)
-0.015***
(0.002)
-0.069***
(0.023)
0.012
0.023**
(0.015)
(0.008)
-0.003
0.004
(0.005)
(0.003)
0.104*
0.088*
(0.057)
(0.029)
0.335***
0.276***
(0.020)
(0.027)
-0.062***
-0.037**
(0.014)
(0.019)
0.067***
0.121***
(0.028)
(0.035)
Yes
Yes
X
X
1319
1304
0.37
0.38
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legal proxy 2: port_lease
Model 3
Model 4
Win
Win
0.072**
0.056**
(0.026)
(0.027)
0.052***
0.027
(0.020)
(0.065)
-0.058*
-0.057
(0.031)
(0.069)
0.034**
(0.015)
-0.096
(0.184)
0.094
(0.064)
0.211
(0.158)
0.076
(0.054)
-0.024
(0.089)
-0.013
(0.017)
-0.029***
(0.008)
0.019***
0.024**
(0.007)
(0.008)
0.736***
0.477***
(0.062)
(0.121)
0.075*
0.102*
(0.040)
(0.058)
0.487***
0.287***
(0.016)
(0.027)
-0.068***
-0.029
(0.014)
(0.020)
0.077*
0.132***
(0.061)
(0.018)
No
No
X
X
1319
1304
0.35
0.36

The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit: RMB), leverage ratio, cash to asset ratio, profit ratio,
whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations
(Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the disputable amount. We also include
dummies for appeal, whether the counter-party is a non-SOE(Otherparty_nonSOE), the fixed effects of industry, year,
suit types and province (or regional GDP). We estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces.
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.

We further divide the sample to firms whose CEOs or directors are locally connected and
whose CEOs or directors have political connections outside their local provinces. There are 625
cases involving locally connected non-SOEs. We expect the firms with local connections to enjoy
extra benefits if their cases are tried locally. We also expect the exogenous local governor
turnovers to have a negative impact on the win rate of locally connected firms. Within the nonSOE subsample, we have 167 cases tried during exogenous provincial leader changes.
Table 8 presents the results. Model 1 shows that the locally connected firms receive
extra favors from the courts when the cases are tried locally. Model 2 demonstrates that the
change in the local governor has a negative impact on the win rate of the locally connected nonSOEs. During the regime switch, the difference in the probabilities of winning between locally
connected and unconnected non-SOEs drops by 7.1%. Column 3 shows that the additional
advantage enjoyed by the locally connected firm in the local courts diminishes during the time
of leader change, consistent with our full sample results.
The impacts of other control variables are of the same direction and comparable
magnitude with the full sample case. However, the Leader_change dummy has a significant
negative coefficient now, as contrary to the full sample case. During the regime switch, an
average non-SOE is less likely to win in court. This can be explained by an overall uncertainty
caused by the governor turnover, which affects non-SOEs more severely than SOEs.
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Table 8 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and local connections
This table reports the regression results of how the local state-owned enterprises enjoy additional benefits when the
cases are tried in their home provinces. The dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables
include the following: a CEO/DIR connection dummy for connected firms, a LConnection dummy local connection.
Home_province is a dummy that equals 1if the case is tried in the disclosing firm's home province. Leader_change is a
dummy that equals 1 whenever there is an exogenous provincial governor turnover.
The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, operating profit, whether the disclosing
firm is the plaintiff, and whether the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigation (Repeated_player). We
also include the ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE) and the appeal status of a case. Other
control variables include: high court dummy, disputable amount, province dummy, industry, and year controls. None
of those are significant.

CEO/DIR connection
LConnection
LConnection * home province
home province
Leader Change

Model 1
Win
0.071*
(0.033)
0.022
(0.042)
0.045**
(0.021)
-0.023
(0.026)

Model 2
Win
0.028*
(0.011)
0.032
(0.022)

0.021**
(0.012)
0.0003
(0.000)
-0.961***
(0.102)
0.111**
(0.048)
0.478***
(0.027)
-0.022
(0.019)
0.015
(0.020)
0.072***
(0.023)
X
1319
0.38

0.013
(0.012)
0.0002
(0.0003)
-0.412***
(0.004)
0.111**
(0.049)
0.386***
(0.028)
0.011
(0.018)
0.022
(0.020)
0.087***
(0.025)
X
919
0.41

LConnection* Leader Change
Leader Change* home province

-0.087***
(0.031)
-0.071**
(0.031)

LConn. * Leader Change* home province
Ln(asset)
Leverage
Cash ratio
Operating profit
Plaintiff Dummy
Repeated_player
Appeal
Otherparty_nonSOE
Other Controls
Observation
R-square

Model 3
Win
0.013***
(0.004)
0.043
(0.032)
0.032**
(0.015)
0.038
(0.023)
-0.084
(0.063)
0.071
(0.051)
-0.078
(0.058)
-0.025**
(0.012)
0.022**
(0.013)
-0.0005
(0.002)
-1.153***
(0.117)
0.106**
(0.048)
0.575***
(0.031)
-0.019
(0.023)
0.022
(0.020)
0.074***
(0.028)
X
919
0.64

***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.
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1.4.5 Self Established Political Connections vs. State Ownership
The question asked next is whether the CEO/director connections of non-SOEs can
completely eliminate their disadvantages against the SOEs. If this is the case, then the non-SOEs
are able to level the playing field without any formal policy interference. Since the majority of
the non-SOEs have some form of political connections, we may conclude that only a small
fraction of the privately owned firms suffer the judicial bias. To test this, we use the subsample
of all of the SOEs and politically connected non-SOEs to re-run the main regression Equations 1,
2, and 3.1. We find that the connected non-SOEs are still more likely to lose compared to the
SOEs, though the coefficient is of a smaller magnitude (6.8%) compared to the full sample case.
The non-SOEs' disadvantages still diminish as potential information asymmetry on case merits
gets smaller, but the local legal index no longer has a significant impact on the win rate of the
SOEs. We do not present the full table here for conciseness. The overall message is that our
main findings hold in the subsample only including connected non-SOEs, but the impact of
political connections is weaker due to the self-established political ties.

1.4.6 Effect of Litigation Outcomes on Stock Performances
Previous literature has shown that litigation announcements have negative impacts on
listed firms' stock prices (Bhagat et al.1994, Firth et al. 2010) due to the potential financial
distress. Among others, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Garber and Adams (1998) analyzed the
impacts of product liability verdicts on firm values in the United States. However, no existing
literature has looked at the wealth impact of the court rulings across all suit types. Like product
liability cases, most inter-corporation lawsuits involve considerable monetary compensations. If
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the market reacts to the potential financial distress brought by litigation announcements, it
should also react to the realized losses of the losing firms once the uncertainty in the verdict is
resolved.
In this section, we provide a succinct test to examine the effect of trial outcomes on the
firm's stock prices. We show that market responds differently to favorable and adverse rulings.
The judicial bias against unconnected firms has a real wealth impact on the firms.
To examine the market impact of court rulings, we employ an event study method and
collect the dates on which the disclosing firms announces the trial outcome and treat it as the
event date. The announcement date is usually within a couple months after the verdict date.
Though the verdict is already made, the court makes no effort to make the information
publically available. Given that many lower level courts do not have well maintained websites,
the best most courts can do is to post the verdicts on the bulletin boards outside, which makes it
essentially impossible for the non-local investors to get timely information. Moreover, under
certain circumstances, 17 listed firms are allowed to postpone revealing their involvements in
pending litigations until the verdicts come out. Some firms choose to do so. Not able to know
that firms are involved in litigation, the investors are unlikely to pay attention to particular
courts’ bulletin boards. As a result, while insiders may hear about the ruling right after (or even
before) the formal verdicts are released, most people learn about rulings from the disclosing
firms’ announcements.
Using a market adjusted model, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
over an event window of (1,5), which means that the CARs are measured from the day after the

17

E.g., when the compensation amount is below a threshold.
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announcement to 5 trading days afterward. The market beta of the stocks is calculated using
daily returns from the fiscal year just prior to the year in which the event occurs.
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the CAR on different subgroups. We divide our
sample to winning and losing firms. There are more losing firms in the sample. The winning firms
have an average CAR(1,5) of 0.12%, and the losing firms have an average CAR(1,5) of -0.47%.
Though as in Column 2,the t-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the winning/losing firm has a
higher/lower-than-0 CAR, a one tail t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the winning firm's CAR
is smaller or equal to that of a losing firm at a 5% level (Column 5). The test confirms our
conjecture that the winning firm enjoys a better return. To take into consideration the possible
information leakage before the verdict announcement date, we also try an alternative event
window of (-2,2) (results not reported here). The difference between the mean CARs of winning
and losing firms is of the same sign and similar magnitude. However the standard error is larger,
and the one tail test is only significant at a 10% level.

Table 9 t-test on CAR(1,5)
This table compares the five-day CARs of the winning and losing firms after the firms’ verdict announcement date.
Column 1 is the number of observations. Column 2 is the equal weighted CAR. Columns 3 and 4 are the minimum and
maximum CARs. Column 5 is the t-test result of whether the CAR is statistically different between the two groups.
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Winning
(Win=1)
Losing
(Win=0)

1
Obs.

2
Mean

3
Min

4
Max

939

0.12%
(0.04)
-0.47%
(0.08)

-17%

26%

-23%

38%

2384
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5
diff. in mean
(winning-losing)
0.59%**
(0.10)

To formally test the market impact of the trial outcomes, we employ an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression:

CARi = α + β1 wini + β 2 Pol _ Conni + β ' Controls i + ε i

(6)

where Pol_Conn is a dummy for politically connected firms, measured by the state ownership
status of a firm or the CEO/director's personal connections in a non-SOE. The dependent
variable is CAR(1,5) around the event date. We run the test for both measures of political
connection. We also run separate tests for loan cases because those are the cases with the most
direct impact on firms' financing decisions.
The first column (all suit types) of Table 10 presents the results for the full sample. We
include the trial outcomes and other firm level control variables in the regression, while
controlling for province, suit type, industry, and year fixed effect as before. Consistent with our
t-test result from the summary statistic table, the win variable has a positive coefficient of
0.0053, which is significant at a 10% level. A 0.53% difference in stock returns translates to a 5.2
million RMB (0.66 million USD) difference in the shareholder wealth if multiplied by the average
total market value of all the firms in our sample. The ownership status, size, leverage, cash ratio
and profitability do not have significant impacts on the CAR, which should be expected as the
financial situation of a firm is observable before the trial outcome gets revealed. In the second
column we run the regression with only loan cases. The coefficient of win is again positive and of
comparable magnitude. A win on the loan cases generates a 5-day CAR that is 45 basis points
higher.
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Column 3 and 4 of Table 10 present the result within the non-SOE subsample. Again, the
winning firms have a 5 day CAR that is on average 0.5% higher than the losing firms have. The
result holds for the loan cases as well.
In conclusion, the trial outcome has a real impact on firms’ shareholder value. The
unconnected firms endure economic losses as a direct result of their lower chances of winning.
We report a new channel through which the unconnected firms could suffer a financial loss.

Table 10 Regression analysis on CAR(1.5)
The dependent variable CAR is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of 5 days after the verdict
announcement. Win is the trial outcome, which equals 1 if the disclosing firm wins. SOE is a dummy variable, which
equals 1 if the firm is state owned. CEO/DIR connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a
CEO/director who is connected to the government. The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio,
operating profit, and cash-to-asset ratio. We also control for the fixed effects of province, suit types, industry, and
year.
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.

Win

Full Sample
All suit type
CAR(1,5)
0.0053*
(0.0022)

Loan Cases
CAR(1,5)
0.0045**
(0.002)

-0.0011
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.0004
(0.002)
0.002
(0.035)
0.011
(0.022)
Yes
X
3323
0.005

-0.0017
(0.009)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.0064
(0.0052)
0.007
(0.024)
No
X
1954
0.008

CEO/Dir Connection
SOE
lnasset
leverage
cash ratio
Operating Income
suit type
Other controls
Observation
R squared
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Non-SOE only
All suit type
CAR(1,5)
0.0049*
(0.003)
0.0011
(0.070)

Loan Cases
CAR(1,5)
0.0046***
(0.0011)
0.0018
(0.0019)

-0.001
(0.004)
-0.0003
(0.001)
-0.0005
(0.002)
0.001
(0.027)
Yes
X
1319
0.004

-0.004
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.0083
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.005)
No
X
784
0.003

1.5 Robustness Check
To alleviate possible omitted-variable bias, we add other control variables such as sales
growth, receivable/asset ratio, and whether the two parties involved in a suit were from the
same province. Our findings remain unchanged: sales growth enters insignificantly; receivable
ratio has a negative impact on the probability of winning for both SOEs and non-SOEs; and
having the two parties come from the same province does not have significant impact.
Additionally, we try different measures for the local legal environment. In particular, we
use an index of financial intermediary development and legal institution (Marketization Index
No. 7) instead of the Property Producer Rights Index. The results remain quantitatively
unchanged, and we will not report the results here for conciseness.
We also use leverage from bank loans as a proxy for firms’ political influence, following
Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010). Generally, higher leverage ratios imply that the SOEs are
more subject to soft budget problems, which signals firms’ close relationships with banks. Only
when SOEs have strong ties with banks or the government can they get loans with ease.
However, as in Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010), our regression with leverage yields mixed
results. High leverage ratios, which signal firms’ political strength, are also an indicator for high
bankruptcy risk. It is hard to separate these two effects. Using short leverage encounters the
same problem.
The last step taken is to use a logit model instead of a linear model to run the main
regressions in the paper. The means of the coefficients of the interaction terms are of the right
signs and significant, but of different magnitude.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we document firm-level empirical evidence on judicial bias against
politically unconnected firms in China. Using state ownership as a natural form of political
connection, we find the SOEs have a winning probability that is 8.6% higher than the non-SOEs,
based on a hand-collected sample of 3,323 corporate litigations during 1998-2010. Since
winning firms are shown to receive higher cumulative abnormal returns around the verdict
announcement, the judicial bias against non-SOEs has a real wealth impact on firms. The effect
of political connection in predicting the litigation outcome is more pronounced when the case
merit is more straightforward, which distinguishes our story of judicial bias from the alternative
explanation that SOEs win more often in an unbiased court due to their superior information on
the case merits. We further find that the biases against the unconnected firms in trial are
alleviated in regions with improved local legal institutions, during times of provincial leader
switches, and when the case is not tried in the home province of the SOE.
Moreover, the non-SOEs can partially correct the judicial biases by establishing political
ties through top managers. Using the personal ties of the top managers in the non-SOEs as a
second proxy for political connections, we find that the connected non-SOEs fare better than
the unconnected ones in court rulings. The difference between their win rates is similarly
influenced by the local legal institution development, provincial leader switches, and whether
the case is tried locally. However, the connected non-SOEs still will less often compared to the
SOEs. The overall evidence is consistent with the judicial bias against unconnected firms in China,
which has a negative effect on the firms’ shareholder wealth.
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CHAPTER 2

STERILIZATION IN CHINA: EFFECTIVENESS
AND COST
2.1 Introduction
Due to growing exports and speculative capital inflows, China has experienced twin
surpluses on both the capital and current accounts since 2001. The current account has been
positive since the 1990s and grew substantially after 2005. In order to maintain the crawling peg
exchange rate system it adopted in 2005, China has to keep purchasing the excess supply of
foreign currencies to prevent its domestic currency the RMB from abrupt appreciations. As a
result the country has been accumulating foreign reserves at a rapid pace. It surpassed Japan in
2006 to become the largest foreign reserves holder in the world, holding more than $2.85
trillion of reserves as in Dec., 2010 and more than $ 3 trillion in the first quarter of 2011. Figure
3 plots monthly foreign reserves as shown on the balance sheet of China's central bank, People's
bank of China (PBC). The stock of foreign reserves has been increasing for every month since
2004 except for one month in 2008, one month in 2009 and May 2010. Some people attribute
these drops to foreign capital outflows.
A large stock of foreign reserves has both pros and cons. On the plus side, abundant
foreign reserves enable a country to maintain a stable exchange rate and to meet its foreign
debt obligations. It can also be used to cushion the sudden shocks on a country's current and
capital account. On the other hand, an increase in foreign exchange reserves leads to an
accumulation of foreign assets, which is a component of the reserve money (i.e. the money
base). Without intervention, this can translate into an expansion of the domestic monetary base.
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Table 11 shows a typical balance sheet of the central bank of China. The asset side consists of
foreign assets and claims on domestic government and other intuitions. Foreign assets are
mainly composed of foreign exchange and gold. On the liability side, reserve money (the money
base) consists of currency issued and deposits as reserves. From the balance sheet, one can
calculate the net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA) of the monetary authority.
The bottom of the table shows how those two variables are defined. By definition, Reserve
Money=NFA+NDA. An increase in NFA directly contributes to the increases in the reserve money,
which then affects the broad money supply M2 through the identity M2=Reserve Money ×
money multiplier
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Figure 3 Foreign Exchange reserves flows and stocks

Thus an increase in foreign reserves, ceteris paribus, causes monetary expansion and
puts inflationary pressures on the economy, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange
rate. For those reasons, the accumulation of foreign reserves poses a challenge for domestic
macroeconomic management. Many East Asian countries have experienced similar problems
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induced by large private capital inflows that started in the late 1980s. This quickly drew
attention from the literature on open economy macroeconomics. Montiel, Peter J (1998, 1)
refers to it as the "capital inflow problem".
Table 11 Balance Sheet

Total Asset

Total Liability

Foreign assets

Reserve money

Claims on government

Deposits of financial corporations
excluded from Reserve Money

Claims on depository corporations

Bond outstanding

Claims on other financial and non

Foreign liabilities

-financial corporations
Other assets

Other liabilities
Deposits of government

Net Foreign Assets  Foreign assets - foreign liabilities
Net Domestic Assets  Claim on depository corporations
 Claims on other financial and non -financial corporations Claim on government
 Other assets - Deposits of financial corporations excluded from Reserve Money
- Bond outstanding - Deposits of government - Other liabilities
 Reserve Money = Net Foreign Assets

To offset the expansionary effect of the increasing foreign reserves, the central bank
can sterilize the foreign assets by taking opposite actions with the domestic assets, or
implement other contractionary monetary policies. As Takagi, Shinji and Esaka, Taro (1999)
documents, sterilization is a common practice for monetary authorities of East Asian countries
such as Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, during the capital inflow episode of 1987 -- 1997. It is
widely believed, as previous literature points out, that China has sterilized at least some of its
rising foreign reserves. However, the exact effectiveness of sterilization is unclear. Since China
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has applied different methods at different times, "it is not straightforward to assess exactly how
much sterilization has taken place" (Prasad, Eswar and Goodfriend, Marvin. 2006, 24).
Despite China's effort to neutralize the expansionary effect of increasing foreign
reserves, there are reasons why sterilization may not be as effective as the central bank wishes
it to be. The famous "Trilemma" states that it is impossible for a country to achieve the following
three goals simultaneously: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial
integration. While choosing a combination of managed exchange rate and monetary
independence, China has to impose effective capital controls. Nevertheless it has been
documented that capital controls in China are somewhat porous. For example, Prasad, Eswar
and Wei, Shangjin (2005, 440) documented large swings in the errors and omissions category
under foreign reserves of China, which is "indicative of unrecorded capital flows into China". If
this is the case, then a change in domestic assets will induce further capital inflows or outflows,
which undermine domestic monetary policies such as sterilization.
The changes in domestic assets and foreign reserves thus have a contemporaneous
relationship. Changes in one variable induce changes in another. A simple OLS would lead to a
biased estimation due to endogeneity. Furthermore, since domestic monetary conditions are
controlled by the central bank and are affected by many other factors besides foreign exchange
reserves, it is necessary to estimate some monetary reaction functions of the central bank.
Prior work examining the effectiveness of monetary sterilization of China has
employed different methods to circumvent the problems above. Wu, Ying (2006) performed a
Johansen cointergration test on changes in NFA and NDA. He found that the coefficient of NDA
in response to one unit change in NFA is -0.41. This is called the sterilization coefficient and a
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coefficient of -1 implies complete sterilization, since a unit increase in NFA is then fully offset by
a contemporaneous decrease in NDA. A coefficient of 0, on the other hand, indicates zero
sterilization. Wu's result thus implies incomplete sterilization. This method, while
straightforward to understand, ignores all the other monetary factors that may have affected
NFA and NDA. He, Dong et al (2007) estimated a reduced VAR model with interest rate and
domestic credit as controls, and gained a sterilization coefficient of -1. A VAR model uses lagged
variable and has a clear advantage of circumventing the endogeneity problem. Nevertheless,
VAR can only identify coefficients of lagged variables, making it impossible to detect the
contemporaneous impact.
Among others, Ouyang, Alice Y., Rajan, Ramkishen S. and Willett, Thomas D. (2007a)
applied two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate two simultaneous equations. The major
challenge here is to find valid instruments that help to separately identify NDA and NFA. They
used government expenditure as an instrument for NDA and the real effective exchange rate for
NFA. The estimated sterilization coefficients ranged from -0.5 to -0.92 for the period of 1999 to
2005, which implies a close to full sterilization. However their argument of government
expenditure having no direct effect on capital inflows is not very convincing. It is easy to imagine
a scenario where fiscal expansions have an effect on the interest rates, which triggers outflows
of capital. Kim, Woochan (2003) also documents empirical evidence that a high budget deficit
has a negative effect on capital account liberalization using OECD data.
Following Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a), in this paper I apply 2SLS to estimate the
degree of recent sterilization in China, but with different instruments and updated data. This
paper confirms their result that China has been able to carry out an almost complete
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sterilization up to the first half of 2010. The coefficients of capital mobility in this paper are
comparable to those of Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a). However unlike their paper, I find no
obvious trend of increase in the degree sterilization, lending no support to the claim that
sterilization has become harder over the years.
The question that naturally comes next, which is also a question that has been
drawing a lot of attention recently (e.g. Prasad and Wei 2005, Green, Stephen 2006, Ouyang,
Rajan and Willett 2007, Zhang, Ming 2009), is whether the cost of sterilization can be fully
covered by the PBC's income from foreign reserve investment. If not, the sterilization cost is
likely to soon become too high for the central bank to sustain. Consequently the central bank
may lose its control of the domestic monetary base. The answer here is not an obvious one.
Some people have argued that China has been earning a premium from its foreign reserves
accumulation due to a low domestic rate (Prasad and Wei 2005), while others are worried that
the increasing issuance of PBC bills, which is the central bank's main sterilization tool, will soon
impose too big a burden on the PBC (Zhang 2009).
In the second part of the paper, I compare the PBC's cost of sterilization and its
income from foreign reserves investment. As Prasad and Wei (2005) conjecture, the PBC's
income from foreign reserves investment has exceeded its sterilization cost consistently from
2003 to 2010. To my knowledge this is the first study to calculate and compare the actual
sterilization cost of the PBC and its income from foreign reserves investment. I also make some
simple linear projections of those costs and income. The projection shows that there is no sign
of unsustainability in the near future. However, the continuous appreciation of the RMB may
have a profound negative impact on the PBC's income from foreign reserves in domestic
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currency terms.
The next section briefly documents crucial background information on China's foreign
reserves management and the evolution of the country's foreign exchange reserves, clarifying
the concept and process of sterilization. It also discusses China's major sterilization tools: open
market operation and raising required reserves. Section 2.3 explains the 2SLS method applied in
this paper, describes the data and the empirical results. Section 2.4 shows the calculation and
projection of the PBC's cost of sterilization and its income from foreign reserves investment. The
final section concludes the paper.

2.2 Overview of foreign exchange reserves and sterilization tools in China

2.2.1 China's foreign reserves management and evolution
Traditionally, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is a
subsidiary of the PBC, is responsible for managing foreign reserves held by the central bank. The
foreign reserves are recorded on the PBC's balance sheet and invested in low risk assets such as
long term government bonds. In recent years however, the PBC has been making other uses of
its foreign reserves.
Some foreign reserves were used to recapitalize the large state owned financial
institutions. As a part of financial reforms, the Central Huijin Investment Company Limited was
established in December 2003 as an investment subsidiary to improve the capital quality of the
big state owned banks to prepare them for IPOs. The purpose of the Central Huijin is to improve
corporate governance and initiate reforms of the banking sector, by creating an organizational
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structure where the PBC and the China government can operate as shareholders of the state
owned banks. It had a registered capital of 50 million RMB which came from the Ministry of
Finance, but its investment fund came from the PBC. From 2003 to 2008, the PBC made a few
capital injections through Huijin to different state owned commercial banks and insurance
companies, some of which came out of the foreign exchange reserves. For example, it took a
total of $45 billion from foreign reserves to invest in the Bank of China, the China Construction
Bank and its subsidiary at the end of 2003. It made a capital injection of $15 billion to The
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 2005.
Table 12 Huijin's investment

Institutions

Date

Amount (billions)

Bank of China

Dec. 2003

22.5 $US

China Construction Bank

Dec. 2003

20 $US

Jianyin Investment Company

Dec. 2003

2.5 $US

Bank of communication

June 2004

3 RMB

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China April 2005

15 $US

Miscellaneous

Galaxy Security Company

June 2005

10 RMB

Shenyin & Wanguo Security Company

Aug . 2005

2.5 RMB

Plus 1.5 Billion RMB in loan

Guotai Junan Securities Co

Aug . 2005

1 RMB

Plus 1.5 Billion RMB in loan

China Galaxy Financial Holding Co.

Aug . 2005

5.5 RMB

China reinsurance (group ) Co.

April 2007

2 $US

China Everbright Banks

Nov. 2007

20 RMB

National Development Bank

Dec. 2007

20 $US

Agricultural Bank of China

Oct. 2008

19 $US

Source: CEIC

Table 12 shows a list of capital injections of the Central Huijin Investment Company to
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state owned companies 18. Some of the capital injection came from the foreign reserves directly
(i.e. those amounts denominated in US dollars), some were said to come from repaid central
bank loans (i.e. the 3 billion RMB injection to the Bank of Communication) 19. If I assume that all
the capital injections are completed within a month and use the exchange rate at the month
end to convert the RMB amount to dollars, Huijin has injected an overall of $108.4 billion into
state owned banks and the Galaxy Security company. As described above, some of the injections
are taken from the foreign reserves. If one wants to consider the foreign exchange held by China
as a country, this amount should be added back.
In September 2007, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established with the
intent of utilizing the accumulating reserves for the benefit of the state. Special Treasury bonds
of 1.5 trillion yuan ($207.91 billion) were issued by the Ministry of Finance to create the capital
that the CIC needed. The Ministry of Finance then used the proceeds to purchase foreign
exchanges from the PBC and put them under the management of the CIC. The CIC later acquired
the Central Huijin Company from the PBC with $ 67 billions and made it a full subsidiary. As a
result, many of CIC's investments and capital injections are still made under the name of Huijin.
The net effect of the establishment of the CIC on the PBC's balance sheet is a total reduction of
$140.9 billion in foreign reserves.
The CIC makes occasional announcements about its investment, but the overall
transparency of its investment strategy is low. Compared with the SAFE, the CIC makes more
aggressive investments in equities. Table 13 shows an (incomplete) list of its investment projects.

18

In September 2007, Huijin had effectively become a subsidiary of the CIC, which will be covered later.
However it keeps operating and serving its purpose of recapitalizing stated owned banks.
19
See the introduction of Huijing in Chinese: http://www.mecin.cn/Invest/Invest20080919000619.htm
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Besides the PBC and its subsidiaries, financial firms and individuals of China are also
allowed to make investments in foreign markets and thus hold some foreign exchange. Since
2001, domestic investors, including individual residents, have been allowed to invest their own
foreign exchange in B-shares 20. Starting from 2002, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII)
have been allowed to invest in the domestic capital market. Since 2004, insurance companies
have been allowed to use their own foreign exchange to invest in the international capital
market. When restrictions on qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) were lifted in April
2006, domestic fund management companies (asset management companies) began to
establish and sell products (mutual funds) to invest in the international capital market, first in a
trial run by Hua An Fund Management in September 2006, and then in earnest from September
2007, after the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) established a new set of rules. In
2007, firms were allowed to hold foreign exchange in a current account at their discretion. In
the same year, annual foreign exchange purchases and sales quotas for individuals were raised
to US$ 50,000 to meet their needs for holding and using foreign exchange

Table 13 CIC's incomplete list of investment

Amount ($billions)

Type of investment

The Blackstone Group May 2007

3.0

Pre-IPO, 9.4% equity

China Railway Group Nov. 2007

0.1

Pre-IPO, equity

Institutions

Date

Morgan Stanley

Dec. 2007

5.0

mandatory convertible securities , 9.9% equity

Visa

Mar. 2008

0.1

Pre-IPO, equity

JCFlowers

April 2008

3.2

Private Equity Fund

20

China B shares are virtually the same as common shares (which are referred to as A shares), except that
they were originally developed as stock shares for foreign investors. They are listed on Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges and are denominated in RMB, but are payable in foreign currency. Before 2001,
only foreign investors were allowed to purchase B shares.
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As China is moving to a more liberal foreign exchange policy, the PBC and state banks
are no longer the only institutions that can hold foreign exchange legally. However, since
monetary sterilization is solely implemented and managed by the PBC, and I am interested in
whether the PBC's foreign reserves investment return is enough to cover its sterilization cost, I
only take into consideration the foreign reserves listed on the balance sheet of the PBC in this
paper. All the other foreign exchange not currently held by the central bank are ignored in the
estimation.
China has experienced a rapid increase in foreign reserves since 2003, due to the
recorded twin surpluses in the current and capital accounts. Figure 4 shows the evolution of
China's balance of payments. The current account surplus clearly contributes the most to the
huge growth in foreign reserves. It was $12 billion in 1990. It grew rapidly and reached $249.9
billion in 2006, then $426.1 billion in 2008 and dropped back to 297.1 billion in 2009 due to a
slowdown in exports. A closer look reveals that the current account surplus has come mainly
from the trade surplus, the share of which in the current account surplus was 84% in 2009 21. At
the same time, net exports grew from 2.5% of GDP in 2004 to 8% of GDP in 2008 and then 5% in
2009. The contribution of net exports to GDP growth also increased dramatically from an
average of 3% from 2001 through 2004 (0.36 percentage points of GDP growth), to an average
of 21% from 2005 through 2007 (2.4 percentage points of GDP growth). It dropped to 8% in
2008 due to a change in the economic conditions abroad. The capital account, mainly coming
from FDI, was mostly positive during the period 1995 to 2009 as well, implying a net capital
inflow. Since 2001, China has received annual FDI in excess of USD 40 billion. However the error
and omission term was mostly negative before 2002, implying a net unrecorded capital outflow.
21

CEIC database, 2009
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Figure 4 Balance of Payment of China

The rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, combined with China's crawling peg
exchange rate, calls for sterilization. Sterilization happens when the monetary authority tries to
gain control of the reserve money in face of an exogenous increase in the NFA, by taking
opposite actions with the net domestic assets. In other words, as the NFA increases, we may see
the NDA decrease as a result of sterilization. Reserve money is kept unchanged in this way,
preventing the broad money supply from soaring. However, an increase in the reserve money or
the broad money supply per se does not necessarily mean that the PBC has lost control. The
central bank may want the monetary base to increase anyway to keep up with economic growth,
as in China's case. Figure 5 shows that both the reserve money and the broad money supply have
been increasing in China as foreign reserves accumulate. Nevertheless the reserve money
increases at a slower pace especially after 2005, indicating the operation of sterilization. The
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following section gives an overview of China's major sterilization tools.

foreign reserves
Source: CEIC database

Figure 5 reserve money and the broad money supply in China,

2.2.2 Major sterilization tools
According to the monetary report published quarterly by the PBC, the main
sterilization methods of China are open market operations (OMO) and raising required reserve
ratios. Table 14 gives a summary of how the two methods work. OMO reduces the domestic

assets by taking the excess liquidity out of the system, while raising required reserves reduces

the money multiplier. From a central bank's point of view, however, increasing the level of
required reserves as an attempt to sterilize affects the liability side of its balance sheet in a
similar way that open market operations do. If the interest paid on required reserves is equal to
the interest on central bank bills, the two methods have the same impact on the central bank.
Generally the cost of sterilization using required reserves is lower than open market operations,
since the central bank pays minimum interest on required and excess reserves.
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Table 14 Sterilization process

Method

Steps

OMO

1. NFA increases by NFA.

bond issuance 2. RM  NFA  NDA increases by NFA.
3. NDA decreases by NDA, and RM is back to previous level.

or repo

4. M2  RM  mm in unchanged.
Raise required 1. NFA increases by NFA.
reserve ratio

2. RM increases.
3. mm decrease.
4. M2  RM  mm in unchanged as a net effect.

where RM is reserve money, and mm is the money multiplier
.
Open market operations in China mainly include bond issuance and short term
repurchase operations (repos, usually within 91 days). There are also non-market tools such as
transferring the deposits from the commercial banking system to the central bank and "window
guidance"(moral suasion). In recent years, the PBC also started making foreign exchange swaps
with big commercial banks as a tool of controlling liquidity. In November 2005 it was reported
that the PBC made its first one-year swap of a total amount of $6 billion with 10 domestic
commercial banks 22. Unfortunately, the PBC usually doesn't make public announcements on
swaps. Since 2005, the amount and timing of the PBC swaps remain secretive. Partial
information can only be inferred from the annual reports of those commercial banks which are
involved in the swaps with the PBC and are publicly listed. For example, China Construction Bank
revealed a foreign exchange swap of $9 billion with the PBC in its 2006 annual report. Bank of
China and the National Development Bank also revealed swaps of $41.5 billion and $22.9 billion

22

From Xinhua News:
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-04/17/content_5987783.htm
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respectively with the PBC in 2006 23.
Before 2002, open market operations are mainly done by issuing government bonds.
In September 2002 the PBC replaced the outstanding Treasury securities with central bank bills,
when the stock of government bonds available shank to a low level. The first new PBC bill was
issued in April 2003. Since then the PBC has been issuing bills on a weekly basis. There have
been 265 total issuances by Aug. 2010 and the volume of PBC bond outstanding is RMB 4.6
trillion up to April 2010 24, exceeding the volume of currency issue. PBC bills usually have a term
of less than 1 year. The most frequently issued bills are the 3 month bills and the 1 year bills.
Occasionally the PBC has also issued 3-year bills for urgent sterilization need (in late 2004 and
early 2005, also at the beginning of 2007 and 2010) and 6 month bills (mostly before 2006). The
PBC bills are issued as zero coupon bonds and are auctioned off to banks and other financial
institutions at some discounted values in each issuance. They are traded in the interbank bond
market, and are usually held by financial institutions such as commercial banks and money funds.
Ever since their issuance, the central bank bills have replaced the Treasury and become the main
tool in sterilization 25. In May 2004, the PBC also announced the start of repo sales to depositary
institutions (Green, Stephen 2005). Figure 6 shows the net central bank bill issuance since 2000,
and figure 7 shows the total PBC bonds outstanding as a percentage of foreign reserves from
2000 to 2010. Both figures show an increasing trend in sterilization especially after 2006, using
the amount of PBC bills as an indicator.

23

Banks are not required to reveal swap transactions in their annual reports. Even if they do, they may
choose not to reveal the name of the counterparty. For example Bank of Communications revealed a swap
of $5 billion in 2006 without giving the name of the other party. Thus it is very hard to get a good estimate
of the PBC's swaps.
24
http://fc.fund123.cn/Content.aspx?ArticleID=1671
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Figure 7 Bond outstanding as % of foreign reserves from Balance sheet of PBC

The government keeps issuing Treasury notes, of course. Those notes are no longer used as OMO tools.

In general, altering reserve requirements as a tool of monetary control is always dealt
with cautiously since it's considered to have too drastic an effect on the money supply through
changing the money multiplier (Feinman, Joshua N. 1993). For example, the Federal Reserve has
left reserve requirements essentially unchanged since the passage of the MCA in 1980 26. One
change happened in April 1992 to lower the requirement on transaction deposits from 12
percent to 10 percent. It is not uncommon for emerging economies in Asia to raise required
reserve ratios as a method of sterilization though. Countries like Malaysia, Korea and Philippines
have all used the method during the capital inflow episode (Takagi and Esaka 1999).
China has been gradually raising the required reserve ratios since the third quarter of
2003, corresponding to an increase in foreign reserves inflows. The required reserve ratio was
raised from 6% and reached its peak value of 18.5% in December 2010 27. However, in practice
the effect of changing required reserve ratios may be limited in China's case, since depository
institutions tend to maintain high excess reserve ratios (usually the same or even higher than
the required ratio in the early years) due to a lack of alternative investment channels as the PBC
has traditionally paid interest on both required and excess reserves. It was also believed that
part of the excess reserves is used for interbank settlement and liquidity management purposes
(Goodfriend and Prasad 2005). An increase in the required reserve ratio may simply lead to a
decline in the excess reserve ratio, leaving the money multiplier unchanged. To discourage the
holding of excess reserves, China has decreased the interest on excess reserves from 1.62%
26

The Monetary Control Act, which mandated universal reserve requirements to be set by the Federal
Reserve for all depository institutions. For more description on MCA, see J Feinman, "Reserve
Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform".
27
China has introduced differentiated reserve requirements into the banking system in 2004. The secondtier banks, including the joint stock commercial banks which do not meet certain standard in terms of
capital adequacy are subject to a higher reserve requirement than what is cited here.
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(which was the same as the interest on required reserves) in 2003 to 0.72% in 2008.

Figure 8 plots the sum of required and excess reserve ratios. As described before, there

is a trend of increase in required reserve ratio since 2003. However the total reserve ratio was
actually dropping slowly until the end of 2006, when the increase in required reserve ratio
started to accelerate. Before 2006 a large part of the effect of increases in required reserve
ratios was offset by drops in excess reserves. This may be the reason for the PBC to have
increased its bond issuance throughout the years to conduct a more effective sterilization. To
get an idea of the effectiveness of sterilization, figure 9 plots quarterly changes in NFA and NDA
of China. Here foreign assets are calculated using the product of foreign reserves denominated
in US dollars and exchange rates (RMB/US$). The changes in net foreign assets are adjusted for
exchange rates to exclude the revaluation effect (see section 2.3 for the details on data and
adjustment). Net domestic assets are defined as reserve money minus net foreign assets. The
plot shows that China's net domestic assets have been declining since 2002, corresponding to a
simultaneous increase in net foreign assets. Both figure 5 and figure 9 imply sterilization to
some degree, but the implication is far from clear.
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Source: PBC, author's calculation
Figure 8 required reserve ratio

Source: IFS, author's calculation
Figure 9 Quarterly Change in Net Foreign Reserve and Net Domestic Reserve of Central Bank of China
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2.3 Sterilization coefficient estimation: data, methodology and empirical results
2.3.1 2SLS description
In this paper, I estimate the sterilization effect with 2SLS with innovative instrumental
variables for NDA and NFA. Namely I propose to use the dummy variable for the 4th quarter as
an instrument for NDA, and the past twelve month RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility as an
instrument for NFA. As will be explained later, unlike government expenditure, the dummy
variable for the 4th quarter is unambiguously exogenous to the changes in NFA. The twelve
month exchange rate volatility is also highly correlated with NFA.
One concern with this regression is the lack of theoretical foundation for the choices
of control variables. Among a rich literature on monetary reaction functions, Brissimis,
Sophocles N. et al (BGT) (2002) explicitly derives two simultaneous equations used to estimate
NFA and NDA from minimizing a simple loss function of the monetary authority, subject to some
constraints. Ouyang, Alice et al. (2006) modified the BGT model and applied it to several Asian
economies. Largely based on the BGT model and Ouyang et al (2007a)'s modified model, I
specify a set of two simultaneous equations as follows:

NFA t   0   1 NDA t   2 mm t   3 CPI t1   4 NX t1   5 r t  E t e t1 
  6 y ct1   7 ex_vol t12,t   8 G t   t
NDA t   0   1 NFA t   2 mm t   3 CPI t1   4 NX t1   5 r t  E t e t1 
  6 y ct1   7 I Q4 ,t   8 G t   t

NFA and NDA are adjusted 28 net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively.
Those are the main variables of concern. The control variables include mm (the money
multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US
28

Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later.
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Treasury annual rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). The
first difference of the data is employed here to avoid a unit root problem.
α1 is the offset coefficient. It measures how foreign capital inflow responds to a
change in domestic monetary environment. My main interest lies in the sterilization coefficient
β₁, which measures how domestic assets respond to a change in net foreign assets. A β1 of -1
would indicate complete simultaneous sterilization. An α ₁ of -1 implies perfect capital mobility.
In BGT, both α₁ and β₁ are predicted to be negative. An increase in NDA implies an
expansionary monetary policy, suppressing the domestic interest rate. This will result in a
foreign capital outflow, which leads to a decrease in NFA. When capital controls are present, as
in the case of China, capital mobility may be less than perfect, which translates into an α₁
greater than -1. The sterilization coefficient β₁ should be negative too, as long as the central
bank is trying to mitigate the expansionary effect of an increase in NFA.
The set of equations can be estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS). The two
equations are separately identified by exvolt-12,t, which is the past twelve month
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility calculated by month-end exchange rate in the first equation
and IQ4,which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if it's the 4th quarter, and 0 otherwise in
the second equation. The choice of IQ4,t is an innovation. It is due to the fact that Chinese
commercial banks tend to hold significantly more reserves in each 4th quarter in preparation for
large withdrawals before the Chinese New Year, according to the quarterly monetary report of
the PBC. The New Year follows the lunar calendar and usually falls in February. It is a tradition
for people to exchange gifts, buy new clothing and decorations, and repay their loans in the
New Year. Children also receive cash from parents and relatives (the red packets). The NFA,
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however, should not be significantly impacted by the arrival of the Chinese New Year. In fact,
the correlation between ΔNDAt and I Q4 is 0.53, while the correlation between ΔNFAt and I Q4 is 0.005.
The choice of exvolt-12,t follows Brissimis, Gibson and Tsakalotos(2002), which claims
that exchange rate deviation only affects the change in NFA but not NDA. Though China has
maintained a fixed exchange rate until July 2005, we are still able to observe small fluctuations
of the RMB/US$ rate during the whole sample period. In any month t (since I use quarterly data,
t can only be March, June, September or December here), exvolt-12,t is calculated as the standard
deviation of monthly exchange rate from t-12 to t. The correlation between exvolt-12,t and ΔNFAt
is 0.52, while it is -0.08 between exvolt-12,t and ΔNDAt. The other alternative instrument real
effective exchange rate only has a correlation of less than 0.03 with ΔNFAt.
The rest of control variables in the equations are chosen according to existing
empirical literature in the area 29. Those are the variables that motivate foreign capital flows in
or out of the country, and variables that are important to monetary policy decisions. In
particular, the use of the lagged terms in price change, cyclical income and net export further
alleviates the endogeneity problem.
For some control variables in the above equations, it is obvious that their coefficients
should take certain signs. Other coefficients require more detailed discussion.
The coefficients of the money multipliers in both equations, α₂ and β₂ are expected to
be negative. A high mmt indicates an overall expansionary policy and a low total reserve ratio.

29

E.g. see Brissimis, Gibson and Tsakalotos(2002), He.D., C.Chu, C.Shu and A. Wong(2005), Ouyang,
Rajan and Willett(2006).
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Expansionary policy leads to a drop in interest rate which induces capital outflow. A low total
reserve ratio leads to a low level of reserve money and thus a smaller NDA component on the
central bank's balance sheet.
Both coefficients of price change should be negative, since a higher inflation leads to
reduced capital inflows as well as a contractionary monetary policy. However there may exist a
time lag between inflation and policy responses. In that case it is hard to predict which way the
coefficients of price changes would go. The coefficients of net export is expected be positive for
NFA, since an increase in NX contributes to NFA, ceteris paribus.
Δ(rt∗ + Et et+1 ) is a measurement of foreign interest rate adjusted by exchange rate.

α₅ is negative since both an increase in foreign interest and an expected depreciation of
domestic currency signal better investment opportunities abroad. β5 is also expected to be
negative since the uncovered interest parity implies that the central bank would want to raise
the domestic interest rates as a response to a positive Δ(rt∗ + Et et+1 ).

The coefficient of cyclical income, α6, may be negative since an increase in real GDP

worsens the balance of payments. However a high GDP may induce more capital inflows as it is
a sign of overall economy strength. Similarly, the government usually decides to take a countercyclical monetary policy which leads to a negative β6. On the other hand it is also possible that
the government wants to stimulate the economy even more after economic growth, making β₆
positive. Similar arguments can be applied to α8 and β8, where government expenditure may
have an ambiguous effect on NDA and NFA.
Finally, α7 is expected to be negative since a more volatile exchange rate impedes
capital inflows. However it is also possible that a more flexible exchange rate regime induces
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more speculative capital inflows. β7 is expected to be positive since NDA increases with the
arrival of Chinese New Year.

2.3.2 Data and Empirical results
2.3.2.1 Data summary
Most literature points out (both qualitatively and quantitatively) that sterilization did
not become an issue in China until around 2000. This paper employs quarterly data from Q1
1995 to Q2 2010. Ideally data of high frequency should be used, however, monthly GDP of China
are not available. I recognize the sample size is small, thus the estimated coefficients should be
viewed with caution. All the data are from the CEIC database, IFS and the PBC's website, taken
at the end of each period.
ΔNFAt, ΔNDAt, ΔNXt and ΔGt are scaled with the GDP of the corresponding period. The
change in money multipilers and interest rates are expressed in logs. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
method is applied to find the trend of the real GDP. Cyclical income is then calculated using the
formula ln(Real GDP)-HP trend . Following Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a), the expected
HP trend

nominal exchange rate Et et+1 is approximated in two ways: perfect foresight and static

expectation. In perfect foresight, Et et+1 equals lnet. With static expectation, Et et+1equals lnet+1.

A standard ADF test is applied to test the stationarity of all the variables. The null

hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root. Table 15 shows the summary statistics of the ADF
test. All the variables are stationary at 5% significant levels.
The net foreign assets are calculated as the difference between foreign reserves
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minus gold and foreign liability. Foreign reserves data is from IFS and is dollar denominated.
Foreign liability is taken from the PBC's balance sheet and is recorded mark-to-market in
domestic currency (RMB). Thus net foreign assets are calculated as follows:

=
NFAt ( foreign reservest × e t ) − foreign liabilityt
where et is the exchange rate of RMB against $US.
It is obvious that the value of NFA may change due to fluctuations in exchange rate. This
type of change is not caused by an inflow of foreign assets and is irrelevant to the study. To
exclude the revaluation effect, I follow Aizenman, Joshua and Glick, Reuven. (2009) and
calculate the adjusted NFA at time t-1 as NFAt −1 (

et
)
et −1

Table 15 ADF test result

Variable

Test Stat (t)

Type of Test

NFA t

t 5.496 ** (0.000)

with trend

NDA t

-8.367 ** (0.000)

without trend

mmt

-9.206** (0.000)

CPI t1

-6.285** (0.000)

NX t1

-11.756** (0.000)

r t E t e t1 

-3.217** (0.002) for perfect foresight
-3.391**(0.001) for static expectation

y ct1

-10.143** (0.000)

G t
ex_vol t12,t

-15.151** (0.000)
-1.748** (0.04)

Note: (**)denotes significanceat 5% level.
Therefore the change in net foreign assets excluding the revaluation effect is
et
)
∆NFAt = NFAt − NFAt−1 (
et−1
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Here I make a simplistic assumption that all the foreign reserves are in US dollars.
Ideally, if the exact currency composition of China's foreign reserves is known, the revaluation
effects should be adjusted for each currency. However no data is available on the exact
composition of China's foreign reserves. In section 2.4 of the paper some approximations of the
composition of China's foreign reserves are proposed, however as will be shown later in this
section, a robustness check with a different currency composition does not change the major
findings. Previous literature 30 also suggests that estimation results on sterilization are usually
robust to different currency compositions of reserves.
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Table 16 Summary statistics of the variables.

NFA and NDA are adjusted net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively. Other variables include mm (the
money multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US Treasury annual
rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). ex_vol is the past twelve month
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility

Variable

30
31

Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min

Max

NFA t

62

0.0619

0.048

-0.001 0.201

NDA t

62

-0.026

0.081

-0.205 0.158

mmt

62

0.0076

0.060

-0.123 0.149

CPI t1

62

0.031

0.052

-0.021 0.238

NX t1

62

0.006

0.010

-0.021 0.025

r t E t e t1 

62

Perfect insight

-0.005

0.010

-0.05 0.001

Static expectation

-0.004

0.010

-0.05 0.001

y ct1

62

0.000

0.019

-0.033 0.048

Gt

62

-0.005

0.095

-0.204 0.129

ex_vol t12,t

62

0.038

0.061

0.000 0.257

Ouyang et al. (2006), Prasad and Wei (2005)
Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later.
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Finally the change in NDA is calculated as the residual under the identity: ∆NDAt =

∆RMt− ∆NFAt

where RM stands for reserve money and is taken from the balance sheet of the PBC.

Table 16 gives the summary statistics of all the variables.

2.3.2.2 Empirical results
I use 2SLS to estimate the set of simultaneous equations. To avoid potential problems
of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in residuals, Newey-West covariance is computed up
to 3 lags. Small sample correction is performed for all the estimations. Table 17 presents
summary statistics of the regression result. The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.
The sterilization coefficient is between -0.934 and -0.793, indicating a high level of, but
less than full sterilization by the PBC during my estimation period. This number is smaller than
the estimated coefficients in Aizenman and Glick (2008). The reason for the divergence may lie
in the fact that they used a simple OLS instead of 2SLS. The offset coefficient is between -0.650
and -0.649, implying some degree of capital mobility despite strict capital controls in China. This
is related to the speculative "hot money" that flows into China under an expectation that the
RMB will appreciate. As Goodfriend and Prasad (2006,5)pointed out, "the effectiveness of
capital controls (in China) inevitably erodes over time" since domestic and international
investors find channels such as exaggerating export invoices to evade them. This offset
coefficient here is comparable to and slightly smaller than the estimation obtained in Ouyang,
Rajan and Willett (2007a).
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Table 17 Regression results.
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NFA and NDA are adjusted net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively. Other variables include mm (the
money multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US Treasury annual
rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). ex_vol is the past twelve month
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility

Perfect Foresight

Static Expectation

Explanatory Var

NFA t

NDA t

NFA t

NDA t

Constant

0.024 (0.023)

0.027* (0.015)

0.023 (0.024)

0.034*** (0.012)

NFA t

__

-0.793** (0.340)

__

-0.934*** (0.232)

NDA t

-0.650** (0.312)

__

-0.649** (0.313)

__

mmt

-0.689** (0.303)

-1.01*** (0.179)

-0.683** (0.303)

-1.00*** (0.181)

CPI t1

0.175* (0.103)

0.219*** (0.054)

0.187* (0.107)

0.208*** (0.051)

NX t1

0.292 (0.313)

0.514 (0.557)

0.283 (0.316)

0.553 (0.567)

r t E t e t1 

- 0.137 (0.298)

0.198 (0.464)

-0.276 (0.359)

- 0.402 (0.402)

y ct1

-0.075 (0.432)

0.553 (1.64)

-0.063 (0.435)

0.589 (1.57)

Gt

-0.030 (0.103)

0.122 (0.345)

-0.027 (0.104)

0.127 (0.331)

I Q4,t

__

-0.012 (0.039)

__

-0.012 (0.036)

ex_vol t12,t

0.064 (0.105)

__

0.039 (0.119)

__

Excluded Instruments

I Q4,t

ex_vol t12,t

I Q4,t

ex_vol t12,t

R-square

0.93

0.86

0.93

0.88

Centered R-square

0.81

0.84

0.81

0.86

(*), (**), (***) denotes significance at 10%,5% and 1% level

The coefficients of Δmmt are significant and of the right sign. The coefficients of
ΔCPIt−1 are at least marginally significant, and has a significant positive impact on ΔNDA t and
ΔNFAt. This can be due to the fact that both the monetary authorities and foreign investors need

some time to react to a change in domestic price conditions, while the price change affects
domestic assets more directly. Moreover, while NFA and NDA are relatively volatile, CPI are
stable (with quarterly changes usually less than 2%) for most periods covered by the study, with
the exception of the last three quarters of 2003, the last quarter of 2007 and first two quarters
32

Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later.
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of 2008. This may cause statistical difficulties to detect the true relationship between the
variables. ΔNXt−1 is of the right sign and Δ(rt∗ + Et et+1 )has the wrong sign in one specification,

but both are insignificant.

Surprisingly, IQ4,t is of the wrong sign and both IQ4,t and ex_volt−12,t are insignificant.

The first stage F-stat for ex_volt−12,t are 8.05 and 11.38 for the two cases. The first stage F-stat

for IQ4,t is comparable. Those values are smaller than the conventional critical value of 10.3 for
weak instrument test 33. This suggests that the use of IQ4,t and ex_volt−12,t might be exposed

to a weak instrument problem, which can lead to biased results in 2SLS. However Angrist,
Joshua D. and Pischke, Jorn-Steffen (2008) point out that a Monte-Carlo simulation shows that
just identified IV is approximately unbiased unless the instrument is extremely weak. This
provides me with some confidence in interpreting the results.
As a robustness check, lagged control and dependent variables are added to the right
hand side of the equation, as independent variables. The coefficients of CPIt-2 are of the right
negative sign but insignificant, this lends some support to the previous explanations on positive
coefficients of price changes. The offset coefficients are largely unchanged, while the
sterilization coefficients remain negative but become significant only at a 10% level. The reason
behind this is probably that NDA responds to contemporaneous changes as well as lagged
changes in NFA. Sterilization may be completed over a couple of quarters. With a small sample
size, it is harder to obtain significant coefficients for every lagged NFA. In fact as the next section
shows, a simple VAR implies that the sterilization is mostly completed within the next two
periods. The result is also robust to a different composition of the foreign reserves, namely 70%

33

See, for example, Stock, James H and Yogo, Moto (2005)
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US dollars and 30% Euros 34.
Inspired by Aizenmand and Glick (2008), I estimate the sterilization coefficients with
2SLS using 40-quarter rolling samples. The sample period begins with 1995 Q1 to 2004 Q4,
moves to 1995 Q2 to 2005 Q1 and ends with 2000 Q3 to 2010 Q2. There are 23 rolling periods in
total. Figure 10 and Figure 11 shows a plot of the rolling coefficients with 95% confidence
intervals. The x-axis corresponds to the end of the 40th quarter of each rolling sample. The
coefficients are steady but with a slight downward trend, suggesting an increase in the degree of
sterilization. However no definite conclusion can be reached given the large standard errors.
This is not a direct contradiction to the findings in Aizenman and Glick (2008) or Ouyang, Rajan
and Willett (2007a) though, since the two studies cover different sample periods.

4
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Figure 10 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression
Perfect foresight

34

Results are not reported here to ensure conciseness of the paper.
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Figure 11 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression
Static Expectations

To further check the robustness of the result, I replace NDA by M2 and estimate the
following equation:

M2   0   1 NFA t1   2 mm t   3 CPI t1   4 NX t1   5 r t  E t e t1 
  6 y ct1   7 G t1   t

Here ΔNFAt-1 is used instead of ΔNFAt to break the mechanical relationship between NFA and
contemporaneous money supply. The regression gives a λ₁ of .630 with a standard error of 0.616
for static expectation, and 0.669 with a standard error of 0.602 for perfect foresight. In both
cases the λ₁ coefficient is not significantly different from 0. This implies that NFA from previous
period has no significant impact on current M2.

2.3.2.3 Robustness check: VAR to detect the effect of NFA on the price levels
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If China has been successfully sterilizing the inflows of foreign capital, it should be able
to insulate its domestic monetary conditions from the increase in NFA to a large degree. Figure
12 plots the percentage change in China's quarterly CPI and NFA from 1994 to 2010. Despite a

continuous increase in NFA, CPI seems to be quite stable after 1997 except for the spikes in late
2003 and early 2008. To take a closer look at the problem, I study the direct impact of the
changes in net foreign assets on domestic price levels by applying the following reduced form
VAR:
k

k

k

i=1

i=1

i=1

k

k

k

i=1

i=1

i=1

k

k

k

i=1

i=1

i=1

ΔNFAt = Φ1 + � Φ11,i ΔNFAt−i + � Φ12,i ΔNDAt−i + � Φ13,i ΔCPIt−i + ε1t
ΔNDAt = Φ2 + � Φ21,i ΔNFAt−i + � Φ22,i ΔNDAt−i + � Φ23,i ΔCPIt−i + ε2t
ΔCPIt = Φ3 + � Φ31,i ΔNFAt−i + � Φ32,i ΔNDAt−i + � Φ33,i ΔCPIt−i + ε3t
where NFA, NDA and CPI are defined as before. The VAR measures the transmission of an
impulse from net foreign assets to net domestic assets, as well as to the price levels. If the result
from the section above is true, the change in NFA should have limited effects on CPI.
This is a very simple VAR with only 3 variables. It is appropriate in this setting because
I want to focus on the effect of net foreign assets on the price levels. Moreover, it is well known
that the Cholesky decomposition used to orthogonalize the variance-covariance matrix of the
VAR residuals imposes a recursive causal structure from the top variables to the bottom
variables. Including too many control variables makes it harder to decide on a sensible order of
all those variables. Here it is assumed that NFA affects the other two variables
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contemporaneously but not vice versa. This ordering is based on the previous 2SLS result, which
shows that an increase in NFA triggers the change in NDA in the opposite direction. On the other
hand, the inflow of foreign capital is not so much induced by a change in domestic assets. Both
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the foreign assets and domestic assets are assumed to affect price levels contemporaneously.

NFA %change
Source: IFS, author's calculation
Figure 12 Change in NFA VS. CPI

Based on the Akaike Information Criterion, 4 is selected as the optimum lag number.
Figure 13 shows the orthogonalized impulse response function. From the graph, NDA responds

significantly to a change in NFA. Namely NDA drops when NFA increases and most of the
changes are completed within the first two following quarters. Shocks to net foreign assets have
little influence on price levels. The responses of NDA and CPI can be interpreted as the impact of
changes in net foreign assets has been effectively neutralized, which restates the previous result
that the PBC's sterilization operations have been successful.
A Granger causality test indicates that ΔNFAt Granger causes ΔNDAt , not the other way

around. ΔNFAt does not Granger cause ΔCPIt . This suggests that the sterilization is effective in
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the sense that change in NFA does not have a positive effect on the price levels. The magnitude
of ΔCPIt response to changes in lagged ΔNFAt is also at the minimum as Figure 13 shows. Over all,

the VAR results support my conclusion from the previous section that the PBC is carrying out a
high degree of sterilization.

Figure 13 VAR: Impulse Response Function

2.4 The Sterilization cost born by the PBC
The aforementioned section concludes that China has been capable of carrying out an
almost complete sterilization. In spite of a rapid increase in foreign reserves, China is able to
maintain a relatively independent monetary policy.
However, the sterilization comes at a cost. As the foreign reserves keep accumulating,
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the PBC has to issue more debt for sterilization purpose, which may drive up the interest rates
on the PBC bills. Eventually the cost may become too high for the central bank. The appreciation
of the RMB against the US dollar can also contribute to a net capital loss in domestic currency
terms, since the PBC bills are denominated in RMB and the foreign reserves are denominated in
US dollars and other foreign currencies. On the other hand, the foreign reserves have been
increasing consistently. The growing investment return from the foreign reserves helps to offset
the cost and sustain the sterilization operation.
In the following section I estimate the PBC's cost of sterilization and compare it with
its income from the foreign reserves investment from the period 2003 to 2010, taking exchange
rate fluctuation into consideration. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that at the
current interest and exchange rate, China's foreign exchange reserves have to drop around 36%
( or to put it in another way, the RMB has to appreciate by more than 50% against the US dollar)
before it fails to cover the sterilization cost of the PBC. A projection of the sterilization cost and
the income from foreign reserves investment also indicates no sign of unsustainability in the
near future.
2.4.1 Comparison of the sterilization cost and the PBC's investment income
The cost of sterilization is generated from two categories on the liability side on the
PBC's balance sheet: the interest payments on the outstanding PBC bonds and on the total
(required and excess) reserves. Since repos usually have terms of less than 91 days and are of a
much smaller scale compared to PBC bonds, the interest payments on them are small and thus
are ignored here.
The volume, term and final price of each bond issuance are published by the PBC
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every week. From this data, the interest expenses associated with each issuance can be
calculated. The expense is then distributed evenly into each month until the bond reaches
maturity (the same concept as amortization in accounting). The total cost of PBC bills in a certain
month can be calculated by summing up the interest expenses associated with all of the
currently outstanding bonds. Figure 14 plots the weighted monthly interest rate of the PBC bills
with different terms. Contrary to popular belief, though the interest rate peaked in 2008 there is
no obvious trend of a continuous increase in the interest rates over the years.
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Figure 14 PBC bill: weighted monthly average

Unlike many other countries, China pays interest on both required reserves and
excess reserves. The current annual interest rate is 1.62% for required reserves and 0.72% for
excess reserves. Historically the interest rates have been higher. Table 18 shows the historical
adjustments of reserve interest rates.
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Table 18 Interest rate of required and excess reserves

time of

required

excess

adjustment

reserve

reserve

1996.05.01

8.82

8.82

1996.08.23

8.28

7.92

1997.10.23

7.56

7.02

1998.03.21

5.22

1998.07.01

3.51

1998.12.07

3.24

1999.06.10

2.07

2002.02.21

1.89

2003.12.21

1.62

2005.03.17

0.99

2008.11.27

1.62

0.72

Month-end data of total reserve amount can be found on the PBC's balance sheet,
starting from 2000. Since the bond interest payment is calculated as an average amount over
the month, I also replaced the month-end reserve data by the month-average reserve amount
(calculated by taking the average of previous and this month-end data). However the PBC's
balance sheet does not distinguish between required reserves and excess reserves, which makes
the precise calculation of interest payment on reserves impossible. To deal with the problem, I
calculate the upper (and lower) bound of the monthly interest payments, corresponding to the
extreme cases where all reserves are required reserves (or excess reserves). The actual interest
payments on reserves must lie somewhere in between. The total cost of sterilization is
calculated by adding up the interest payments on both the PBC bonds and the total reserves.
There is one caveat in the method mentioned above. Not all the interest paid on
reserves by the PBC can be categorized as sterilization cost, since the commercial banks are
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always required to hold some reserves. Strictly speaking, the lower bound calculated here
should be higher than the "true" lower bound if we assume the repo costs are negligible. This
wouldn't hurt my result though, since this overestimated lower bound is exceeded by the
income from foreign reserves investment as a result.
The estimation of the PBC's income from foreign reserves investment is less
straightforward. China has been very cautious in revealing information on the compositions of
its international reserves and no public information is available. It is widely believed, however,
that China's foreign reserves mainly consist of US dollars, Japanese Yen and Euros. To get a
rough approximation of the composition of China's foreign reserves, I use quarterly
international reserves composition of emerging markets from IMF Currency Composition of
Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database, only taking into account assets
denominated in US dollars, Euros and Japanese Yen. This approximation is consistent with the
conventional belief that around 70% of China's foreign reserves are in US dollars (Morrison,
Wayne M. and Labonte, Marc. 2008). The composition is expressed in percentage terms and has
already taken into consideration of the exchange rate between Yen/Euro and dollar. Thus even
though foreign reserves in China are expressed in dollars, there is no need to worry about the
exchange rate change between Yen/Euro and dollar when calculating the average yields.
Yields on these assets are approximated by five-year government bonds issued by the
corresponding national governments (for Euro assets, it's an average of the bonds of several
national governments in the Euro area). Those data are published by the respective central
banks and are the average values over the month. Long-term bonds are used in the
approximation because according to the data published by the Federal Reserve, only 6.7% of
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China's holding of US Treasury securities (official and unofficial combined) are short term
Treasury bills during the period from 2003 to 2009. The rest are all some forms of long term
securities. The Fed's data does not distinguish between private or institutional investors and the
monetary authorities. However, foreign reserves account for a majority of China's US Treasury
holdings. It is safe to conclude that the PBC holds mostly long term bonds as its investment. The
Treasury securities alone, long term and short term combined, account for 36% of China's
foreign reserves 35. The monthly yield on foreign reserves is then calculated as the average of
yields on assets denominated in those three currencies, weighted by the percentage
composition implied by COFER. In addition, the gain/loss caused by monthly exchange rate
changes is taken into account when converting dollar income to RMB.
The approximation results in an average annual return of 3.39% for the period from
April 2003 to June 2010, which is used to further calculate PBC's total income from foreign
reserves. Liu, Liya (2008) estimated the annual yield on China's foreign reserves to be between
3.6% and 4.3%, for the period from 2000 and 2007. My estimation is lower than that in Liu
(2008), most likely due to a drop in the US treasury rate after 2007. Using yields on two-year and
ten-year government bonds as a benchmark would result in an average annual yield of 2.74%
and 4.03% respectively.
The total income from the foreign reserves investment is calculated as
Incomet=(Average Foreign Reservet×Average[et]-Incomet-1)×yieldt, where the subscript t stands
for the values at time t. Since the foreign reserves and exchange rates data from IFS are at the

35

According to the statistics on foreign net purchase of US securities published by Fed, China's total
purchase includes U.S government bonds, some cooperate bonds and very little U.S. cooperate stocks.
However the term structure of the bonds or the exact break down of China's holding of US assets are not
available. Here I use the long term government bond as a proxy.
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end of month, average monthly values are calculated using data from this and the previous
month. Income from the previous month is deducted from this month's average foreign
reserves stocks to get the principle amount for this month. I here make the simple assumption
that the income earned from foreign reserves each month is not re-invested and can indeed be
used to cover the sterilization cost. In this way, there is no double counting the interest earned.
Figure 15 plots the PBC's estimated monthly income from foreign reserves investment
using ten-year and five-year bonds respectively and its cost of sterilization, starting from April
2003, when the first new PBC bill was issued. From the graph one can see that the positive gap
between income and cost has been growing since 2005, but has recently taken a downturn at
the end of 2008 and widened again afterwards, mainly due to a drop in long term foreign
interest rates. Due to a combination of rapid increases in foreign reserves and high yields on
reserves investment, the PBC's income from foreign reserves investment calculated from both
types of bonds have been exceeding the upper bound of sterilization cost consistently, with the
only exception in December 2008, where the income from five-year yields falls below the upper
bound on cost but still stays above the lower bound. At the current exchange rate and keeping
the PBC's cost constant, China's foreign reserves will have to drop 36% before the income from
five-year bonds hits the lower bound. Another way to look at it is that the RMB would have to
appreciate by more than 50% against the US dollar before the income from five-year bonds fails
to cover the lower bound, assuming the exchange rates stay constant.
If foreign interest rates keep dropping, China will suffer a more drastic decrease in its
income from foreign reserves, especially if its investment is of a shorter term than that
estimated. Figure 16 plots the same graph as before but with five-year and two-year bond yields
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as proxies instead. Since the short/medium term foreign interest rate has dropped sharply,
investment yields from two-year government bonds cannot cover PBC's interest expenses after
late 2008. Moreover, China holds some of the US ABS (Asset-Backed Securities). Though the

billions, RMB

exact amount is unknown, the ABS may be another source for the losses in foreign reserves.
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Figure 15 PBC's income VS. Sterilization Cost, long term bonds
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Using different foreign exchange compositions leaves the conclusion largely
unchanged. Especially, in one experiment all the Euros are replaced with Japanese Yen, leaving
the proportion of US dollars unchanged. Since Japanese government bonds have much lower
yields than their US and European counterparts, this experiment leads to a lower value of the
investment income from foreign reserves. In this case, the income from the 10-year bond still
exceeds both the upper and lower bounds on sterilization cost in every month except for
December 2008. The yields from 5-year bonds exceeds the cost lower bound except for
December 2008.

2.4.2 Linear Projections
As a thought experiment, I also performed simple linear projections of the sterilization
cost and the income from foreign reserves investment. Figure 17 shows the projected values
from July 2010 through June 2015 using COFER compositions. The projected values and
standard errors of the upper/lower bound on sterilization costs are calculated using OLS based
on the data from July 2005 to June 2010. Foreign reserves denominated in dollars are projected
under a linear regression based on the values from the same period and the investment yield is
assumed to stay constant at the June 2010 level. Future exchange rates of RMB against US$ are
also projected linearly, based on the values between July 2005 and June 2010. The projected
income from foreign reserves investment is calculated as Incomeproj,t+j=(Average Foreign
Reserveproj,j×Average[eproj,j]-Incomeproj,j-1)×yieldJune2010, where the subscript stands the projected
value at time j after June 2010. Standard errors of the income from foreign reserves investment
are calculated using delta methods assuming the covariance matrix of foreign reserves and
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exchange rates is diagonal. As before, I convert the month-end data of foreign reserves and
exchange rates to month-average. Those data are then used in the projection.
We can see that even with RMB appreciating, according to Figure 17 the ten-year
bond income still stays well above the upper cost bound. The upper cost bound only start to
catch up with the 5 year bond income in the end of 2012. I also did a similar experiment with
the exchange rate fixed at the June 2010 level. Without the appreciation, even the five-year
bond income stays above the upper cost bound. Using two-year bond income produces a
drastically different picture in the projection, of course. As the previous section indicates, the
foreign exchange investment income estimated from two-year government bond always stays
below the lower cost bound (graph is not shown here). However it is quite unlikely that China
will switch massively to a shorter term investment in the near future, since the SAFE has never
expressed any concern on the liquidity of its current foreign exchange investment.

Figure 17 Linear projection (projected exchange rate)

Admittedly this projection is very parsimonious. Nevertheless it sends an important
message that among all the things, the appreciation of the RMB and the terms of the invested
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Treasuries have profound impacts on the PBC's income from foreign reserves. This does not
mean that the PBC's sterilization is not sustainable, though. Firstly, there is no reason why China
would want to switch to a short investment horizon in terms of foreign reserves. Secondly, as
the RMB appreciates, the speculative capital inflow into the country will be reduced. In that case,
the PBC will no longer need to engage in such massive sterilizations. I thus conclude that as long
as China is able to keep a stable interest rate paid on the PBC bills and experiences no sudden
drop in foreign reserves, there is no obvious reason why the PBC will lose its capacity of
extensive sterilizations in the near future.
Having said that, I recognize that sterilization might have other unobserved costs
besides interest payments. For example, it was argued that domestic interest rates on the PBC
bills were artificially kept low by the central bank, in order to sustain low interest payments on
bonds. This so-called financial repression environment hinders the financial market from
working efficiently. Furthermore, raising the required reserve ratio posts a cost on domestic
commercial banks by lowering their profit margin. The cost of those is, however, hard to
quantify. Moreover, there is little definite evidence showing that the PBC bond is indeed
overpriced. It is obvious that the PBC bills should have a lower rate than other corporate bonds
since the bills are implicitly backed by the Chinese government and thus are considered to be
default free. The only comparable security here is probably the Treasury bond of similar terms
issued by the Ministry of Finance, which is also auctioned off and is traded in the interbank
markets and at the exchanges. The average annual yields of China's one year government bond
traded at the exchanges are 2.84% and 3.13% in 2007 and 2008 respectively 36, which are
actually lower than the PBC bill rates in the same period. Since the Treasury bonds are traded at
36

Data from Bloomberg, index GCNY1YR
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the exchanges and thus are accessible by the general public, their yields should better reflect
the market expectations. The fact that the PBC bills have a higher rate sheds some doubts on
the claim that the PBC bills rates are intentionally suppressed. Of course one can always argue
that the PBC suppresses the domestic rates on RMB denominated assets in general. The
validation of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper.

2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the degree of sterilization and capital mobility in China in the
recent episode of a crawling peg exchange rate and rapid foreign reserve accumulation. The
results suggest a sterilization coefficient between -0.8 and -0.9, and an offset coefficient of
around -0.6. This implies that the PBC has been carrying out a almost full sterilization, and the
capital controls in China are somewhat porous but still effective. In spite of a continuous inflow
of foreign exchange, China seems to be able to maintain a steadily increasing monetary base
and a stable price level. A reduced form VAR confirms the result that the impact of changes in
net foreign assets has been effectively neutralized. The sterilization coefficients in this paper lie
within the wide range offered by Aizenman and Glick (2008). They are smaller than those
obtained by He et al. (2005) and greater than those of Wu (2006) and Ouyang, Rajan and Willett
(2007a). The offset coefficients in the paper are comparable to those of Ouyang, Rajan and
Willett (2007a). Unlike in Aizenman and Glick (2008), rolling regressions show that there is no
obvious increasing trend in sterilization coefficients from 2004 to 2008. A small sample size in
this paper and a different time frame and method may have contributed to the differences.
Secondly, I estimate the lower and upper bounds on PBC's cost of sterilization and
compare them with the income the PBC earns from investing foreign exchange reserves in long
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term foreign government bonds. Calculation shows that so far the PBC's sterilization cost can be
fully covered by its income from foreign reserves, which provides support to Prasad and Wei
(2005)'s claim that there are in fact net marginal benefits to a combination of large reserves
holding and continuous sterilization in China's case. Projections of future sterilization cost and
foreign reserves investment income also show no sign that sterilization will become
unsustainable in the near future. However further appreciation of RMB and a switch to short
term bond may have a profound negative impact on the PBC's income from foreign reserves
investment in domestic currency terms. As China is moving towards a more liberal exchange
rate policy, it will probably suffer a capital loss on its foreign exchange reserves in RMB terms.
Nevertheless, in this case the resulting decrease in the speculative capital inflows will mitigate
the need for sterilization.
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper we provide a comprehensive review of China’s financial system and
extensive comparisons with other countries. Almost every functioning financial system includes
financial markets and intermediaries (e.g., a banking sector), but how these two standard
financial sectors contribute to the entire financial system and economy differs significantly
across different countries. In this regard, we discuss what has worked and what has not within
the two sectors, and consider the effects of further development on the entire economy. We
also examine a non-standard financial sector, which operates outside the markets and banking
sectors and consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and institutions.
Finally, we provide guidelines for future research on several unresolved issues, including how
China’s financial system can integrate into the world’s markets and economy without being
interrupted by damaging financial crises.

Although there is no consensus regarding the
108

prospects for China’s future economic growth, a prevailing view on China’s financial system
speculates that it is one of the weakest links in the economy and it will hamper future economic
growth.
We draw four main conclusions about China’s financial system and its future
development.
First, when we examine and compare China’s banking system and financial markets with
those of both developed and emerging countries, we find China’s financial system has been
dominated by a large banking system. Even with the entrance and growth of many domestic
and foreign banks and financial institutions in recent years, China’s banking system is still mainly
controlled by the four largest state-owned banks. All of these ‘Big Four’ banks have become
publicly listed and traded companies in recent years, with the government being the largest
shareholder and retaining control. This ownership structure has served these banks well in
terms of avoiding major problems encountered by major financial institutions in developed
countries that are at the center of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Moreover, the level of
non-performing loans (NPLs) over GDP has been steadily decreasing after reaching its peak
during 2000- 2001.

Continuing improvement of the banking system, including further

development of financial institutions outside the Big Four banks and extending more credit to
productive firms and projects, can help stabilize China’s financial system in the short run, given
the uncertainties in the Chinese and global economies.
Our second conclusion concerns China’s financial markets.

Two domestic stock

exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE hereafter) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)
were established in 1990. Their scale and importance are not comparable to the banking sector;
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and they have not been effective in allocating resources in the economy, in that they remain
speculative and driven by insider trading. In recent years the stock market has witnessed
significant development. Going forward, financial markets are likely to play an increasingly
significant role in the economy. We discuss several issues and potential problems related to
increasing the size and scope and improving the efficiency of the stock and other financial
markets.
Third, in an earlier paper, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, AQQ hereafter) find that the most
successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy,
is not the banking sector or financial markets, but rather a sector of alternative financing
channels, such as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits, and
coalitions of various forms among firms, investors, and local governments. Many of these
financing channels rely on alternative governance mechanisms, such as competition in product
and input markets, and trust, reputation and relationships. Together this alternative financial
sector has supported the growth of a “Hybrid Sector” with various types of ownership structures.
Our definition of the Hybrid Sector includes all non-state, non-listed firms, including privately or
individually owned firms, and firms that are partially owned by local governments (e.g.,
Township Village Enterprises or TVEs). 37 The growth of the Hybrid Sector has been much higher
than that of the State Sector (state-owned enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central
government has ultimate control) and the Listed Sector (publicly listed and traded firms with
most of them converted from the State Sector). The Hybrid Sector contributes most of China’s

37

We include firms partially owned by local governments in the Hybrid Sector for two reasons. First,
despite the ownership stake of local governments and the sometimes ambiguous ownership structure and
property rights, the operation of these firms resembles more closely that of a for-profit, privately-owned
firm than that of a state-owned firm. Second, the ownership stake of local governments in many of these
firms has been privatized.
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economic growth, and employs the majority of the labor force. The co-existence of the
alternative financial sector with banks and markets can continue to fuel the growth of the
Hybrid Sector.
Finally, a significant challenge for China’s financial system is to avoid damaging financial
crises that can severely disrupt the economy and social stability. These crises include traditional
financial crises: a banking sector crisis stemming from an accumulation of NPLs and a sudden
drop in banks’ profits; or a crisis/crash resulting from speculative asset bubbles in the real estate
market or stock market. There are also other types of financial crises, such as a “twin crisis”
(simultaneous foreign exchange and banking/stock market crises) that struck many Asian
economies in the late 1990s. Since its entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,
the integration of China’s financial system and overall economy with the rest of the world has
significantly sped up. This process introduces cheap foreign capital and technology, but large
scale and sudden capital flows and foreign speculation increase the likelihood of a twin crisis. At
the end of 2007, China’s foreign currency reserves surpassed US$1.5 trillion, overtaking Japan to
become the largest in the world; they increased to about US$3.2 trillion as of June 2011 with a
large fraction invested in U.S. dollar denominated assets such as T-bills and notes. 38 The rapid
increase in China’s foreign exchange reserves suggests that there is a large amount of
speculative, “hot” money in China in anticipation of a continuing appreciation of the RMB,
China’s currency, relative to all other major currencies, especially the US dollar. Depending on
how the government and the central bank handle the process of revaluation, especially when
there is a large amount of capital outflow, there could be a classic currency crisis as the
38

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, China’s holding of U.S. treasury securities reached $ 1.17
trillion in July 2011. Morrison and Labonte (2008) estimate that around 70% of China’s foreign reserves
are invested in dollar denominated assets.
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government and central bank try to defend the partial currency peg, which in turn may trigger a
banking crisis if there are large withdrawals from banks.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly review the
history of China’s financial system development, present aggregate evidence on China’s financial
system, and compare them to those of developed and other developing countries. In Section
3.3, we examine China’s banking system and changes over time. In Section 3.4, we briefly
examine the growth and irregularities of financial markets, including the stock market, real
estate market, and listed firms, and consider the effects of several initiatives to develop new
markets and further develop existing markets, as well as changes in corporate governance
among listed firms. In Section 3.5, we examine the non-standard financial sector, including
alternative financial channels and governance mechanisms. Motivated by the success of this
financial sector and firms in the Hybrid Sector, we also compare the advantages and
disadvantages of using the law as the basis of finance and commerce. We then examine
different types of financial crises and their potential effects on China’s financial system in
Section 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the paper. In terms of converting RMB into US dollar,
we use the exchange rate of US$1 = RMB 8.28 (yuan) for transactions and events occurring
before 2005, and the spot rate at the end of each year for those activities during and after 2005
(Figure 25-A provides a graph of the exchange rates between the US dollar and the RMB).

3.2 Overview of China’s Financial System
3.2.1 A Brief Review of the History of China’s Financial System
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China’s financial system was well developed before 1949. 39 One key finding in reviewing
the history of this period, including the rise of Shanghai as one of the financial centers of Asia
during the first half of the 20th Century, is that the development of China’s commerce and
financial system as a whole was by and large outside the formal legal system. For example,
despite the entrance of Western-style courts in Shanghai and other major coastal cities in the
early 1900s, most business-related disputes were resolved through mechanisms outside courts,
including guilds (merchant coalitions), families and local notables. 40 In Section 3.5.3 below, we
argue that modern equivalents of these nonlegal dispute-resolution and corporate governance
mechanisms are behind the success of Hybrid Sector firms in the same areas in the 1980s and
1990s, and that these alternative mechanisms may be more responsive in adapting to changes
in a fast-growing economy like China than the law and legal institutions.
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all of the pre-1949
capitalist companies and institutions were nationalized by 1950. Between 1950 and 1978,
China’s financial system consisted of a single bank − the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), a central
government owned and controlled bank under the Ministry of Finance, which served as both the
central bank and a commercial bank, controlling about 93% of the total financial assets of the
country and handling almost all financial transactions. With its main role to finance the physical
production plans, the PBOC used both a “cash-plan” and a “credit-plan” to control the cash
flows in consumer markets and transfer flows between branches.
39

For more descriptions of the pre-1949 history of China’s financial system, see AQQ (2008); for more
anecdotal evidence on China’s financial system in the same period, see, for example, Kirby (1995) and Lee
(1993).
40
See, e.g., Chung (2005), for descriptions on family- and community-based mechanisms for contract
enforcement. Looking at how disputes were resolved in and outside courts, Goetzmann and Köll (2005)
conclude that the passing of China’s first Company law in 1904, which was intended to provide a better
legal environment for business and commerce, did not lead to actual changes in corporate governance and
better protection of (minority) shareholder rights.
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The first main structural change began in 1978 and ended in 1984. By the end of 1979,
the PBOC departed the Ministry and became a separate entity, while three state-owned banks
took over some of its commercial banking businesses: The Bank of China 41 (BOC) was given the
mandate to specialize in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; the People’s
Construction Bank of China (PCBC), originally formed in 1954, was set up to handle transactions
related to fixed investment (especially in manufacturing); the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC)
was set up (in 1979) to deal with all banking business in rural areas; and, the PBOC was formally
established as China’s central bank and a two-tier banking system was formed. Finally, the
fourth state-owned commercial bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was
formed in 1984, and took over the rest of the commercial transactions of the PBOC.
For most of the 1980s, the development of the financial system can be characterized by
the fast growth of financial intermediaries outside of the “Big Four” banks. Regional banks
(partially owned by local governments) were formed in the Special Economic Zones in the
coastal areas; in rural areas, a network of Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs; similar to credit
unions in the U.S.) was set up under the supervision of the ABC, while Urban Credit Cooperatives
(UCCs), counterparts of the RCCs in the urban areas, were also founded. Non-bank financial
intermediaries, such as the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs; operating in selected
banking and non-banking services with restrictions on both deposits and loans), emerged and
proliferated in this period.
The most significant event for China’s financial system in the 1990s was the inception
and growth of China’s stock market. Two domestic stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were
41

BOC, among the oldest banks currently in operation, was originally established in 1912 as a private bank,
and specialized in foreign currency related transactions.
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established in 1990 and grew very fast during most of the 1990s and in recent years in terms of
the total market capitalization and trading volume. In parallel with the development of the
stock market, the real estate market also went from nonexistent in the early 1990s to one that is
currently comparable in size with the stock market. 42 Both the stock and real estate markets
have experienced major corrections during the past decade, and are characterized by high
volatilities and speculative short-term behaviors by many investors.
These patterns are in part due to the fact that the development of a supportive legal
framework and institutions has been lagging behind that of the markets. For example, China’s
first bankruptcy law (governing SOEs) was passed in 1986 on a trial basis, but the formal
Company Law did not become effective until the end of 1999. This version of the Company Law
governs all corporations with limited liability, publicly listed and traded companies, and
branches or divisions of foreign companies, as well as their organization structure, securities
issuance and trading, accounting, bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions (for details see the
website of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/). In August
2006, a new bankruptcy law was enacted, and it became effective June 1, 2007. We provide a
brief analysis of the status and problems of the stock market and real estate market in Section
3.5 below.
Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, financial sector reform has focused on stateowned banks and especially the problem of NPLs (the China Banking Regulation Committee
(CBRC) was also established to oversee the banking industry). We will further discuss this issue
in Section 3.3. China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001 marked the beginning of a new era,
42

At the end of 2007, the total market capitalization of the two domestic exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) was
around $1.8 trillion, whereas total investment in the real estate market was around $3.12 trillion.
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as we continue to observe increasing competition from foreign financial institutions and more
frequent and larger scale capital flows. While increasingly larger inflows of foreign capital and
the presence of foreign institutions may continue to drive further growth of the financial system
and economy, larger scale capital flows can also increase the likelihood of damaging financial
crises. We will discuss these issues in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.
A developed financial system is characterized by, among other factors, the substantial
role played by institutional investors. In China, institutional investors began to emerge in the
late 1990s: the first closed-end fund, in which investors cannot withdraw capital after initial
investment, was set up in 1997, and the first open-end fund, in which investors can freely
withdraw capital (subject to share redemption restrictions), was established in 2001.

By

November 2009, there were 65 fund companies managing 551 funds with 520 open-ended
funds and the rest close-ended. The total net assets value (NAV) increased from RMB11 billion
(or US$ 1.3 Billion) in 1998 to RMB 2.26 trillion (or $328 billion) in November 2009, which is still
small compared to the assets within the banking sector. In 2003, a few Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investors (QFII) entered China’s asset management industry, and they have been
operating through forming joint ventures with Chinese companies. On the other hand, China
allowed Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) to invest in overseas markets beginning
in July 2006. At the end of 2008, the ten QDII funds had a total of $109.4 billion assets under
management.
At the national level, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established in
September 2007 with the intent of utilizing the accumulated foreign reserves for the benefit of
the state and $207.91 billion foreign reserves were placed under management at the
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establishment. CIC makes occasional announcements about its investment, but the overall
transparency of its investment strategy is low. Since inception, CIC has made some aggressive
investment decisions, including the well publicized $3 billion (pre-IPO) investment in private
equity group Blackstone, and the $5 billion investment in Morgan Stanley (this took the form of
mandatory convertible bonds that can be converted into almost 10% of the firm’s equity).
Endowed with limited capital and given problems with the administration of the
pension system, pension funds have not played a significant role in the stock or bond market. 43
With a fast aging population and the growth of households’ disposable income, further
development of a multi-pillar pension system, including individual accounts with employees’
self-contributed (tax exempt) funds that can be directly invested in the financial markets, can
lead to the development of both the financial system and the fiscal system as well as social
stability. At the top of the pension fund system, China’s National Social Security Fund (NSSF)
was established in August 2002 and is administered by the National Council for Social Security
Fund. This (sovereign) fund is mainly financed by capital and equity assets derived from the
listing of state-owned companies, fiscal allocations from the central government, and other
investment proceeds. It has recently shifted its core investment strategy of focusing on the
domestic A-share and bond markets to a more diversified basket of assets, including
investments in emerging markets and Europe. At the end of 2008, the fund had a total of $89.2
billion in assets; it grew to RMB856.7 billion ($142.8 billion) at the end of 2010 according to the
annual report of NSSF. Finally, there are very few hedge funds that implement “long-short”
43

While there is a nationwide, government run pension system (financed mainly through taxes on
employers and employees), the coverage ratio of the pension system varies significantly across regions and
is particularly low in rural areas. Moreover, there is a very limited amount of capital in individual accounts
and most of the capital has been invested in banks and government projects with low returns. See, for
example, Feldstein (1999, 2003) and Feldstein and Liebman (2006), for more details on China’s pension
system.
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strategies, as short selling has been prohibited until recently. 44
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Figure 18 Overview of China’s Financial System

Figure 18 depicts the current structure of the entire financial system. In what follows
we will describe and examine each of the major sectors of the financial system. In addition to
the standard sectors of banking and intermediation and financial markets, we will document the
importance of the non-standard financial sector. Due to space limitation, we do not cover
China’s “foreign sectors” in this chapter; for discussions on the history and the role of these
sectors in supporting the growth of the economy, see, for example, Prasad and Wei (2007) for a
review.

44

Along with the introduction of an index future (for A shares) in April 2010, a trial program on short
selling began for selected institutional investors (security companies; see, e.g., www.wsj.com, 3/31/2010).
The impact of introducing these new programs and products on the financial market is yet to be seen.

118

3.2.2 Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banks, Markets, and Alternative

Finance

In Table 19, we compare China’s financial system to those of other major emerging
economies, with measures for the size and efficiency of banks and markets taken from Levine
(2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and data from the World Bank Financial Database.
We present average figures over the period 2001-2007 for each country as well as the average
of all the other emerging economies (excluding China). We first compare the size of a country’s
banks and equity markets relative to that country’s gross domestic product (GDP). In terms of
total market capitalization, China’s stock market, at 64% of its GDP over the period 2001-2007, is
slightly larger than the 58% of GDP average of the other major emerging economies. “Value
Traded” is perhaps a better measure of the actual size of the market than “market
capitalization,” because the latter includes non-tradable shares or tradable shares that are
rarely traded. In this regard, the size of China’s stock market (62% of GDP) is significantly larger
than the average of other emerging economies (with an average of 37% of GDP). Similarly, the
size of China’s banking system, in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors, is 116% of its
GDP over 2001-2007, and considerably larger than the average of other major emerging
economies (with an average of 65% of GDP). However, the majority of the bank credit goes to
state-owned firms in China and only a small fraction goes to firms in the Hybrid Sector (more
evidence of this is given below). In addition, NPLs account for a larger fraction of all the loans in
China than the average of other emerging economies (16% vs. 10%), indicating that its banking
sector still has scope to improve its efficiency. 45

45

Levine (2002) uses bank overhead cost/total assets to measure banking sector efficiency, and used this
measure to construct the “Structure Efficiency” and “Finance Efficiency” measures. However, the World
Bank Financial Database no longer reports the overhead cost/assets ratio; we replace this with NPLs/loans
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Table 19 Comparing financial systems: Banks and Markets (average 2001-2007)
This table compares financial markets and banking sector of China with those of other large emerging
economies. All the measures on the size and efficiency of banks and markets are based on Levine (2002)
and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), and data is from the World Bank Financial Database. We present
the 2001-2007 average figures for all countries (except for “Structure Regulatory,” which are based on
2005 figures). Average of other emerging economies are (simple) averages across other emerging
economies excluding China.
Structure Indices: Markets vs.
*
banks

Size of Banks and Markets

Measure
China
Argentin
Brazil
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Philippin
Russian
S. Africa
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Turkey
Ave. for
EMs

Bank
credit/
GDP

NPL/
Total
Loans

Financial
**
Development (banking
and market sectors)

Value
traded
/GDP

Market
cap./
GDP

Activity

Size

Efficiency

Regulatory

Activity

Size

Efficiency

1.16
0.14
0.34
0.52
0.37
0.24
1.15
0.18
0.26
0.21
0.34
0.26
1.38
0.31
1.02
0.20

0.16
0.10
0.04
0.21
0.07
0.12
0.12
0.03
0.14
0.08
0.15
0.04
0.02
0.15
0.11
0.10

0.62
0.04
0.19
0.19
0.57
0.12
0.43
0.06
0.72
0.03
0.07
0.27
0.88
0.03
0.50
0.39

0.64
0.48
0.53
0.60
0.64
0.28
1.45
0.26
0.28
0.44
0.47
0.65
2.06
0.18
0.63
0.28

-0.62
-1.32
-0.61
-1.02
0.44
-0.69
-0.98
-0.99
1.01
-1.96
-1.54
0.06
-0.45
-2.33
-0.72
0.67

8.88
3.93
6.45
6.88
7.65
5.66
8.51
4.74
7.55
4.10
5.50
6.54
9.40
4.52
8.52
6.65

2.32
1.59
0.72
2.54
1.50
1.23
2.85
-0.26
1.36
1.22
1.97
0.96
1.43
1.00
1.95
1.05

16
7
10
13
10
Na
10
12
10
8
7
Na
8
7
9
12

8.88
3.93
6.45
6.88
7.65
5.66
8.51
4.74
7.55
4.10
5.50
6.54
9.40
4.52
8.52
6.65

8.91
6.50
7.49
8.04
7.76
6.51
9.72
6.11
6.61
6.81
7.36
7.41
10.2
6.31
8.77
6.32

5.97
3.60
6.17
4.48
6.71
4.60
5.89
5.38
6.26
3.63
3.85
6.52
8.38
2.97
6.10
5.93

0.46

0.10

0.30

0.62

-0.70

6.44

1.41

9.46

6.44

7.46

5.36

Notes: *: Structure indices measure whether a country’s financial system is market- or bank-dominated; the
higher the measure, the more the system is dominated by markets. Specifically, “structure activity” is equal to
log(value traded/bank credit) and measures size of bank credit relative to trading volume of markets; “structure
size” is equal to log(market cap/bank credit) and measures the size of markets relative to banks; “structure
efficiency” is equal to log(market cap ratio×bank NPL ratio) and measures the relative efficiency of markets vs.
banks; finally, “structure regulatory” is the sum of the four categories in regulatory restriction, or the degree to
which commercial banks are allowed to engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and real estate: 1unrestricted; 2-permit to conduct through subsidiary; 3-full range not permitted in subsidiaries; and 4-strictly
prohibited.
**

: Financial development variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors
combined), and the higher the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is. Specifically,
“finance activity” is equal to log (total value traded ratio×private credit ratio), “finance size” is equal to log
(market cap ratio×bank private credit ratio), and “finance efficiency” is equal to log (total value traded
ratio/bank NPL ratio).

ratio as an alternative measure of efficiency and use this variable to define other efficiency measures in
Table 19.
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The next two columns of Table 19 (“Structure indices”) compare the relative importance
of financial markets vs. banks, with a lower score indicating that banks are more important
relative to markets.

China’s score for “Structure size” (Log of the ratio of Market

Capitalization/Total Bank Credit) is positive, suggesting that the size of total market
capitalization is actually larger than that of bank credit, and the score is greater than the average
of other emerging economies; its score for “Structure Activity” (Log of the ratio of Float supply
of market cap/Total Bank Credit) is negative, indicating that float supply fraction of the market
cap is still smaller than bank credit, and it is similar to the average of other emerging economies.
Taken together these numbers suggest that the financial system of most emerging economies,
including that of China, remains bank-dominated. In terms of “Structure efficiency” (Log of
product (Market capitalization/GDP) × (bank NPLs/bank total loans)), which denotes the relative
efficiency of markets vs. banks, China has a higher score than most other developing countries,
suggesting that its banks are relatively less efficient than markets compared to other countries.
“Structure regulatory” measures (based on 2005 data) the extent to which commercial banks
are restricted to participate in activities outside commercial lending, and China’s score of 16 is
higher than most other countries, suggesting that by law commercial banks in China face tight
restrictions in operating in other areas.
We also compare the development of the financial system (“Financial Development”),
including both banks and markets (the last three columns of Table 19). China’s overall financial
market size, in terms of both “Finance Activity” (Log of product of (Float supply of market/GDP)
× (Bank credit/GDP)) and “Finance Size” (Log of product of (Market capitalization/GDP) + (Bank
credit/GDP)), are larger than the averages of other emerging countries. In terms of “Finance
Efficiency” (Log of (Total floating supply/GDP)/Bank NPLs Ratio), China’s measure is slightly
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higher than the average of other emerging countries. Based on the evidence from the past
decade, we can conclude that China’s banks and markets, or the formal sectors of the financial
system, are as large as or larger than other major emerging economies (relative to its size of the
economy). However, the banking sector does not lend much to the Hybrid Sector, which as we
will see in Section 3.5, is the dynamic part of the economy.
A related question to the size of banks and markets is where do most firms get the
capital and funds? As shown in AQQ (2005, 2008), the four most important financing sources
for all firms in China, in terms of firms’ fixed asset investments, are, (domestic) bank loans, firms’
self-fundraising, the state budget and FDI, with self-fundraising and bank loans carrying most of
the weight. Self-fundraising, falling into the category of alternative finance (non-bank, nonmarket finance), includes proceeds from capital raised from local governments (beyond the
state budget), communities and other investors, internal financing channels such as retained
earnings and all other funds raised domestically by the firms. The size of total self-fundraising of
all firms has been growing at an average annual rate of 23.6% over the period of 1994-2009, and
reached $2,213.2 billion at the end of 2009, compared to a total of $565.7 billion for domestic
bank loans for the same year. It is important to point out that equity and bond issuance, which
are included in self-fundraising (but fall into the category of formal external finance), apply only
to the Listed Sector, and account for a small fraction of this category.
While the Listed Sector has been growing fast, SOEs are on a downward trend, as
privatization of these firms is still in progress. Around 30% of publicly traded companies’
funding comes from bank loans, and this ratio has been very stable. Around 45% of the Listed
Sector’s total funding comes from self-fundraising, including internal financing and proceeds
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from equity and bond issuance. Moreover, equity and bond sales, which rely on the use of
external markets, only constitute a small fraction of total funds raised in comparison to internal
financing and other forms of fundraising. Combined with the fact that self-fundraising is also
the most important source of financing for the State Sector (45% to 65%), we can conclude that
alternative channels of financing are important even for the State and Listed Sectors.
Not surprisingly, self-fundraising plays an even more important role for firms in the
Hybrid Sector, accounting for close to 60% of total funds raised, while individually owned
companies, a subset of the Hybrid Sector, rely on self-fundraising for 90% of total financing.
Self-fundraising here includes all forms of internal finance, capital raised from family and friends
of the founders and managers, and funds raised in the form of private equity and loans. Since
firms in this sector operate in an environment with legal and financial mechanisms and
regulations that are probably poorer than those available for firms in the State and Listed
Sectors, financing sources may work differently from how they work in the State and Listed
Sectors, and those in developed countries. In Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (ACDQQ,
2008), the authors argue that alternative finance channels, substitute for formal financing
channels through banks and markets, and expand the capacity of financial systems in emerging
countries such as China and India.

3.3 The Banking and Intermediation Sector
In this section, we examine the status of China’s banking and intermediation sector.
After reviewing aggregate evidence on bank deposits and loans, we analyze the size and time
trend of NPLs. Finally, we review evidence on the growth of non-state banks and financial
123

intermediaries.

3.3.1 Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans
As in other Asian countries, China’s household savings rates have been high throughout
the reform era. Given the growth of the economy, the sharp increase in personal income, and
limited investment opportunities, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals
have been growing fast since the mid-1980s. From Figure 19-A, residents in metropolitan areas
contribute the most to total deposits beginning in the late 1980s (roughly 50%), while deposits
from enterprises (including firms from all three sectors) provide the second most important
source. The role of deposits from government agencies and organizations (including non-profit
and for-profit organizations, not shown in the figure) has steadily decreased over time.

Components of Bank Deposits
60%

Enterprise (% of total)

50%
Budgetary(% of total)

% of total deposits
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0%

Year

Figure 19-A Sources for Bank Deposits in China
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Figure 19-B Comparing Total Bank Credit extended to private/hybrid sectors

Table 20-A Comparisons of Total Savings and Deposits (in US$ billions)
1998

1999

2003

2004

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

a

320
606
100
68%

391
674
114
73%

777
1143
253
85%

899
1445
307
91%

1030 1265 1671 1931
1748 2069 2363 3187
410 676 878 1205
95% 101% 92% 100%

2683
3811
1661
114%

a

1793
7921

2259
8997

3523
5416

3795
5448

3541 3523 3683 4560
4642 4536 4778 6160

-

181%

185%

-

22
251

184% 142% 131% 118% 114% 109% 106% 106% 110%
South Korea
23
27
36
38
46
54
67
66
50
289 315 383
410
467
485 546 543 471

18
185
46%

54%

61%

Demand deposits
24
Time, savings & foreign
140
currency deposits
Time & Savings Dep/GDP 34%
Source: IMF and CEIC database

28
161
36%

Demand deposits
b
Savings deposits
c
Time deposits
Time & Savings Dep/GDP
Demand deposits
Time, savings & foreign
currency deposits
Time & Savings Dep/GDP
a

Demand deposits
Time, savings & foreign
currency deposits
Time & Savings Dep/GDP
a

2000 2001 2002
China
465 533 647
722 820 961
136 171 199
72% 75% 80%
Japan
2073 1838 2567
8059 5351 5383

63
574

64%

58%

57%

56%

52%

58%

63%

31
175

64% 63%
India
32
35
198 235

44
277

60
333

71
368

89
460

114
647

96
653

119
800

39%

42%

46%

46%

46%

49%

54%

59%

60%

46%

a

b

Notes: : Demand deposits, balance of the accounts can be withdrawn on demand of customers (e.g., check-writing); :
Savings deposits, interest-bearing accounts that can be withdrawn but cannot be used as Money (e.g., no checking
c
writing); : Time deposits, savings accounts or CD with a fixed term.
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Table 20-B Breakdown of Bank Loans (end-of-year figures in RMB billions)
Year

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Total
Loans

Shortterm
Loans

3,997.60
5,054.41
6,115.66
7,491.41
8,652.41
9,373.43
9,937.11
11,231.47
13,129.39
15,899.62
17,819.78
19,469.04
22,534,72

2,694.8
3,337.2
4,021.0
5,541.8
6,061.3
6,388.7
6,574.8
6,732.7
7,424.7
8,366.1
8,684.0
8,744.9
9,853.4

Industrial Commercial
Loans
Loans

994.83
1,177.4
1,421.3
1,652.6
1,782.1
1,794.8
1,701.9
1,863.6
2,019.0
2,275.6
2,389.6
2,251.6
2,865.4

Infrastructure
Construction
Loans

Agricultural
Loans

Loans
to
TVEs

Privately
Owned
Firms

61.72
79.93
97.38
159.11
162.87
147.69
161.71
209.96
274.80
300.21
278.01
298.37
361.26

114.39
154.48
191.91
331.46
444.42
479.24
488.90
571.15
688.46
841.14
984.31
1,152.99
1,320.82

200.
251.
282.
503.
558.
616.
606.
641.
681.
766.
806.
790.
622.

15.59
19.62
27.98
38.67
47.16
57.91
65.46
91.80
105.88
146.16
208.16
218.08
266.76

1,050.98
1,283.71
1,533.26
1,835.66
1,975.24
1,989.09
1,786.85
1,856.34
1,797.31
1,799.44
1,707.41
1,644.76
1,667.15

Joint
Ventures,
Cooperative
Firms

79.23
99.91
134.63
189.10
248.75
298.58
304.98
326.35
269.74
256.94
219.84
197.53
183.27

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of China, CEIC database (1985 – 2009).

Table 20-A compares total savings and bank deposits in China, Japan, South Korea, and
India during the period 1997-2009. In terms of the ratio of Time and Savings Deposits/GDP,
China maintains the highest or second highest level (an average of over 90% in recent years),
while Japan leads the group in terms of total amount. Looking at the breakdown of bank
deposits, interest-bearing “savings deposits” are by far the most important form of deposits in
China, providing a good source for bank loans and other forms of investment. Figure 19-B
compares total (nonstate) bank credit (over GDP) extended to Hybrid Sector firms in China, and
privately owned firms (including those publicly listed and traded) in Taiwan and South Korea.
For South Korea, we also plot the bank credit ratios during its high economic growth period of
the 1970s and 1980s (each year appearing on the horizontal axis indicates the time period for
China, while a particular year minus 20 indicates the time period for South Korea). We can see
that the scale and growth of China’s ‘hybrid’ bank credit during 1991-2009 are far below those
(of private bank credit) of Taiwan and South Korea in the same period, but are similar to those
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of South Korea twenty years ago.
Table 20-B breaks down China’s bank loans by maturities, loan purposes, and borrower
types during the period 1994-2009. While there has been a shift from short-term to long-term
loans (first two columns), the majority of loans goes to SOEs in manufacturing industries
(“Industrial Loans” and “Commercial Loans”). Most of the “Infrastructure/Construction Loans”
(a small component of total loans) fund government sponsored projects, while the size of
“Agricultural Loans” is much smaller. More importantly, the size of loans made to TVEs,
privately- and collectively-owned firms, and joint ventures (last 3 columns), which all belong to
the Hybrid Sector, is also much smaller. Consistent with the aggregate evidence from Section
3.2 above and our firm-level evidence below, we find that bank loans have been one of the
important financing sources for Hybrid Sector firms, but the majority of the bank loans goes to
the State and Listed Sectors. Researchers have argued that the imbalance between loans made
to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s policies of wealth transfer
from the Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks (e.g., Brandt and Zhu, 2000).

3.3.2 An Analysis of NPLs and Further Reform of the Banking Sector
China’s banking sector is dominated by large state-owned banks, namely, the “Big Four”
banks of ICBC, BOC, PCBC, and ABC. The dominance of the Big Four banks also implies that the
degree of competition within the banking sector has been low. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine (2001) compare the five-bank concentration (share of the assets of the five largest
banks in total banking assets), and find that China’s concentration ratio of 91% at the end of
1997 (and for much of 1990s) is one of the highest in the world.
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However, China’s

concentration ratio has been falling sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state
banks and intermediaries.
The most significant problem for China’s banking sector, and for the entire financial
system during the last decade, was the amount of NPLs within state-owned banks, and in
particular, among the Big Four banks. Reducing the amount of NPLs to normal levels was a high
priority for China’s financial system. We mainly rely on official sources for our analysis on NPLs,
but we also speculate based on data from non-government sources, including case studies from
particular regions or banks. Some of this data and speculations paint a much gloomier picture of
the NPLs and China’s state-owned banks than the official data suggests.

3.3.2.1 Comparing NPLs and Reducing NPLs in China
In Panel A of Table 21-A, we compare NPLs in China, the U.S., and other major Asian
economies during 1998-2010 based on official figures. NPLs are measured by their size (in
US$ billion) and as a percentage of GDP in the same year (shown in brackets). Notice that the
official information on China’s NPLs first became available in 1998, but the figures in 1998 and
1999 in Table 21-A probably significantly under-estimate the actual size of NPLs; this also
explains the jump in the size of China’s NPLs from 1999 to 2000. China’s NPLs are the highest in
the group from 2000 to 2007, and as high as 20% to 22.5% of GDP (in 2000 and 2001). The
cross-country comparison includes the period during which Asian countries recovered from the
1997 financial crisis (e.g., the size of NPLs in South Korea exceeded 12% of GDP in 1999 but it
was reduced to below 3% two years later), and the period during which the Japanese banking
system was disturbed by the prolonged NPL problem (the size of Japan’s NPLs is the second
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largest of the group throughout the period). However, the level of NPLs (over GDP) in China has
shown a clear downward trend since the peak in 2000-2001, with the total amount of NPLs also
falling during 2004-2010. In fact, with the banking sector in most developed countries struggling
with the ongoing global financial crisis, China’s banking sector has done quite well, with its total
NPLs in 2010 ($68.1 billion) only one seventh of that of the U.S. and the ratio of NPLs over GDP
falling below that of the U.S. as well.
As bad as some of the NPL numbers in early years in Panel A of Table 21-A appear, they
may still significantly underestimate the amount of NPLs within China’s banking system
according to some critics. First, the official figures on outstanding NPLs (cumulated across all
commercial banks in China) do not include the bad loans that have been transferred from banks
to four state-owned asset management companies (AMCs)—with the purpose of liquidating
these bad loans. For example, if we add the NPLs held by the four AMCs (book value of RMB
866 billion, or $125.5 billion, shown in the last row of Table 21-B) in the first quarter of 2006 to
the mix of NPLs shown in Panel A of Table 21-A, the total amount of China’s NPLs would increase
by two-thirds. Second, the classification of NPLs has been problematic in China. The Basle
Committee for Bank Supervision classifies a loan as “doubtful” or bad when any interest
payment is overdue by 180 days or more (in the U.S. it is 90 days); whereas in China, this step
has not typically been taken until the principal payment is delayed beyond the loan maturity
date or an extended due date, and in many cases, until the borrower has declared bankruptcy
and/or has gone through liquidation. Qiu et al. (2000) estimate that the ratio of loan interest
paid to state-owned banks over loan interest owed is on average less than 50% in 1999,
suggesting that the actual ratio of NPLs over total loans made can be higher than 50% in 1999.
This piece of evidence, along with others, suggests that the amount of NPLs (and as a
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percentage of GDP) could be twice as large as the official figures reported in Panel A of Table 21A. 46
Since a large fraction of the NPLs among state-owned banks, and in particular, the Big
Four banks, resulted from poor lending decisions made for SOEs, some of which were due to
political or other non-economic reasons, it can be argued that the natural party to bear the
burden of reducing the NPLs is the government. This view of essentially treating NPLs as a fiscal
problem implies that the ultimate source of eliminating NPLs lies in China’s overall economic
growth.

47

As long as the economy maintains its strong growth momentum so that tax receipts

also increase, the government can always assume the remaining (and new) NPLs without
significantly affecting the economy. In this regard, Panel B of Table 21-A compares total
outstanding government debt, and Panel C presents a comparison of the ratio of (NPLs +
Government Debt)/GDP across countries, with the sum of NPLs and government debt indicating
the total burden of the government. Depending on data availability, total government debt is
either measured by the sum of all types of domestic and foreign debt (the U.S., Japan, and India),
or by the level of outstanding government bonds (all other countries) in a given year.
Unlike the severity of its NPL problem in the early 2000s, the Chinese government has
not issued a large amount of debt, with total outstanding government bonds growing from only
9% of GDP in 1998 to around 20% of GDP in 2010. By contrast, countries such as the U.S. and
India have a large amount of government debt. Japan is the only country in the group that has a
large amount of NPLs and government debt for most of the period. When we combine the
46

Consistent with this view, Lardy (1998) argues that, if using international standards on bad loans, the
existing NPLs within China’s state-owned banks as of the mid-1990s would make these banks’ total net
worth negative, so that the entire network of state banks would have been insolvent.
47
See, for example, Perkins and Rawski (2008) for a review and projections on the prospects of long-run
economic growth and statistics in China.
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results from Panels A and B and compare the total government burden in Panel C, we use two
sets of ratios for U.S. and Japan. In addition to using total outstanding government debt, we use
ratios (in the brackets) based on the sum of net government debt and NPLs, where net
government debt is the difference between government borrowing (a ‘stock’ measure) and
government lending (also a stock measure); not surprisingly, these ratios are much lower than
using the gross figures.
From Panel C, China’s total government burden is in the middle of the pack: the ratios of
total government burden over GDP (using the official NPL figures) are significantly lower than
those in Japan, the U.S., and India, are comparable with those of Taiwan and Korea, and are
higher than Indonesia only. In recent years, even if we double the size of the official NPL figures,
China’s total government burden would not increase much as the total amount of NPLs is small
relative to the size of GDPs. Based on these crude comparisons, going forward it seems that the
NPLs should not be an arduous burden for the Chinese government (or the banking sector),
while the same cannot be said for Japan and the U.S. Caution is needed for this conclusion: first,
new NPLs in China may grow much faster than other countries as the government’s recent
massive economic stimulus plan led to a significant increase in new loans made during 20082009, including many questionable loans to local governments 48; and second, China’s currently
small government debt may experience a sharp increase in the near future given the need for
higher fiscal spending in areas such as pension plans and other social welfare programs.
Recognizing the importance of and its responsibility in reducing NPLs in the Big Four
48

According to senior officials from the CBRC, Chinese banks are facing default risks on more than onefifth of the RMB7,700bn ($1,135bn) loans they have made to local governments across the country; most
of these loans were used to fund regional infrastructure projects (Financial Times, 08/01/2010). In July
2011, Moody estimated that local government loans can be as high as RMB14.2 trillion, and the NPL ratio
for Chinese banks could be 8-12% (Reuters, 07/05/2011).
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banks, the Chinese government injected large amounts of foreign currency reserves (mostly in
the form of US dollars, T-bills, Euros and Yen) into these banks to improve their balance sheets
in preparation for going public. This process began at the end of 2003, with the establishment
of the Central Huijin Investment Company, through which the PBOC injected US$45 billion of
reserves into the BOC and PCBC, while ICBC (the largest commercial bank in China and one of
the largest in the world in terms of assets) received US$15 billion during the first half of 2005. In
2008, ABC received US$19 billion from Huijin in spite of the global financial crisis. All Big Four
banks have since become publicly listed and traded on either the HKSE and/or the SHSE,
including ABC (the last of the Big Four), which completed its IPO on July 15, 2010 (SHSE) and July
16 (HKSE).
However, the injection plan will not prevent new NPLs from originating in the banking
system. In fact, it may create perverse “too big to fail” incentives for state-owned banks, in that
if these banks believe that there will be a ‘bailout’ whenever they run into future financial
distress, they have an incentive to take on risky, negative-NPV projects. This moral hazard
problem can thwart the government’s efforts in keeping the NPLs in check, while similar
problems occurred during and after the government bailouts in the S&L crisis in the U.S. in the
1980s (e.g., Kane 1989, 2003) and are among the most significant factors that caused the
ongoing financial crisis. In this regard, a credible commitment from the government that the
capital injection plan is a one-time measure to boost the capital adequacy of these banks, and
that there will be no (similar) injection plans in the future can help alleviate the moral hazard
problem.
Another measure taken by the Chinese government to reduce the NPLs is the
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establishment of four state-owned AMCs. As discussed earlier, the goal of the AMCs is to
assume the NPLs (and offering debt-for-equity swaps to the banks 49) accumulated in each of the
Big Four banks and liquidate them. The liquidation process includes asset sales, tranching,
securitization, and resale of loans to investors. 50 Table 21-B shows that cash recovery on the
bad loans processed by the AMCs ranges from 6.9% to 35% between 2001 and 2006 (first
quarter) 51, while the asset recovery rates are slightly higher. A critical issue that affects the
effectiveness of the liquidation process is the relationship among AMCs, banks, and distressed
or bankrupt firms. Since both the AMCs and the banks are state-owned, it is not likely that the
AMCs would force the banks to cut off (credit) ties with defaulted borrowers (SOEs or former
SOEs) as a privately owned bank would do. Thus, as the old NPLs are liquidated, new NPLs from
the same borrowers continue to surface.
To summarize, NPLs have been considerably reduced in recent years. If the economy
can maintain its current pace of growth, the government can always write off a large fraction of
the rest (and newly accumulated) of the NPLs to avert any serious problems for China. Again,
caution is in place for this optimistic outlook. One can argue that NPLs are bigger than the
official statistics suggest to begin with, and that a substantial amount of new NPLs will continue
to arise within state-owned banks. If the growth of the economy significantly slows down, while
the accumulation of NPLs continues, the banking sector problems could lead to a financial crisis.

49

One example is Cinda Asset Management Corporation, which was set up in April, 1999, with a registered
capital of RMB 10 billion provided by the Ministry of Finance. It took over RMB 220 billion NPLs from
the China Construction Bank and funded its purchase via bond issues.
50
The sale of tranches of securitized NPLs to foreign investors began in 2002. The deal was struck between
Huarong , one of the four AMCs, and a consortium of U.S. investment banks led by Morgan Stanley (and
including Lehman Brothers and Salomon Smith Barney) and was approved by the government in early
2003 (Financial Times, 05/2003).
51
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), from which we obtained data (for 2004-2009),
stopped reporting data on NPLs from AMCs.
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This could spill over into other sectors of the economy and cause a slowdown in growth or a
recession.

Table 21-A A Comparison of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and Government Debt

This table compares total outstanding NPLs within the banking system, government debt, and the ratio of (NPLs +
Government Debt)/GDP among China, the U.S., and other major Asian countries for the period 1997-2010. Panel A
presents the size of the NPLs, as measured by US$ billion and as the percentage of GDPs in the same year. NPLs in the
U.S. measure the outstanding “delinquency loan”; NPLs in Japan measure the “risk management loans” (or loans
disclosed under the Financial Reconstructed Law and/or loans subject to self-assessment). In Panel B, outstanding
government debt is measured at the end of each year; for the U.S. and Japan, total government debt includes
domestic and foreign debt. In Panel C, the ratios for China include using the official NPL numbers and using doubled
official NPLs (i.e., the ratios in the brackets are (doubled NPLs + government debt)/GDP); the ratios in the brackets for
the U.S. and Japan are (net government debt + NPLs)/GDP, where net government debt is the difference between
government borrowing (stock measure) and government lending (flow measure). All figures are converted into U.S.
dollars using the average exchange rate within the observation year.

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

China

U.S.

Japan

Korea

66.5
93.8
127.3
165.1
188.6
233.5
273.0
311.3
350.0
364.6
599.8

5,802.8
5,788.8
5,822.7
5,612.7
5,734.4
6,169.4
6,789.7
7,335.6
7,809.5
8,451.4
8,950.7

4,254.0
4,858.0
6,053.1
6,209.8
6,036.0
6,321.3
6,852.9
7,446.6
8,299.5
7,587.1
7,707.7

5.3
14.4
28.5
32.7
39.8
45.2
67.9
107.0
165.5
216.7
245.0

India

Indone

Taiwan

Panel A: Size of NPLs: In US$ billion and as percentage of GDPs in the same year (in brackets)
-- 66.9 (0.8%) 217.4 (5.1%) 16.2 (3.1%)
-- 0.2 (0.1%) 19.6 (6.5%)
20.5 (2.0%) 71.3 (0.8%) 489.7 (12.7%) 23.2 (6.7%) 12.7 (3.1%) 5.5 (5.2%) 21.8 (7.9%)
105.1 (9.7%) 72.2 (0.8%) 547.6 (12.6%) 54.4 (12.2%) 14.0 (3.2%) 3.2 (3.8%) 27.2 (9.1%)
269.3 (22.5%) 90.1 (0.9%) 515.4 (11.1%) 35.5 (6.9%) 12.9 (2.8%) 6.3 (2.7%) 33.2 (10.3%)
265.3 (20.0%) 108.4 (1.1%) 640.1 (15.6%) 12.2 (2.5%) 13.2 (2.8%) 4.3 (1.7%) 37.9 (13.0%)
188.4 (13.0%) 107.8 (1.0%) 552.5 (14.1%)
9.9 (1.8%) 14.8 (3.0%) 3.3 (2.0%) 30.7 (10.4%)
181.2 (11.0%) 95.9 (1.0%) 480.1 (11.3%) 11.7 (1.9%) 14.6 (2.5%) 4.7 (1.5%) 23.1 (7.7%)
207.4 (10.7%) 81.3 (0.9%) 334.8 (7.3%) 10.0 (1.5%) 14.4 (2.2%) 3.8 (2.1%) 26.4 (5.1%)
164.2 (7.3%) 84.6 (0.7%) 183.3 (4.0%)
7.6 (1.0%) 13.4 (1.7%) 6.0 (1.5%) 11.2 (3.2%)
157.4 (5.9%) 103.8 (0.8%) 157.8 (3.6%)
8.2 (0.9%) 11.2 (1.3%) 5.2 (1.4%) 11.3
3.1%
166.8 (5.1%) 168.1 (1.2%) 148.6 (3.4%)
8.3 (0.8%) 13.6 (1.2%) 4.5 (1.0%) 10.0
2.6%
80.6 (1.9%) 328.7 (2.3%) 190.8 (3.7%) 13.0 (1.4%) 15.4 (1.3%) 4.3 (0.8%) 9.0
2.3%
72.6 (1.5%) 477.5 (3.3%) 188.45 (3.63%) 13.9 (1.5%) 18.2 (1.3%) 4.6 (1.0%) 6.7 (1.8%)
68.1 (1.1%) 423.4 (2.9%) 208.70 (3.82%) 26.8 (2.6% 20.7 (1.2%) 4.3 (0.6%) 3.8 (0.9%)
Panel B: Outstanding Government Debt ($ billion)
Outstanding
Total
Total Governm Outstanding Total Public
Outstanding Outstanding
Government Government
ent Debt
Treasury
Debt
Government Government
Bond
Debt
Bonds
Bond
Bond
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-178.4
260.2
232.4
225.4
250.2
259.7
299.6
347.1
375.2
472.0

34.1
45.1
43.5
42.1
48.0
44.7
39.9
45.7
51.8

46.5
45.5
58.7
77.7
75.7
85.2
86.7
85.8
94.5

2008
2009
2010

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

701.6
753.6
805.3
-0.11
0.21
0.36
0.34
0.29
0.28
0.27
0.23
0.20
0.23
0.18
0.17
0.21

9,985.8
12,867.
14,551.

8,966.2
9,466.8
11,284.

217.8
290.9
364.0

496.4
556.6
643.6

Panel C: (NPLs + Outstanding Government Debt)/GDP
0.71 (0.54) 1.05 (0.40)
0.04
-0.67 (0.50) 1.39 (0.63)
0.11
0.46
0.64 (0.45) 1.51 (0.64)
0.19
0.62
0.58 (0.40) 1.45 (0.65)
0.13
0.53
0.58 (0.39) 1.63 (0.83)
0.11
0.50
0.60 (0.42) 1.76 (0.90)
0.10
0.54
0.63 (0.45) 1.73 (0.86)
0.13
0.48
0.63 (0.46) 1.70 (0.81)
0.17
0.47
0.63 (0.47) 1.86 (0.84)
0.22
0.47
0.65 (0.44) 1.78 (0.88)
0.24
0.44
0.66 (0.45) 1.79 (0.89)
0.24
0.44
0.72 (0.50) 1.78 (0.88)
0.25
0.42
0.94 (0.46) 1.55 (1.15)
0.24
0.58
1.01 (0.70) 1.94 (1.20)
0.33
0.45

52.8
52.5
68.4

90.4
82.9
102.0

--0.24
0.31
0.30
0.23
0.22
0.19
0.16
0.14
0.13
0.11
0.11
0.10

--0.25
0.24
0.33
0.37
0.33
0.32
0.27
0.26
0.27
0.25
0.24
0.25

Sources: Statistical Bureau of China, the People’s Bank of China, Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., the Statistical Bureau of Japan; Ministry of
Finance, Korea, the Bank of Korea, Korean Statistical Information System; IMF, World Bank; Bank Indonesia; Ministry
of Finance, India; National Statistical Bureau of Taiwan, Bloomberg, Chinabond, and Taiwan financial supervisory
commission.

Table 21-B Liquidation of NPLs by Four Asset Management Companies (RMB billion)
This table presents results on the liquidation of NPLs by four state-owned asset management companies in
China during the period 2001 to the 1st quarter of 2006. These asset management companies were set up to
specifically deal with NPLs accumulated in the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks.
Book value of
Assets
(Accumulated)
Hua Rong
Great Wall
Oriental
Xin Da
Total

23.21
53.11
18.29
29.90
124.51

Hua Rong
Great Wall
Oriental
Xin Da
Total

32.04
45.48
22.10
33.10
132.73

Hua Rong
Great Wall

Accumulated
209.54
209.91

Assets
Recovered

Cash
Recovered

2001
12.54
7.55
6.30
3.69
8.51
4.42
22.50
10.49
49.86
26.15
2002
11.43
10.20
7.94
5.47
10.60
5.57
17.46
10.51
47.43
31.75
2004
Cash Disposal Ratio
41.34
59.77
21.57
61.91
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Asset Recovery
Rate (%)

Cash
Recovery
Rate (%)

54.0
11.9
46.5
75.3
40.0

32.5
6.9
24.2
35.1
21.0

35.7
17.5
47.9
52.7
35.7

31.8
12.0
25.2
31.8
23.9

Asset Recovery
25.29
14.43

Cash
19.73
10.27

Oriental
Xin Da
Total

104.55
151.06
675.06

Hua Rong
Great Wall
Oriental
Xin Da
Total

243.38
263.39
131.76
201.21
839.75

Hua Rong
Great Wall
Oriental
Xin Da
Total

246.80
270.78
141.99
206.77
866.34

23.29
50.81
137.00
2005
54.39
27.35
32.01
62.84
176.60
2006 (Q1)
54.66
27.83
32.81
65.26
180.56

41.42
48.90
53.96

29.50
38.29
25.48

22.27
33.64
20.29

69.17
77.88
52.08
63.82
66.74

26.92
12.90
28.73
34.30
24.58

22.35
10.39
24.30
31.23
21.03

70.11
80.11
56.13
64.69
68.61

26.50
12.70
27.16
34.46
24.20

22.15
10.28
23.11
31.56
20.84

Notes: 1. Accumulated Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as
well as loss incurred by the end of the reporting period.
2. Disposal Ratio = Accumulated Disposal / Total NPLs purchased .
3. Asset Recovery Ratio = Total Assets Recovered / Accumulated Disposal.
4. Cash Recovery Ratio = Cash Recovered / Accumulated Disposal.
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2002-2005, and the reports of China Banking Regulatory
Commission 2004-2009.

3.3.2.2 The Efficiency of State-owned Banks
As discussed above, the size of NPLs in the banking sector critically depends on the
efficiency of banks. We briefly discuss measures that have been taken to improve the efficiency
of state-owned banks. First, state-owned banks have diversified and improved their loan
structure by increasing consumer-related loans while being more active in risk management and
monitoring of loans made to SOEs. For example, the ratio of consumer lending to total loans
outstanding made from all banks increased from 1% in 1998 to 12% in 2008; by the third quarter
of 2009, RMB 4.99 trillion (or $730.4 billion) of outstanding bank loans were extended to
consumers. The size of housing mortgages, now the largest component (87% as in the third
quarter of 2009) of consumer credit, grew more than 200 times between 1997 and 2008,
reaching a total of RMB 4.35 trillion ($637.2 billion), although the speed of growth has slowed
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down in 2011, according to the China Quarterly Monetary Policy Report of the PBOC. One
problem with the massive expansion of consumer credit is that China lacks a national consumercredit database to spot overstretching debtors, although a pilot system linking seven cities was
set up in late 2004. The deficiency in the knowledge and training of credit risk and diligence of
loan officers from state-owned banks is another significant factor in credit expansion, which can
lead to high default rates and a large amount of new NPLs if the growth of the economy and
personal income slows down.
Accompanying the rapidly expanding automobile industry, the other fast growing
category of individual-based loans is automobile loans, most of which are made by state-owned
banks. The total balance of all China’s individual auto loans increased from RMB 400 million
($50 million) in 1998 to RMB 200 billion ($25 billion) at the end of 2003, and as much as 30% of
all auto sales were financed by loans during this period (Financial Times, 05/25/2005). The
growth in both auto sales and loans slowed down significantly since 2004 in part due to the high
default rates. In 2008, outstanding auto loans decreased to RMB 158.3 billion ($23 billion). Only
8% of the auto sales were financed by loans during that year. Shanghai and Beijing have the
largest number of car sales and loans. As many as 50% of debtors defaulted on their car loans in
these cities. There are examples in which loan applications were approved based solely on the
applicants’ description of their personal income without any auditing (Barron’s, 12/06/2004).
However, the slowdown of the auto loan market was temporary and it quickly resumed its fast
pace of growth, mainly driven by tremendous demand—China has recently overtaken the U.S.
to become the largest auto market in the world. In aggregate auto loans amount to 10%-20% of
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the total amount spent on autos. Most loans mature in three to five years. 52
Second, the ongoing privatization process, including the listing of state-owned banks, is
also an effective channel for enhancing efficiency. As state ownerships stakes shrink, these
banks can focus more on for-profit goals, and, with more non-state owners entering the mix the
strengthening of corporate governance to ensure profit-maximizing is the next step. Panel A of
Table 22-A presents the performance of IPOs of the Big Four banks (ABC remains in the State
Sector) and that of the Bank of Communications (BComm). A notable case is the IPO of ICBC
(see Allen, Qian, Shan and Zhao, 2012 for more details). Simultaneously carried out in the HKSE
and SHSE on October 27, 2006, ICBC raised US$21.9 billion, making it the largest IPO (up to that
date). The first day (and first week cumulative) return, measured by the net percentage return
of the closing price on the first (fifth) trading day over offer price, was almost 15%, suggesting
high demand for ICBC’s H shares among (foreign) investors. In terms of ownership structure,
the state, through various agencies, is by far the largest shareholder, with only 22% of the
market cap is ‘free float’ or tradable. The largest foreign shareholder is Goldman Sachs with its
5.8% ownership stake negotiated before the IPO. The recent IPO of ABC also attracted a lot of
attention. The total proceeds from its IPO from HKSE (July 16, 2010) and SHSE (July 15, 2010)
reached $22.1 billion, overtaking the ICBC IPO as the world’s largest IPO (Associated Press,
08/16/2010). 53 In particular, foreign investors, including institutional investors and wealthy
families, contributed over 40% of the $12 billion raised from H shares (in the HKSE). 54 While the

52

A few foreign lenders (e.g., GM and Ford) were approved to enter China’s auto loan market by forming
joint ventures with Chinese automakers (Financial Times, 05/27/2005).
53
From Panel A, Table 4A, the total proceeds (in HK$ and RMB) of the ICBC IPO are actually larger than
that of ABC’s IPO, but given the appreciation of RMB over the period 2006-2010, the proceeds of the
ABC IPO are slightly larger measured in US$.
54
Foreign institutional investors include Qatar Investment Authority ($2.8 billion), Kuwait Investment
Authority ($800 million), Britain's Standard Chartered Bank ($500 million), Dutch bank Radobank
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first-week stock performance in the two markets was not as impressive as that of ICBC, the fact
that the IPO was carried out successfully during the recovery period following one of the worst
global financial crises is evidence that investors from around the globe have confidence in ABC’s
role as a leading institution in the world.
The IPOs of the other three large state-owned banks were also successful in terms of
total proceeds raised, and they all attracted significant foreign ownership at the IPO date as well.
In fact, as shown in Panel B of Table 22-A, four of the 10 largest banks in the world, measured in
market capitalization as of July 2010, are Chinese banks, with ICBC leading the chart and the
newly listed ABC making it into the chart too. In terms of (book) assets, ICBC is the eleventh
largest bank in the world (Panel C); however, given the accounting problems of evaluating
troubled assets related to subprime loans and sovereign debt in troubled Euro Zone countries, it
is possible that ICBC’s assets, with virtually no exposure to the U.S. housing markets or European
sovereign debt, could be one of the largest and highest quality in the world. Finally, Moody’s
current ratings on these publicly listed banks (on both deposits and loans) range from A to Baa
(highest rating is Aaa); while S&P rates these banks’ outstanding bonds between A and BBB
(highest rating is AAA).
There are two imminent issues with the privatization process. The first is related to the
structure of the banking sector, and in particular, whether more competition, including the
entrance of more non-state (domestic and foreign) banks and intermediaries, is good for

Nederland ($250 million), Australia's Seven Group Holdings Ltd ($250 million) and Singapore's Temasek
Holdings ($200 million); source: ABC’s post-IPO news report. However, on a global basis, including
shares that are distributed to various government agencies prior to the IPO, foreign investors only hold 4%
of all of ABC’s shares.
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improving the efficiency of both the Big Four banks and the entire sector. 55 Another issue is the
government’s dual role as regulator and as majority owner. These potentially conflicting roles
can diminish the effectiveness of each of the two roles that the government intends to carry out.
In Section 3.4 below, we consider whether the ongoing process of floating non-tradable
government shares in many listed companies can be applied to the privatization process of
many state-owned banks/institutions. Only after these banks are (majority) owned by nongovernment entities and individuals can they unconditionally implement all profit- and
efficiency-enhancing measures. However, in light of what occurred in the developed countries,
where excessive risk-taking and poor risk management and governance in a few large
institutions essentially brought down the entire financial system, the current ownership
structure of the largest Chinese banks, in which the government retains the majority control,
can enhance the regulation of large financial institutions and help to prevent banking and
financial crisis in China and other emerging economies.
Third, reforming the organization structure of banks and providing more incentives to
banks and their employees can improve efficiency. For example, reforms taking place in the
mid-1990s provided local banks with more autonomous power, and after the 1994 reforms,
approved credit volume for specialized banks was based on a maximum ratio between loans and
deposits instead of administrative quota, which provided those banks with greater flexibility to
use within-bank transfers to adjust fund allocation. 56 The reforms also provide more profit
incentives for managers. The evaluation criteria changed from adherence to the national credit
55

For example, with a sample of both state- and non-state owned banks, Berger et al. (2009) show that the
addition of foreign ownership stakes into banks’ ownership structure is associated with a significant
improvement of bank efficiency.
56
These reforms did not liberalize interest rates; the PBOC continues to set the range (upper and lower
bounds, or base rate and floating range) within which interest rates can be set; relending was also
centralized by the PBOC.
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plan to “a combination of profits made by the bank branch, attention to cost control,
investment in fixed capital of the branch, deposit increases, and reduction of overdue loans”
(Park and Sehrt, 2001, p619).
A critical aspect of the decentralization process is to provide individuals with more
authority and responsibilities. According to a number of theories (e.g., Stein, 2002), these
changes improve the quality of ‘soft’ information produced by banks, an essential part of the
lending process. Under the old regime, decision making of the entire lending process was groupbased and no individual loan officers were held responsible for poor decisions. Facing imminent
pressure from competitors (including foreign banks) following China’s entrance to WTO in 2001,
many state-owned banks began implementing new lending policies in 2002. These new policies
grant more authority to individuals in charge of different steps of making loans and monitoring
borrowers and hold them responsible (ex post) for poor performance; decisions such as the final
approval of loan contracts are left to a group of senior employees (through voting). Using
detailed loan-level data from a large state-owned bank with branches throughout the country,
Qian, Strahan and Yang (2011) find that an internal risk assessment measure has a more
pronounced effect, relative to publicly available information (‘hard’ information), on both
pricing (interest rates) and nonpricing terms (loan size) of loan contracts after the reform and
becomes a better predictor of loan outcomes. They also show that when the loan officer and
the branch president who approves the loan contract work together for a longer period of time,
the rating has an incrementally stronger effect on loan contracts. These results highlight how
organizational structure and incentives can affect the production and quality of soft information.
Better information, in turn, expands the supply of credit and improves (lending) outcomes.
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One problem that hinders banks’ efforts in improving efficiency is poor and inconsistent
enforcement of bankruptcy laws and creditor protection. China’s first bankruptcy law, passed in
1986, governed only SOEs and had little impact in practice. The new bankruptcy law, enacted in
August 2006 and effective on June 1, 2007, applies to all enterprises except partnerships and
sole proprietorships. In many aspects the new law resembles bankruptcy laws in developed
countries. For example, it introduces the bankruptcy administrator, who manages the assets of
the debtor after the court has accepted the bankruptcy filing. Moreover, the law states that
these administrators should be independent professionals, such as those working for law or
accounting firms. Despite all the legal procedures specified by the law, enforcement of the law
remains weak and inconsistent. Many distressed and insolvent firms are kept afloat, and almost
all the listed firms that file for bankruptcy end up with restructuring plans and these firms are
rarely delisted. 57
A number of reasons can explain the weak enforcement of the bankruptcy law. There
are regulations and circulars issued by the central government applicable to SOE bankruptcies
that are de facto in priority over the Law. A good example is Doctrine #10 of the State Council,
which governs the bankruptcy process of SOEs in 111 pilot cities. This doctrine requires
approval from secured/senior creditors (e.g., banks) before an enterprise can go through
bankruptcy proceedings. In reality, however, the bankruptcy court also requires the consent of
local government (Fan et al., 2008). Since local governments are usually responsible for the
settlement of workers displaced by bankrupt firms, it is in their best interest to halt the

57

According to the National Development and Reform Commission, 67,000 small and mid-sized
enterprises were shut down in the first half of 2008, but only 2,955 bankruptcy cases were filed nationwide
for the same year. When a listed firm is in distress (with the “ST” flag), typically other (nonlisted) firms
will invest in and restructure the ST firm to avoid delisting, since the ‘shell’ of the distressed firm is
valuable given the difficult and costly process of IPOs.
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bankruptcy filing until a satisfactory settlement plan is reached. As a result, mergers and
acquisitions with other firms are preferred to bankruptcy, and it has been documented that
M&As have been indeed used extensively to resolve firms’ distress (e.g., Kam et al., 2008), and
many bankruptcies cases are postponed or avoided. In fact, when in distress, both the SOEs and
local government give the greatest priority to employees; local government favors SOEs over
banks since SOEs provide more employment opportunities. Furthermore, banks are often
reluctant to push for bankruptcy since most of the distressed debt would be written off; the
recovery rate for most bank loans is less than 10% (World Bank, 2001). Taking the defaulted
firm to court to recover loans or seize the firm’s assets is a lengthy process and the chances of
winning are slim; as a result, only a small number of lawsuits involving bankrupt firms reach the
courts.
For insolvent SOEs, what triggers the bankruptcy procedure is not their financial status
per se, but whether they can get preferential treatment from the government. The average
number of bankruptcy cases placed on file (by courts) was 277 per year during 1989-1993. This
then jumped to 5,900 per year between 1994 and 2003, after the Capital Structure Optimization
Program for industrial SOEs was implemented in several pilot cities. 58 The number of cases fell
after 2003 partly due to the central government’s intention to maintain social stability by
controlling the number of bankruptcies; the Supreme People’s Court also ruled in 2002 that the
courts would not process bankruptcy cases if the main intention were to escape debts.
According to the surveys presented by Garnaut, Song and Yao (2004), 90% of CEOs of the
surveyed SOEs believe that bankruptcy is actually a feasible channel to evade bank debts. Since
58

In China, a court must accept a case petition before deciding whether it should be declined or placed on
file for investigation/prosecution; thus the number of cases accepted is always greater than the number of
cases placed on file.
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the government’s program provides preferential treatments including debt write-offs, many
SOEs would wait until they are covered by the program before filing for bankruptcy.
As the most senior creditors (secured debt), banks’ willingness to lend depends on their
bargaining power and ability to seize collateralized assets upon default, and hence ineffective
creditor protection not only increases potential losses from bad loans, it also reduces banks’
incentive to investigate and monitor borrowers. 59 The favorable treatment SOEs enjoy during
distress adversely change their incentives in investment and corporate governance, these
effects can also spill over into banks’ decisions to lend to non-state firms and reduce the credit
access of these firms. Therefore, consistent regulation guidelines in dealing with distress and
bankruptcy by different types of firms, along with the government’s commitment to leave the
decision process to professionals and courts, can benefit the development of credit markets. On
the other hand, we discuss evidence below that informal dispute resolution mechanisms outside
the legal system based on reputation and relationships has been an effective substitute for
Chinese firms and investors.

Table 22-A Chinese Banks’ IPOs and Comparison with Other Banks

This table presents information on the IPOs of the Big Four banks and that of Bank of Communications (BComm). BOC,
ICBC and ABC were listed in both the HKSE (HK dollar) and SHSE (RMB), while PCBC and BComm only listed shares on
the HKSE. First day (first week) return is percentage return of closing price of first day (fifth trading day) over offer
price. Foreign ownership indicates size of ownership stakes of foreign institutions and investors at the date of IPOs.

Panel A Performance of Chinese Banks’ IPOs
ICBC

HKSE
(HK$)

SHSE
(RMB)

BOC
HKSE
(HK$)

SHSE
(RMB

59

PCBC

BComm

HKSE
(HK$)

HKSE
(HK$)

ABC*
HKSE
(HK$)

SHSE
(RMB

With a large sample of syndicated loans around the globe, Qian and Strahan (2007) show that strong
creditor protection (in borrower countries) enhances loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide
credit on favorable terms (e.g., longer maturities and lower interest rates).
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IPO Date

10/27/
2006
3.07
124.95
14.66%
16.94%
7.28%

10/27
/2006
3.12
46.64
5.13%
4.81%
--

6/01/ 7/05/ 10/27
6/23/2
7/15/ 7/16/
2006
2006
/2005
005
2010
2010
Offer Price
2.95
3.08
2.35
2.5
3.2
2.68
Proceeds
82.86
20.00
59.94
14.64B 93.8B 68.5B
st
1 Day
14.41
22.73 0.00% 13.00%
2.2%
1％
st
1 Week
19.49
19.16
13.00%
9.1%
1.9%
Foreign
14.40
-14.39
18.33%
40.8
-Ownership
%
%
%
Source: IPO prospectuses submitted to SHSE and HKSE; SHSE and HKSE.
*: In USD, ABC raised $22.1 billion from its IPO, beating the record of $21.9 billion from ICBC’s IPO. However in terms
of RMB, ICBC still holds the record of largest IPO since RMB has appreciated significantly since 2006.

Panel B Top 10 Banks Measured by Market Capitalization ($billion)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Bank Name
IND & COMM BK
CHINA CONST BANK
HSBC HLDGS PLC
JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK OF AMERICA
WELLS FARGO & CO
BANK OF CHINA
AGRICULTURAL BANK
CITIGROUP INC
BANCO SANTANDER

Source: Bloomberg.

HQ
Country

Market Cap.
th
$B(July. 16 , 2010)

Total Return (%)
YTD

214.51
189.04
166.51
155.17
140.26
136.71
130.29
128.60
113.00
102.77

-20.14
-1.99
-15.40
-6.06
-7.06
-2.46
1.71
0.4
17.82
-21.87

China
China
U.K.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
China
China
US
Spain

Panel C Top 20 Banks Measured by Total Assets (July 2010; $trillion)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Bank Name (HQ Country)
BNP PARIBAS
ROYAL BANK SCOTLAN
HSBC HLDGS PLC
BANK OF AMERICA
DEUTSCHE BANK-RG
CREDIT AGRICOLE
BARCLAYS PLC
MITSUBISHI UFJ F
JPMORGAN CHASE
CITIGROUP INC
IND & COMM BANK
MIZUHO FINANCIAL
LLOYDS BANKING

HQ Country
France
UK
UK
U.S
Germany
France
U.K.
Japan
U.S.
U.S.
China
Japan
U.K.
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Total Assets ($trillion)
2.95
2.68
2.36
2.36
2.26
2.23
2.23
2.18
2.01
1.94
1.73
1.67
1.66

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

BANCO SANTANDER
CHINA CONST BA-H
SOC GENERALE
SUMITOMO MITSUI
AGRICULTURAL BANK
UBS AG-REG
UNICREDIT SPA

Spain
China
France
Japan
China
Switzerland
Italy

1.55
1.48
1.47
1.32
1.30
1.29
1.28

Source: Bloomberg (based on latest filings), July 15th, 2010.

3.3.3 Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries
The development of both non-state banks and other (state and non-state) financial
institutions will allow China to have a stable and functioning banking system in the future. In
addition to boosting the overall efficiency of the banking system, these financial institutions
provide funding to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.
First, we examine and compare China’s insurance market to other Asian economies
(South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). In terms of the ratio of total assets managed by
insurance companies over GDP (Figure 19-C), China’s insurance market is significantly smaller
than that of other economies. At the end of 2009 total assets managed are only about 10% of
GDP, while this ratio for the other three economies is over 30%. It is clear that the insurance
industry is also significantly smaller compared to China’s banking industry, and property
insurance is particularly underdeveloped due to the fact that the private real estate market was
only recently established (in the past most housing was allocated by employers or the
government). Despite the fast growth of insurance coverage and premium income, only 4% of
the total population was covered by life insurance. Insurance premiums were only 3.2% of GDP
in 2008, standing far behind the global average figure of over 7%; coverage ratios for property
insurance are even lower (according to the reports by KPMG LLP). However, coverage ratios
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have been growing steadily at an average annual rate of 6% between 1998 and 2005 (XinHua
News). In 2008 the insurance industry in China grew at the fastest pace (40%) since 2002. In the
first quarter of 2010, China Insurance Regulatory Committee announced that China’s insurance
premiums totaled RMB 454.14 billion, representing an increase of 38.6 percent year on year.
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Figure 19-C A Comparison of Assets Under Management of Insurance Companies

Table 22-B State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion)
Types of Banks

Total Assets

Big Five Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

40,089.0
17,465.0
11,785.0
5,680.0
1,349.2
27.2
5,492.5

Big Five Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks

31,836.0
12,941.2
8,809.2
4,132.0
1,344.8

Total Deposits
2009
29,506.5
15,041.5
10,548.7
4,492.8
668.8
39.5
4,742.1
2008
23,696.1
11,072.2
7,801.8
3,270.4
533.5
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1

Outstanding
Loans

Profit

20,151.7
9,606.6
6,707.4
2,899.2
727.1

400.1

1.8

92.5
49.7
6.5
0.2
22.8

1.0
1.3
0.9

354.2

2.8

84.1
40.8
11.9

1.3
2.3
0.8

5,421.3
15,029.3
7,162.4
5,054.5
2,107.9
762.1

NPL rate
(%)

Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

80.4
5,211.3

Big Five Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

28,007.0
10,589.9
7,249.4
3,340.5
1,252.5
131.2
4,343.4

Big Five Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

24,236
8,038.4
5,444.6
2,593.8
927.9
183.1
3,450.3

2

Big Five Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

21,005.0
6,502.2
4,465.5
2,036.7
715.5
203.3
3,142.7

Big Four Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

16,932.1
4,697.2

Big Four Banks
Other Commercial Banks
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

16,275.1
3,816.8
1,465.4
333.1
148.7
2,674.6

Big Four Banks
Other Commercial Banks
1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

14,450.0
4,160.0
2,990.0
1,170.0
324.2
119.0
--

Big Four Banks
Other Commercial Banks

13,000.0
3,259.0

1,693.8
515.9
171.5
3,101.3

76.2
4,173.6
2007
20,067.7
9,023.3
6,432.0
2,591.4
390.0
134.1
3,534.9
2006
18,285.1
7512.8
5,396.5
2,116.2
244.0
157.9
3,040.2
2005
16,283.8
6,261.1
4,570.0
16,91.2
179.3
181.3
2,767.4
2004
14,412.3
4,059.9
1,434.1
126.4
154.9
2,734.8
2003
13,071.9
3,286.5
1,174.7
90.7
127.1
2,376.5
2002
11,840.0
3,390.0
---101.0
1,987.0
2001
10,770.0
2,530.7
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3,753.2

0.62
21.9

13,850.9
5,684.4
4,001.9
1,682.6
700.0
84.7
3,256.1

246.6

8.05

56.4
24.8
6.1
0.77
19.3

2.15
3.04
0.46

11,426.2
5526.6
4,156.9
1,369.7
485.9

197.5

9.22

43.4
18.1
5.8
1.0
18.6

2.81
4.78
0.78

10,224.0
4,576.6
3,487.7
1,088.9
363.8
113.1
2,319.9

156.1

10.49

28.9
12.1
3.7
0.9
12.0

4.22
7.73
1.05

10,086.1
2,885.9

45.9
50.7
17.6
8.5
18.8
0.4
9.65

15.57
4.93
5.01
11.73
1.34

9,950.1
2,368.2
774.4
147.6
85.6
1,775.9

196.5

19.74
7.92
14.94
2.87

8,460.0
2,290.0
--154.0
66.4
1,393.0

71.0
---15.2
---

26.1
-9.5
17.7
--

7,400.0
1,649.8

23.0
12.9

25.37
--

2,747.6

904.5
255.8
97.9
1,974.8

5.4
18.1
0.01
4.4

--

1) Joint Equity
2) City Commercial Banks
Foreign Banks
Urban Credit Cooperatives
Rural Credit Cooperatives

2,386.0
873.0
373.4
128.7
--

1,849.0
681.7
-107.1
1,729.8

1,224.0
425.8
153.2
72.5
1,197.0

10.5
2.4
1.7
2.6
--

12.94
-----

Notes: 1. It is before tax profit up to 2006, and after tax profit from 2006-2009.
2. Big four (stated owned) banks refer to Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. Big five banks are the Big four Banks and Bank of Communications.
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000-2008, CEIC data base, Quarterly Monetary Report of PBC.

Table 22-C Comparison of Assets Held by China’s Non-Bank Intermediaries (RMB billion)
This table compares total assets held by banks and non-bank intermediaries during the period 1995-2009.

Year

Stateowned
Banks

RCCs

UCCs

Insurance
Companies

TICs

Nondeposit
Intermediaries

Other
Commercial
Banks

Foreign
Banks

1995
1996
1997

5,373.3
6,582.7
7,914.4

679.10
870.66
1,012.

303.92
374.78
498.94

----

458.60
563.70
636.40

48.97
82.02
100.42

536.91
769.98
948.61

42.90
55.30
75.80

1998
1999
2000

8,860.9
9,970.6
10,793.

1,143.
1,239.
1,393.

560.63
630.15
678.49

-260.4
337.4

802.50
907.50
975.90

120.97
137.08
160.82

1,128.18
1,376.89
1,828.26

118.40
191.40
379.20

2001
2002
2003

11,188.
13,549.
16,275.

1,610.
2,205.
2,674.

780.02
119.23
148.72

459.1
649.4
912.3

1,088.3
1,544.1
--

223.67
408.10
495.58

2,255.70
2,997.72
3,816.80

341.80
317.90
331.10

2004
2005
2006

16,932.
21,005.
24,23.0

3,103.
3,142.
3,450.

171.50
203.3
183.1

1185.4
1529.6
1973.1

----

----

4,697.20
6,502.2
8,038.4

515.90
715.5
927.9

2007
2008
2009

28,007.
31,836.
40,089.

4,343.
5,211.
5,492.

131.2
80.4
27.2

2900.4
3341.8
4063.5

---

---

10,589.9
12,941.2
17,465.0

1,252.5
1,344.8
1,349.2

Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) and CEIC, 2000 – 2009.

Table 22-B provides a (partial) breakdown of the different types of banks. During the
period of 2001-2009, although the largest four or five banks (the fifth largest bank is Bank of
Communications, also state owned) dominate in every aspect of the banking sector, the role of
other banks in the entire banking sector cannot be ignored. As of 2009, other banks (including
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foreign banks) and credit cooperatives’ total assets compose over 70% of the largest five banks
(the actual fraction is likely to be higher due to incomplete information on all types of deposittaking institutions); similar comparisons can be made for total deposits and outstanding loans.
In addition, these banks and institutions appear to have less NPLs than the largest state-owned
banks. Table 22-C provides evidence on the growth of non-bank intermediaries. Overall, the
growth of these non-bank intermediaries has been impressive since the late 1990s. Among
them, “other commercial banks” (many of them are state-owned), RCCs, and TICs hold the
largest amount of assets; the size of foreign banks and mutual funds (not listed in the table) is
minuscule, but these are likely to be the focus of development in the near future. 60 Finally, our
coverage of non-bank financial institutions excludes various forms of informal financial
intermediaries, some of which are deemed illegal but overall provide a considerable amount of
financing to firms in the Hybrid Sector.

3.4 Financial Markets
In this section, we examine China’s financial markets, including both the stock and real
estate markets, and the recent addition of venture capital and private equity markets as well as
asset management industries. We also compare, at the aggregate level, how firms raise funds in
China and in other emerging economies through external markets in order to determine if
China’s experience is unique. We then briefly review publicly traded companies’ financing and
investment decisions. Finally, we discuss the further development of financial markets as well

60

Postal savings (deposit-taking institutions affiliated with local post offices) is another form of non-bank
intermediation that is not reported in Table 4-B due to a lack of time series data. However, at the end of
2008, total deposits within the postal savings system exceeded RMB 2079 billion, or 9.5% of all deposits in
China.
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as corporate governance and the performance of listed firms.

3.4.1 Overview of Stock Markets
After the inception of China’s domestic stock exchanges, the SHSE and SZSE, in 1990,
they initially grew quickly. The high growth rates continued through most of the 1990s, and the
market reached a peak by the end of 2000. As shown in Figure 20, the momentum of the
market, indicated by the SSE Index, then reversed during the next five years as it went through a
major correction with half of the market capitalization lost. Most of the losses were recovered
by the end of 2006, and the market reached new heights during 2007. However, following a
string of negative news worldwide (culminating with the subprime loans-led global crisis) and
domestically (including high levels of inflation) the market lost three quarters of its value by the
end of 2008. During the first half of 2009, with the impact of the massive stimulus package and
rebounding from a trough, China’s stock market bounced back and recovered about one third of
the losses in 2008. However the stock market dipped again in the first half of 2010, partly due
to the concern that the government is taking measures to cool down the fast growing housing
market. Figure 20 compares the performance of some of the major stock exchanges around the
world, as measured by the ‘buy-and-hold’ return in the period December 1992 and December
2010 (gross return at December 2010 with $1 invested in each of the valued-weighted stock
indexes at the end of 1992). We plot inflation-adjusted real returns. Over this period, the
performance of the value-weighted SHSE index (the calculation for the SZSE is very similar) is
below that of the SENSEX (India), which has the best performance among the group, and that of
S&P (U.S.), but better than FTSE (London) and the Nikkei Index, the worst among the group.
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Table 23- A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World (01/01-12/31, 2010)
Total Market
Concentration
Turnover
Rank
Stock Exchange
Cap
(%)
Velocity (%)
1
NYSE Euronext (US)
13,394,081.8
57.0%
130.2%
2
NASDAQ OMX
3,889,369.9
71.9%
340.4%
3
Tokyo SE Group
3,827,774.2
60.1%
109.6%
4
London SE Group
3,613,064.0
82.3%
76.1%
5
NYSE Euronext (Europe)
2,930,072.4
68.9%
76.5%
6
Shanghai SE
2,716,470.2
55.8%
178.5%
7
Hong Kong Exchanges
2,711,316.2
69.4%
62.2%
8
TSX Group
2,170,432.7
79.5%
74.1%
9
Bombay SE
1,631,829.5
87.7%
18.1%
10
National Stock Exchange India
1,596,625.3
69.6%
57.3%
11
BM&FBOVESPA
1,545,565.7
64.2%
64.7%
12
Australian Securities Exchange
1,454,490.6
79.4%
82.3%
13
Deutsche Börse
1,429,719.1
78.4%
119.3%
14
Shenzhen SE
1,311,370.1
31.2%
344.3%
15
SIX Swiss Exchange
1,229,356.5
65.6%
73.5%
16
BME Spanish Exchanges
1,171,625.0
NA
117.2%
17
Korea Exchange
1,091,911.5
75.7%
176.3%
18
NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange
1,042,153.7
69.7%
79.7%
19
MICEX
949,148.9
64.3%
52.8%
20
Johannesburg SE
925,007.2
35.0%
33.3%
Notes: All figures are from http//:www.world-exchanges.org, the web site of the international organization of stock
exchanges. Concentration is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the turnover of
the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%). Turnover velocity is the total turnover of domestic stocks for the
year expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization.

Table 23-B China’s Bond Markets: 1990 – 2009 (Amount in RMB billion)
This table presents the development of China’s bond markets. “Policy Financial Bonds” are issued by “policy
banks,” which belong to the Treasury Department, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in
government run projects and industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the
U.S.) "Redem." here stands for Redemption
Treasury Bonds
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Amount
Issued
19.72
28.13
46.08
38.13
113.76
151.09
184.78
241.18
380.88

Redem.
Amount
7.62
11.16
23.81
12.33
39.19
49.70
78.66
126.43
206.09

Balance
89.03
106.00
128.27
154.07
228.64
330.03
436.14
550.89
776.57

Policy Financial Bonds
Amount
Issued
6.44
6.69
5.50
0.00
0.00
-105.56
143.15
195.02

Amounts
Redem.
5.01
3.37
3.00
3.43
1.35
-25.45
31.23
32.04
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Balance
8.49
11.81
14.31
10.88
9.53
170.85
250.96
362.88
512.11

Corporate Bonds
Amounts
issued
12.4
24.9
68.37
23.58
16.18
30.08
26.89
25.52
15.00

Amounts
Redem.
7.73
11.43
19.28
25.55
28.20
33.63
31.78
21.98
10.53

Balance
19.54
33.11
82.20
80.24
68.21
64.66
59.77
52.10
67.69

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

401.50
465.70
488.40
593.43
628.01
692.39
704.20
888.33
2313.91
855.82
1792.7

123.87
152.50
228.60
226.12
275.58
374.99
404.55
620.86
584.68
753.14
707.15

1,054.20
1,367.40
1,561.80
1,933.60
2,260.36
2,577.76
2,877.40
3144.87
4874.10
4976.78
--

180.09
164.50
259.00
307.50
456.14
414.80
585.17
898.00
1109.02
1082.30
1167.8

47.32
70.92
143.88
155.57
250.53
177.87
205.30
379.0
413.36
406.38
--

644.75
738.33
853.45
1,005.41
1,165.00
1,401.93
1,781.80
2,300.80
2992.68
3668.6
--

15.82
8.30
14.70
32.50
35.80
32.70
204.65
393.83
505.85
843.54
1662.9

5.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.70
167.24
288.09
327.78
440.0

77.86
86.16
100.86
133.36
169.16
201.86
401.81
553.29
768.33
1285.06
--

Yearly
25.3%
24.4%
25.0%
29.7%
27.7%
40.1%
25.5%
22.3%
26.2%
Growth
Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) 2000 – 2009 and the Statistical
Yearbook of China 2000-2009.
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Figure 20 A Comparison of Performance of Major Stock Indexes
(Buy-and-hold returns of $1 between Dec. 1992 and Dec. 2010)

As Table 23-A indicated, at the end of 2010, the SHSE was ranked the sixth largest
market in the world in term of market capitalization, while the SZSE was ranked the fourteenth.
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), where selected firms from Mainland China have been
listed and traded, is ranked the seventh largest in the world. Needless to say, the Chinese
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financial markets will play an increasingly important role in world financial markets. Also from
Table 23-A, “Concentration” is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year
coming from the turnover of the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%), and SHSE
(55.8%) is in line with that of other large exchanges, indicating that trading is concentrated
among large-cap stocks. “Turnover velocity” is the (annual) total turnover for all the listed firms
expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization, and the figures for SZSE and SHSZ
are the highest among the largest exchanges, suggesting that there is a large amount of
speculative trading especially among small- and medium-cap stocks (as these are more easily
manipulated than large cap stocks) in the Chinese markets.
There are two other markets established to complement the two main exchanges. First,
a fully electronically operated market (“Er Ban Shi Chang” or “Second-tier Market,” similar to the
NASDAQ) for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was opened in June 2004. It was designed
to lower the entry barriers for SME firms, especially newly established firms in the high-tech
industries. By the end of February 2007, there are 119 firms listed in this market. Second, a
“third-tier market” (“San Ban Shi Chang,” or “Third-tier Market,”) was established to deal
primarily with de-listing firms and other over-the-Counter (OTC) transactions. Since 2001, some
publicly listed firms on both SHSE and SZSE that do not meet the listing standards have been
delisted and the trading of their shares shifted to this market. On October 23, 2009, China
launched a Nasdaq-style Growth Enterprises Market (GEM, or “Chuang Ye Ban”) with 28
companies, mainly from hi-tech, electronic and pharmaceutical industries. The main purpose of
GEM is to provide financing for small and medium sized private enterprises. The first 10 firms
seeking to list on the GEM drew a combined RMB 784 billion in subscriptions in September 2009,
while the second and third sets had 18 firms, including Huayi Brothers Media, China’s largest
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privately owned film company. As of October 2011, no index is available for the GEM but most
of the listed stocks have outperformed the indexes of the two main exchanges. By April 2010,
the number of listed firms on the GEM reached 200.
There is abundant evidence showing that China’s stock markets are not efficient in that
prices and investors’ behavior are not necessarily driven by fundamental values of listed firms.
For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices are more ‘synchronous” (stock prices
move up and down together) in emerging countries including China than in developed countries.
They attribute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and imperfect regulation
of markets in emerging markets. In addition, there have been numerous lawsuits against insider
trading and manipulation (see, e.g., AQQ (2008), for more details). In many cases, unlike Enron
and other well known companies in developed markets stricken by corporate scandals,
managers and other insiders from the Chinese companies did not use any sophisticated
accounting and finance maneuvers to hide their losses (even by China’s standards). These cases
reveal that the inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets can be (partially) attributed to poor
and ineffective regulation. We discuss below issues related to regulation, market efficiency, and
the further development of China’s financial markets.

3.4.2 Overview of Bond Markets
Table 23-B provides information on China’s bond markets. The government bond
market had an annual growth rate of 25.3% during the period 1990-2009 in terms of newly
issued bonds, while total outstanding bonds reached RMB 4,976.8 billion (or $721.3 billion) at
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the end of 2008. 61 The second largest component of the bond market is called “policy financial
bonds” (total outstanding amount RMB 3,668.6 billion (or $531.7 billion) at the end of 2008.
These bonds are issued by “policy banks,” which operate under the supervision of the Ministry
of Finance, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in government run projects and
industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.). Compared
to government-issued bonds, the size of the corporate bond market is small. In terms of the
amount of outstanding bonds at the end of 2008, the corporate bond market is less than onefourth of the size of the government bond market. However, the growth of the corporate bond
market has picked up pace in the past few years and this trend is likely to continue in the near
future.
The small size of the bond market, especially the corporate bond market, relative to the
stock market, is common among Asian countries. AQQ (2008) compares different components
(bank loans to the private sectors or the Hybrid Sector of China; stock market capitalization;
public/government and private/corporate bond markets) of the financial markets around the
world at the end of 2003. Compared to Europe and the U.S., they find that the size of both the
government (public) and corporate (private) bond markets is smaller in Asia excluding Japan
(Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand);
even in Japan, the size of the corporate bond market is much smaller compared with its
government bond market. They also find that the size of all four components of China’s
financial markets are small relative to that of other regions and countries, including bank loans
made to the Hybrid Sector (private sector) in China (other countries). Moreover, the most
61

On July 26, 2007, Moody’s raised the rating on China’s government bonds to A1 from A2 and kept it
unchanged up to now. In November 2009 it raised China’s sovereign rating outlook from stable to positive.
These ratings are better or comparable than Moody’s ratings on government bonds from most emerging
economies.
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under-developed component of China’s financial markets is the corporate bond market (labeled
“private” bond market).
There are a number of reasons for the underdevelopment in bond markets in China and
other parts of Asia (see, e.g., Herring and Chatusripitak 2000).

Lack of sound

accounting/auditing systems and high-quality bond-rating agencies is a factor. 62 Given low
creditor protection and court inefficiency (in China and most other emerging economies) the
recovery rates for bondholders during default are low, which in turn leads to underinvestment
in the market (by domestic and foreign investors). Lack of a well constructed yield curve is
another factor in China, given the small size of the publicly traded Treasury bond market and
lack of historical prices. The situation is improving however, as the terms of China’s Treasury
bonds now ranges from one month to 30 years. In December 2009, China’s first 50-year
government bond made its trading debut simultaneously in the interbank market and the stock
exchange bond market, extending the bond yield curve even further. The deficiencies in the
term structure of interest rates have hampered the development of derivatives markets that
enable firms and investors to manage risk, as well as the effectiveness of the government’s
macroeconomic policies. Therefore, further development of China’s bond markets, along with
its legal system and related institutions, can help the advancement of other markets and the
overall financial system.

3.4.3 Evidence on the Listed Sector

62

Dagong Global Credit Ratings, a leading Chinese credit ratings agency, recently released its first
sovereign ratings report, in which the Chinese and German sovereign debt received higher ratings (AA+
and a stable outlook) than those of US, the UK and Japan (AA or lower ratings and a negative outlook;
Bloomberg, 7/14/2010).
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In this section, we briefly examine publicly listed and traded companies in China. It is
worthwhile to first clarify whether firms from the Hybrid Sector can become listed and publicly
traded. Regulations and laws (the 1986 trial version of the bankruptcy law and the 1999 version
of the Company Law) did not prohibit the listing of Hybrid Sector firms; and selected firms from
the Hybrid Sector did enter the Listed Sector through an IPO or acquisition of a listed firm from
the inception of SHSE and SZSE. However, the accessibility of equity markets for these firms has
been much lower than for former SOEs in practice due to the enforcement of the listing
standards and process. As a result, AQQ (2005) find that 80% of their sample of more than
1,100 listed firms are converted from former SOEs. In recent years, the government has
attempted to change the composition of listed firms by relaxing regulations toward Hybrid
Sector firms, including the establishment of the recently opened GEM.
Until the recent share reform, which is discussed further below, listed firms in China
issued both tradable and nontradable shares (Table 24-A). The nontradable shares were either
held by the government or by other state-owned legal entities (i.e., other listed or non-listed
firms or organizations). Table 24-B shows that, as of the end of 2009, nontradable shares
constituted around half of all shares (53%, column 2) and the majority of tradable shares were A
shares. Among the tradable shares, Class A and B shares are listed and traded in either the SHSE
or SZSE, while Class A (B) shares are issued to and traded by Chinese investors (foreign investors
including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong and QFIIs). While the two share classes issued by
the same firm are identical in terms of shareholder rights (e.g., voting and dividend), B shares
were traded at a significant discount relative to A shares and are traded less frequently than A
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shares. 63 The “B share discount” has been reduced significantly since the CSRC allowed Chinese
citizens to invest and trade B shares (with foreign currency accounts) in 2001. In addition, Class
H shares, issued by selected “Red Chip” Chinese companies, are listed and traded on the HKSE.
Finally, there are N shares and S shares for firms listed in the U.S. and Singapore but operate in
China (we omit discussions on these shares since they are not listed on the domestic exchanges).
After the share reforms discussed below in Section 3.4.7, government shares became G shares
and are tradable.
Table 24-A Types of Common Stock Issued in China
Tradable?
No (Private
block
transfer
possible)

Definition

State-owned
shares*

Shares that are controlled by the central government during the process when
firms are converted into a limited liability corporation but before listing. These
shares are either managed and represented by the Bureau of National Assets
(G shares after Management or held by other state-owned companies, both of which also
recent reform and appoint firms’ board members. After reforms announced in 2005 and
tradable)
implemented in 2006-7 state shares became G shares and are tradable.
Entrepreneur's
shares

Shares reserved for firms’ founders during the same process described above;
different from shares that founders can purchase and sell in the markets.

Foreign owners

Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during the same process

Legal entity holders Shares sold to legal identities (such as other companies, listed or non-listed)
during the same process.
Employee shares Shares sold to firm’s employees during the same process.
Yes

A Shares

(Newly
issued
shares)

Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai
or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; most of these shares are sold to and held by
Chinese (citizen) investors.

B Shares

Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai
or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; these shares are sold to and held by foreign
investors; starting in 2001Chinese investors can also trade these shares.

H Shares

Shares issued by selected Chinese companies listed and traded in the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange; these shares can only be traded on the HK Exchange but
can be held by anyone.

*: There are sub-categories under this definition
63

Explanations of the B share discount include: 1) Foreign investors face higher information asymmetry
than domestic investors, 2) lower B share prices compensate for the lack of liquidity (due to low trading
volume), and 3) the A share premium reflects a speculative bubble component among domestic investors.
See, e.g., Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) and Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) for more details.
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Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Table 24-B Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China’s Listed Companies
Shanghai SE: ^Non-tradable/total *Tradable/total A/total shares A/Tradable
*
State/total
shares
shares
shares
shares
0.41
0.69
0.31
0.16
0.52
0.49
0.72
0.28
0.16
0.57
0.43
0.67
0.33
0.21
0.64
0.39
0.64
0.36
0.21
0.60
0.35
0.65
0.35
0.22
0.62
0.32
0.65
0.35
0.23
0.66
0.34
0.66
0.34
0.24
0.71
0.43
0.65
0.35
0.26
0.75
0.44
0.64
0.36
0.28
0.80
0.50
0.64
0.36
0.29
0.80
0.52
0.65
0.35
0.26
0.74
0.57
0.64
0.35
0.27
0.76
0.58
0.64
0.36
0.28
0.77
0.57
0.62
0.38
0.30
0.78
0.36
0.65
0.35
0.27
0.81
0.37
0.69
0.31
0.28
0.90
0.47
0.58
0.42
0.37
0.91
0.47
0.49
0.53
0.50
0.98

^: Non-tradable shares include “state-owned” and “shares owned by legal entities”;
This column is calculated as “(Non-tradable in Shanghai SE+ Non-tradable in Shenzhen SE)/(Market cap
in Shanghai SE + Market cap in Shenzhen SE)”
*: tradable shares include
A, B, and H shares;
Source: China Security Regulation Committee Reports (2000-2006), CEIC database and
http://www.csrc.gov.cn

We next describe standard corporate governance mechanisms in the Listed Sector. First,
according to the (2005) Company Law, listed firms in China have a two-tier board structure: the
Board of Directors (five to nineteen members) and the Board of Supervisors (at least three
members), with supervisors ranking above directors. The main duty of the Board of Supervisors
is to monitor firms’ operations as well as top managers and directors; it consists of
representatives of shareholders and employees, with the rest either officials chosen from
government branches or executives from the parent companies; directors and top managers of
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the firms cannot hold positions as supervisors. The company has the discretion to decide the
number of representatives of employees on the Board of Supervisors, but representatives of
employees must account for at least one third of the board. The Board of Directors serves
similar duties as their counterparts in the U.S., including appointing and firing CEOs. According
to the “one-share, one-vote” scheme adopted by firms in the Listed Sector, shareholders
including the state and legal person shareholders (that typically own the majority of shares)
appoint the board members. Specifically, the Chairman (one person) and Vice Chairman (one or
two) of the Board are elected by all directors (majority votes); at the approval of the Board, the
CEO and other top managers can become members of the Board. The CSRC requires at least
one third (and a minimum of two people) of the Board to be independent.
Since the Law does not specify that every member of the Board must be elected by
shareholders during general shareholder meetings, in practice some directors are nominated
and appointed by the firms’ parent companies and the nomination process is usually kept secret,
in particular for former SOEs. Since not all members of either board are elected by shareholders,
a major problem with the board structure is the appointment of and contracting with the CEOs.
Based on firm-level compensation data (available since 1998 due to disclosure requirements),
Fung et al. (2003) and Kato and Long (2004) find that no listed firms grant stock options to CEOs
or board members. The situation is somewhat different now. Among overseas listed SOEs,
barriers to exercising stock options have been overcome, and some senior executives have been
granted stock options (examples include the former chairman of CNOOC Wei Liucheng and Bank
of China-Hong Kong former chairman Liu Mingkang) and received substantial rewards (Caijing
Magazine, 2008). However, the cash-based compensation level for CEOs is still much lower than
their counterparts in developed countries, and the consumption of perks, such as company cars,
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is prevalent.
Second, the existing ownership structure, characterized by the large amount of nontradable shares including cross-holdings of shares among listed companies and institutions,
makes it difficult for value-increasing M&As. According to the China Venture Source, there were
2,656 M&A deals involving listed firms in 2010 totaling US$169.6 billion, a small fraction of the
total market capitalization. In many deals, a Hybrid Sector firm (non-listed) acquires a listed firm
that is converted from an SOE, but the large amount of non-tradable shares held by the state
remain intact after the transaction. 64 Such an acquisition can be the means through which low
quality, non-listed companies bypass listing standards and access financial markets (e.g., Du et
al., 2008).
Third, one factor contributing to the occurrence of corporate scandals is the lack of
institutional investors (including non-depository financial intermediaries) as they are a very
recent addition to the set of financial institutions in China. Professional investors would perhaps
not be so easily taken in by simple deceptions. Another factor is that the enforcement of laws is
questionable due to the lack of legal professionals and institutions.
Fourth, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and blockholder for many
listed firms, including banks and financial services companies. The main role of the CSRC
(counterpart of the SEC in the U.S.) is to monitor and regulate stock exchanges and listed
companies. The government exercises its shareholder control rights in listed firms through the
64

If we include the cross-border M&As and transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, the
total amount increases to US $47 billion in 2000, $14 billion in 2001, $29 billion in 2002, and $24 billion
in the first three quarters of 2003. 68% of all M&A deals (66% in terms of dollar deal amount) are initiated
by Hybrid Sector firms, while former SOEs and foreign firms initiate 29% and 3% of the rest, respectively
(27% and 7% in deal amount). M&As are most active in coastal regions, and in industries such as
machinery, information technology, retail, and gas and oil.
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Bureau of National Assets Management, which holds large fractions of nontradable shares, or
other SOEs (with their holdings of nontradable shares). However, since the senior managers of
the Bureau are government officials, it is doubtful that they will pursue their fiduciary role as
controlling shareholders diligently, since their compensation is probably not incentive-based;
even if their compensation was tied to performance, they may lack the expertise to make the
correct strategic decisions. Moreover, the government’s dual roles can lead to conflicting goals
(maximizing profits as shareholder vs. maximizing social welfare as regulator or social planner) in
dealing with listed firms, which in turn weaken the effectiveness of both of its roles. 65 There are
cases in which the government, aiming to achieve certain social goals, influenced the markets
through state-owned institutional investors (e.g., asset management companies) but created
unintended adverse effects. Based on a sample of 625 firms with 28% of the CEOs being ex- or
current government bureaucrats, Fan et al. (2007) find that the three-year post-IPO average
stock returns of the sample underperform the market by 20%, and the underperformance of
firms with such politically-connected CEOs exceeds those without politically-connected CEOs by
almost 30%. Firms with politically-connected CEOs are also more likely to appoint other
bureaucrats but not personnel with relevant professional to boards of directors.
Overall, internal and external governance for the Listed Sector is weak, and further
development of governance mechanisms is likely in this sector going forward. In Section 3.4.7
below we further discuss this issue..

65

See Pistor (2010) for a description of the complicated relationships among various regulatory agencies
and the central government branches, and how these relationships affect the decision-making process of
regulations and enforcement.

163

3.4.4 Real Estate Market
Like other economic sectors, China’s real estate market has long been operating under
the ‘dual tracks’ of both central planning and market-oriented systems.

Prior to 1998,

government control was dominant with the market only playing a secondary role, and
mortgages were not designated for retail customers and households. Chinese citizens working
for the government and government owned companies and organizations could purchase
properties at prices significantly below market prices, with the subsidies coming from their
employers. The reform policies introduced in 1998 aimed to end the distribution of properties
by employers and establish new housing finance and market systems.

Provinces and

autonomous regions have established programs to sell properties (e.g., apartments in urban
areas) to individuals instead of allocating residency as part of the employment benefits.
Since 1998 the residential housing reform and the development of individual mortgages,
along with rising household income and demand for quality housing, had stimulated the fast
growth of the real estate market. Figure 21-A shows the total real estate investments and their
funding sources over time. Total investment increased from RMB 321 billion in 1996, 12% of the
national fixed assets investments, to RMB 4.8 trillion in 2010 and 20% of the national fixed
assets investment. Most of the investment funds have come from domestic sources. Not
surprisingly, bank loans are the most important source of real estate financing.

China’s

continuing economic growth especially in private sectors, urbanization and industrialization,
limited land supply, increasing foreign direct investments and institutional investments, will
further enhance the liquidity and long-term prospects of China’s real estate assets.
As the real estate sector gained more weight in the economy, its impact on other
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industries, especially the financial and banking industries, increased considerably. With the
expansion of the real estate market, banks and other financial institutions lent more to keep up
with the demand for financing. When the fast expansion, in part fueled by the inflows of
speculative capital and agency problems in investment, could not be sustained, increased
demand led to hikes in property prices and real estate bubbles surfaced. The bursting of such
bubbles can lead to painful consequences in the entire economy.
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Figure 21-A Total Real Estate Investments and their sources (1996-2009)

Bottom part of the figure in the top panel is enlarged and plotted in the bottom panel, which presents the
funding sources of real estate investment over the period of 1996-2009.
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Figure 21-C Growth Rats in Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China
(data source for Figures 21-B and 21-C: CEIC)

The real estate prices in major cities have risen sharply in recent years, and whether
these fast growing prices are ‘bubbles’ and how to cool down the markets are among the most
closely watched and hotly debated issues in China. We provide some simple analysis here; for a
more thorough and careful analysis see, e.g., Wu, Gyourko, and Deng (2011). Figure 21-B shows
the trends of total housing space developed vs. total space sold over the period 2002-2009 for
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the entire nation, and Figure 21-C compares the growth rates of total housing space developed
vs. total space sold; actual space is normalized so that both charts begin at 100 in 2002; hence
the vertical axis measures growth rates. We can see that while total space developed and total
space sold (for both residential and nonresidential properties) grew at similar rates over the
period (Figure 21-C), the gap between total space developed and sold—a proxy for the
inventory of housing supply in the markets—widened from around 0.6 billion square meters in
2002 to 2.2 billion square meters in 2009.
In Figures 22-A through 22-E we plot and compare growth rates of average housing
prices and disposable household income, over the period 2002-2009, for the nation and the four
major cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Once again, actual housing prices
(RMB per square meter) and disposable income are normalized so that both charts begin at 100
in 2002; hence the vertical axis measures growth rates and all the figures for prices and income
are inflation adjusted. Steady growth of disposable income in line with rising housing prices can
help sustain the growth of the housing markets, and hence considerable and increasing gaps in
the growth rates reflect potential bubbles in the housing markets. Based on the figures it
appears that while at the national level and in the city of Guangzhou there are no signs of
bubbles, the opposite can be said for the large regional markets in Beijing, Shanghai and
Shenzhen, where housing prices are rising at much higher paces than those of real disposable
income in recent years. Shenzhen presents the most worrisome case, where despite fast-rising
housing prices fueled by the inflow of speculative capital, real household income actually
declined in 2008 and 2009 (from 2007 levels), perhaps (partially) due to the adverse effects of
the global financial crisis on the exporting sectors, which rely mainly on migrant workers from
other regions.
167

National Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
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Figure 22-A: Comparing the growth of National Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income
(data source for Figures 5-A through 5-E: CEIC)

Beijing Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100
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Figure 22-B: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Beijing
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Shanghai Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income per capita
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100
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Figure 22-C: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shanghai

Shenzhen Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income per capita
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100
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Figure 22-D: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shenzhen
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Guanzhou Housing Price vs Disposable Annual Income
Normalized, base year=2002
adjusted by CPI, 2002=100
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Figure 22-E: Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Guangzhou

We would like to emphasize again that our results are based on simple measures;
however, analyses from Wu et al. (2011), who use more sophisticated metrics and regressions
controlling for other factors that may affect housing prices, yield similar results that there may
well be bubbles in the regional markets of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. There is some
evidence that speculative foreign capital (the “hot money”) flowing into China is partially
responsible for the accelerated rise in real estate markets (e.g., Chu and Sing, 2004; Guo and
Huang, 2010). Given the rising status of the Chinese economy and its currency, coupled with the
weakening of the U.S. economy (and other developed countries), the dollar and near-zero
interest rates in most developed countries, the inflow of ‘hot money’ into China’s real estate
markets (and other sectors) may continue.
The government has been taking aggressive measures to control property prices. Since
2004, it has issued new policies in order to suppress speculative activities; another policy
measure to control the growth of the real estate market is through the PBOC’s required reserve
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deposit ratio. In 2010 and 2011, in response to the fast rising housing prices, the government
has announced a series of interventions including: (a) increased equity down payment shares
from 20% to 30% for first homes of more than 90 square meters in size; (b) increased equity
down payment shares from 40% to 50% for second homes; (c) general discouragement of the
use of any leverage on third homes or by external buyers (i.e., those not living in the market of
the intended purchase); (d) new rules to prevent developers from hoarding housing units; (e)
preparation of the introduction of a local property tax, with possible pilot implementations in
Chongqing, a large city in the southwestern region that is under direct control of the central
government, within the next one to two years; and (f) direct administrative orders on how much
land and units of buildings can be developed.66 Among these measures, the proposed property
tax may play a significant role in cooling down the markets, because it would raise the cost of
carry on speculative investments in owner-occupied housing.
Despite the government’s macroprudential policies in recent years and the newly
announced measures and strong signals in recent months, the impact of these measures on the
housing markets seems to be limited. One reason, as stipulated by many observers, is that since
various government agencies and officials have played a major role in developing ‘commercial
properties’ it is not in their best interest to see major market corrections. The evidence in Wu et
al. (2011) provides some support of this view. They find that much of the increase in housing
prices is occurring in land values. Using land auctions data from Beijing, they also find SOEs
controlled by the central government paid 27% more than other bidders for an otherwise
equivalent land parcel. Since many vested government officials have a lot to lose following a
66

For more details, see “Gazette of Executive Meeting of the State Council,” December 14th, 2009; and
“Circular of the State Council on Resolutely Containing the Precipitous Rise of Housing Prices in Some
Cities” (Decree No. [2010] 10), April 17th, 2010, and Wu et al. (2011).
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crash in the real estate markets, it is argued that the new measures, including the proposed
property taxes, will not be effectively enforced; such a belief can also explain why speculative
capital continues to enter the housing markets.
Given the experiences of many other countries in the recent and previous financial
crises, the government’s efforts in controlling the rise of housing markets in the aforementioned
regions, and preventing this spreading to other regions of the country can augment its other
efforts in stabilizing the economy and alleviating social tensions. In Section 3.4 below we
further examine how the inflow of speculative capital and subsequent outflow can create
bubbles in the markets and then the bursting of the bubbles can spread to other sectors of the
economy.

3.4.5 Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries
Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) have suggested that stock market-based economies, such
as the U.K. in the 19th century and the U.S. in the 20th century, have been more successful in
developing new industries than intermediary-based economies such as Germany and Japan.
They argue that markets are better than banks for funding new industries, because evaluation of
these industries based on experience is difficult, and there is wide diversity of opinion. Stock
market-based economies such as the U.S. and U.K. also tend to have well-developed systems for
the acquisition and distribution of information, so the cost of information to investors is low.
Markets then work well because investors can gather information at low costs and those that
anticipate high profits can provide the finance to the firms operating in the new industries.

172

A key part of this process is the private equity/venture capital sector (see, e.g., Kortum
and Lerner 2000). Venture capitalists are able to raise large amounts of funds in the U.S.
because of the prospect that successful firms will be able to undertake an IPO. With data from
21 countries, Jeng and Wells (2000) find that venture capital is less important in other countries,
while the existence of an active IPO market is the critical determinant of the importance of
venture capital in a country. This is consistent with the finding of Black and Gilson (1998) in a
comparison of the U.S. and Germany, that the primary reason venture capital is relatively
successful in the U.S. is the active IPO market that exists there.
These facts imply that the development of active venture capital and private equity
markets can increase the financing for China’s new industries. What is unusual about China
(perhaps along with India) is that it currently has the ability to develop both traditional
industries, such as manufacturing, and in the near future new, high-tech industries, such as
aerospace, computer software, semiconductors, and bio-genetics. This is different from the
experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and that of most other emerging economies
in the 1990s, as all these other countries focused on developing manufacturing industries first.
In terms of developing traditional industries (e.g., Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s), China has
already followed suit in first introducing advanced (relative to domestic companies) but not the
most advanced technologies from developed countries; and “nationalizing” these technologies
within designated companies before moving toward the more advanced technologies. Allen and
Gale (1999, 2000a) argue that banks are better than financial markets for funding mature
industries because there is wide agreement on how they are best managed, so the delegation of
the investment decision to a bank works well. This delegation process, and the economies of
scale in information acquisition through delegation, makes bank-based systems more efficient in
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terms of financing the growth in these industries. Therefore, the banking system can contribute
more in supporting the growth and development of these industries than markets.

3.4.6 Asset Management Industries
The mutual fund industry in China has gone through three stages of development. The
first stage is between 1992, when China’s first fund (LiuBo) was established, and 1997, when the
first version of the mutual fund regulation was drafted and passed by the CSRC. The LiuBo Fund
was a closed-end fund with NAV RMB100 million RMB ($12.5 million) and began to trade on the
SHSE in 1993. While the industry experienced fast growth in the few years after 1992, lack of
regulation and problems associated with fund trading hampered the further development of the
industry. The first open-end fund was established in September, 2001 (Hua An Chuangxin),
following the announcement of the proposal for open-end fund investment by the CSRC, a
milestone for China’s mutual fund industry.
Figure 23 shows the development of the mutual fund industry in China. With only a
handful of funds in 1998, China now has sixty-five fund companies managing 551 different funds
as of November 2009. The total net assets value increased from RMB11 billion (or $1.3 Billion)
in 1998 to about RMB 2.26 trillion (or $328 billion) in November 2009 (this figure was much
higher in the second half of 2007 before the markets went south). In 2001, the NAV of all funds
was about 0.8% of GDP and 1.19% of total national savings; these figures rose to 6.16% of GDP
and 8.58% of total savings in 2008. The growth of open-end funds contributed to most of the
growth in the industry. As of November 2009, 520 funds are open-ended and 31 are closeended, with 96% of the total fund value managed by open-end funds. The most popular
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investment style is actively managed (domestic) equity, with only a few index funds and ETFs
(exchange traded funds).
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Figure 23 Growth in China’s Mutual Fund Industry (1998-2009)

Many mutual fund companies are owned by securities and other financial services
companies. Like their counterparts in the U.S., management fees are the major source of
income for fund companies, accounting for about 80% of total income. Administration fees
account for 9% of total income, and the rest of the income comes from investment and other
incomes. More than half of the fund managers have a master-level or higher academic degree,
and the majority of them are 36 to 45 years old. Investment capital from institutional investors
is about the same as that from individual investors in 2005, but in 2006 individual investors
account for 70% of the total mutual fund investment. Among the 23 newly launched funds in
the first half of 2009, individual investors account for 75.8%.
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The first fund managed by a qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) was set up in
2002. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the government agent that
regulates the QFII funds. The QFII Act allows foreign investors to invest in Chinese securities,
with the intention of introducing sophisticated foreign investors to the Chinese market with the
hope that their presence would improve market efficiency. In addition, with the exercise of
their shareholder rights, their presence can also help improve corporate governance of the
Listed Sector. However, the original QFII rules imposed restrictions on foreign investors, such as
a capital lock-up period of one to three years limiting capital withdrawal (and leaving China) and
other operating restrictions.

In August 2006, CSRC revised QFII rules to promote more

participation from foreign investors. Under the new rules, there has been a significant increase
in applications from foreign investors for QFII quotas.
Most of the institutions in the first group of QFII applicants were securities companies
and investment banks, with other financial services companies such as insurance companies and
pension fund companies also on the list. By the end of July 2006, China had approved a total of
$7.495 billion foreign investment capital (quota) from 45 QFIIs, or three quarters of the then
ceiling of $10 billion capital inflow through QFIIs.

In December 2007, the investment

quota/ceiling tripled, from $10 billion to $30 billion. In September 2009, draft rules were issued
by SAFE to increase the upward limit of investment for an individual QFII institution to $1 billion
from the previous $800 million. Some analysts believe that the move to increase the QFII quota
was also intended to prepare for the large amount of floating of non-tradable shares. If the
holders of the newly floated shares rush to sell, QFII funds can be a stabilizing source of the
market. As of August 2011, there were a total of 116 approved QFIIs operating in China, of
which 103 were investment funds. The approved investment quotas reached $20.69 billion.
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The approval of qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) to invest in overseas
markets came after QFII, in July 2006. The QDII funds invest in stocks, bonds, real estate
investment trusts and other mainstream financial products in markets such as New York,
London, Tokyo and Hong Kong. Similarly to the QFII scheme, it is a transitional arrangement
that provides limited opportunities for domestic investors to access foreign markets at a stage in
which a country/territory’s currency is not freely convertible and capital flows are restricted. As
of early 2008, ten fund companies had obtained the approval to launch QDII. The total number
of QDII funds reached 75 in July 2009. By April 2011, QDIIs had approved investment quotas of
$72.67 billion. Given the recent turmoil in the global financial markets, the performance of the
QDII funds has been less than stellar. Going forward, the probable continuing appreciation of
the RMB against major international currencies including the dollar is a major concern for QDII
investors.
China’s asset management industry is expected to continue its growth in the near future.
In the U.S., mutual funds became the largest group of financial intermediaries in financial
markets in 1999, holding 29% of all financial assets. By contrast, mutual funds in China only held
around 8.1% of all financial assets as at the end of 2009. The further growth of the economy and
continuing reform of the pension system will generate both demand and supply of capital for
the industry. If the trend of opening up domestic markets to foreign investors continues, there
will be a greater inflow of QFIIs.

3.4.7 Further Changes in Financial Markets
As we have documented, the financial markets in China do not currently play nearly as
177

important a role as banks. Going forward, further improvements in the operation of China’s
financial markets can help to promote the development of high-technology industries as
discussed in Section 3.4.5. In addition, developing new financial products and markets can
enhance the risk management capabilities of China’s financial institutions and firms. Finally,
deep and efficient markets can provide an alternative to banks for raising large amounts of
capital.
In recent years the performance of the stock markets has been volatile.

This is

somewhat surprising given the robust performance of the real economy. We attribute this
(relatively) poor performance to a number of factors including the following:
Limited self-regulation and formal regulation.
The large overhang of shares owned by government entities.
The lack of listed firms originating in the Hybrid Sector.
The lack of trained professionals.
The lack of institutional investors.
Limited financial markets and products.
Efforts have been made to address some of these weaknesses. However, some of these
are problems can only be tackled over the long run. We discuss each in turn.
3.4.7.1 Regulations
There are two ways in which markets are regulated in practice and each has advantages
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and disadvantages: first, market forces and self-regulation, and second, government regulation.
A good example of regulation through market forces and self-regulation is provided by
the capital markets in the UK in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Michie, 1987). The
role of government regulation and intervention was minimal. Despite this the markets did
extremely well and London became the financial capital of the world. Many firms and countries
from all over the world raised large amounts of funds. Reputation and trust were an important
factor in the smooth operation of these markets. For example, Franks et al. (2003) compare the
early twentieth century capital markets with those in the mid-twentieth century. Despite
extensive changes in the laws protecting minority shareholders there was very little change in
the ways in which the market operated. The authors attribute this to the importance of trust.
We argue below that China’s Hybrid sector is another example of a situation where
market forces are effective. Formal regulation and legal protections do not play much of a role
and yet financing and governance mechanisms are quite effective. In this case, as we shall see,
it appears that competition as well as reputation and trust work well.
In contrast, the examples of fraud and other problems of manipulation and the
inefficiency of markets pointed to in Section 3.4.1 suggest that in China’s formal financial
markets these alternative mechanisms do not work well. Although such mechanisms may
develop in the long run as in the nineteenth and early twentieth century U.K., in the short run
formal government regulation of the type introduced in the U.S. in the 1930s and subsequently
as a response to the stock market collapse that started in 1929 and the Great Depression may
allow Chinese markets to function better. There is evidence from many countries that this type
of formal regulation is effective. For example, based on a study of securities laws with the focus
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on the public issuance of new equity in 49 countries (China is not included) LLS (2006) find that
disclosure and liability rules help to promote stock market development.

3.4.7.2 Sale of Government Shares in Listed Firms
One of the major problems Chinese stock markets have faced in recent years has been
caused by the large amount of shares in listed companies owned by the government and
government entities shown in Table 24-B. The Chinese government attempted sales of state
shares of selected firms in 1999 and 2001, but halted the process both times after share prices
plunged and investors grew panicky about the value of the entire market. This overhang
created great uncertainty about the quantity of shares that would come onto the market going
forward. This uncertainty was probably in part responsible for the stagnation of share prices
between 2002 and 2005 despite the very high levels of growth in the economy.
In 2005 the government announced a plan of “fully floating” state shares. Under the
plan, the remaining state shares among listed firms were converted to “G” shares. The CSRC
outlined the format for compensating existing shareholders and also imposed lockups and
restrictions on the amount of G shares that could be sold immediately after they became
tradable.

More specifically, the plan stipulated that G shares were not to be traded or

transferred within 12 months after the implementation of the share structure reform.
Shareholders owning more than 5% of the original non-tradable shares can only trade less than
5% of the total shares outstanding within one year and less than 10% within 2 years. These
restrictions of G share sales were intended to reduce the downward pressure on the stock price,
maintain market stability and protect the interests of public investors. The details of the “fully
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floating plan” for a firm, including the number of G shares to be granted to each Class A
shareholder and the time window (e.g., one to three years) of G shares become fully floating,
had to be approved by two thirds of Class A shareholders of the firm.
Share reforms began with a pilot program with only four companies participating in
April 2005. By the end of 2006, 96% of all the listed companies had completed share reforms;
by the end of 2007, there were only a few companies that had not reached an agreement with
their shareholders on the terms of the reform. 67 As documented in Table 24-B above, as of
September 2009, for the first time tradable shares accounted for more than half of the stock
market, suggesting that the floating of nontradable shares is progressing.
Another fact worth mentioning is that for the firms that go public (IPOs) after the share
reform, not all of their stocks are immediately floated to the market. Lock-up periods may still
apply to large shareholders who obtained the shares before the IPO. For example, in the case of
ABC’s recent IPO, the majority of A shares (87.6%) have already been distributed to various
agencies of the government before the IPO. In fact, only 25.5 billions A shares (8.6% of total
outstanding A shares) were issued in the IPO. Those shares held by the government have a lockup for 3 years. However, they are technically A (not G) shares. Thus no compensation will be
paid when those shares become freely tradable.

67

Hwang et al. (2006) document that share reform increases turnover, especially for firms with low
liquidity prior to the reform, and reduces speculative trading. Although share prices drop significantly on
the day of share supply increases, shareholder wealth increases by 15% overall. Beltratti and Bortolotti
(2006) document an 8% abnormal return around the date of share reform announcement. Liao and Liu
(2008) show that market reactions to share reforms are positively associated with the quality of the listed
firms (as measured by firm disclosure), providing evidence of improved market efficiency.
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3.4.7.3 The Listing of Firms from the Hybrid Sector
One of the major problems of the stock exchanges is that most of the firms listed are
former SOEs. Relatively few are firms from the more dynamic Hybrid Sector. Reforming listing
requirements and procedures to make it advantageous for dynamic and successful companies to
become listed on the exchanges can enhance the overall quality of the Listed Sector. The
establishment of the recently opened “GEM” provides an example in this regard.

3.4.7.4 The Training of More Professionals
This step will allowan improvement in the enforcement of laws and contracts. An
independent and efficient judicial system requires a sufficient supply of qualified legal
professionals. The Ministry of Justice of China states that there are 143,000 lawyers and 12,428
law firms as of 2007. Two hundred and six out of China’s 2,000 counties still do not have
lawyers. Lawyers represent only 10% to 25% of all clients in civil and business cases, and even in
criminal prosecutions, lawyers represent defendants in only half of the cases. Among the
approximately five million business enterprises in China, only 4% of them currently have regular
legal advisers. Moreover, only one-fifth of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a
lower fraction of judges have formally studied law at a university or college. As mentioned
before, a similar situation exists for auditors and accounting professionals.

3.4.7.5 Institutional Investors
In most developed stock markets institutional investors, such as insurance companies,
pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, play an important role. They employ well182

trained professionals who are able to evaluate companies well. This causes markets to have a
higher degree of efficiency than if they are dominated by individual investors. In addition, there
can be advantages in terms of corporate governance if institutional investors actively participate
in the monitoring of firms’ managers and are directly involved in firms’ decision-making process
as blockholders of stocks. For example, in the U.S., pension funds such as CALPERS have
become the symbol of shareholder activism that strengthens corporate governance, while in
Japan and Germany, financial intermediaries serve similar purposes. For China, the efficiency of
China’s stock markets as well as corporate governance of listed firms can be improved by
further entry of domestic financial intermediaries that can act as institutional investors. With
their large-scale capital and expertise in all relevant areas of business, financial intermediaries
can provide a level of stability and professionalism that is sorely lacking in China’s financial
markets.
Currently institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and pension
funds are relatively small in terms of assets held given their early stage of development.
However, they are expanding dramatically. Among policies that can further encourage the
development of such intermediaries are those that provide tax advantages to various types of
products such as life insurance and pension related savings and investments.

3.4.7.6 A Greater Range of Financial Products and Markets
More financial products allow investors to form diversified portfolios with more than
just stocks. As discussed above, corporate bond markets, along with better enforcement of
bankruptcy laws and bond rating agencies, provide an alternative class of assets to stocks.
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Second, the introduction of more derivative securities such as forwards, futures, and options on
commodities (already in place and trading) as well as on other securities, enlarges the risk
management toolbox of investors and firms. In fact, China has launched an index future on April
16th, 2010, tracking the Shanghai-based Hushen 300, the index of 300 Shanghai- and Shenzhen
listed class A-shares. On the first day four contacts were traded. Of the 2,200 index future
accounts opened as of May 4, 2010, 95% of them were individuals, and the rest were
institutional investors. The proportion of institutional investors is expected to rise in the future,
since the index future is targeted mainly toward more sophisticated investors for hedging
purposes. The launch of this long awaited index future is a major step in the reform of capital
markets in China and introduces a new tool for risk management. Along with the index future,
margin trading and short selling of shares were also permitted in April.
Third, the expansion of their coverage and products (e.g., in property and auto
insurance as well as life and medical insurance) by insurance companies, and the introduction
and development of asset-backed securities and other structured finance products by financial
services companies can further diversify the supply of financial products.

3.5 The Non-standard Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector Firms
In this section we study how the non-standard financial sector supports firms in the
Hybrid Sector to raise funds and to grow from start-ups to successful industry leaders. We also
examine the alternative governance mechanisms employed by investors and firms that can
substitute for formal corporate governance mechanisms. Due to data limitations, much of this
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evidence is by necessity anecdotal or by survey. 68
We first compare the Hybrid Sector with the State and Listed Sectors to highlight the
importance of its status in the entire economy in Section 3.5.1. Second, we consider survey
evidence in Section 3.5.2.

Finally, Section 3.5.3 provides discussions and comparisons of

alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms that support the growth of the
Hybrid Sector versus formal financing channels (through banks and markets) and governance
mechanisms (laws and courts).

3.5.1 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors
Figure 24-A compares the level and growth of industrial output produced in the State
and Listed Sectors combined vs. that of the Hybrid Sector from 1998 to 2009. 69 The output from
the Hybrid Sector has been steadily increasing during this period and exceeded that of the other
two sectors in 1998. The total output in 2009 is almost $5,700 billion for the Hybrid Sector,
while it is around $2,500 billion in the State and Listed Sectors combined. 70 The Hybrid Sector
grew at an annual rate of over 23% between 1998 and 2009, while the State and Listed Sectors

68

All firms including Hybrid Sector firms must disclose accounting and financial information to the local
Bureau of Commerce and Industry, and most of the reports are audited. However, these data are then
aggregated into the Statistical Yearbook without any firm-level publications.
69

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China revised its total industrial output statistics in the 2000
year book without any explicit explanations. The outputs in previous years (i.e. 1997) were significantly
revised down compared to the 1998 year book. To be consistent and avoid confusion, we only use data
from the NBS after 1998.
70
Due to data limitations, our calculations underestimate the output of the State and Listed Sectors. We use
the output produced by SOEs and listed firms in which the state has at least a 50% ownership stake as the
total output for these sectors, but this calculation excludes output from listed firms that are not majority
owned by the state; the output for the Hybrid Sector is the difference between the total output and the total
for the other two sectors. However, as mentioned above, only around 20% of all listed firms do not have
the state as the largest owner, hence the total output of these firms is not likely to change our overall
conclusion on the dominance of the Hybrid Sector over the other two sectors.
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combined grew at around 15% during the same period. 71 In addition, the growth rates for
investment in fixed assets of these sectors are comparable (China Statistics Yearbooks; and AQQ
(2005)), which implies that the Hybrid Sector is more productive than the State and Listed
Sectors. In fact, with large samples of firms (from sources) with various ownership structures,
Liu (2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) both find that the returns to capital is much higher in nonstate sectors than the State Sector, and that a capital reallocation from state to private sectors
will generate more growth in the economy. Fan et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2007) find that stateowned firms in China have a much easier access to the debt market and accordingly higher
leverage than non-state firms. One reason for the differences is that due to government
protection (for economic and social/political reasons) the costs for bankruptcy and financial
distress are much lower for state-owned firms. These firms also have easier access to bank
loans, especially credit extended by state-owned banks.
All of the above facts make the growth of the Hybrid Sector even more impressive. Not
surprisingly, there has been a fundamental change among the State, Listed, and Hybrid Sectors
in terms of their contribution to the entire economy: the State Sector contributed more than
two thirds of China’s GDP in 1980 and (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of Hybrid
Sector firm, were negligible, but in 2009 the State Sector only contributed 30% of the GDP
(China Statistical Yearbook, 1998-2010). The above trend of the Hybrid Sector replacing the
State Sector is likely to continue in the near future.

71

There is an ongoing process of privatizing SOEs. Potentially this may bias the growth rate of the Hybrid
Sector higher, as there are firms shifting from the State Sector to the Hybrid Sector. However, the
overwhelming majority of SOEs became Listed Sector firms (the main channel through which SOEs were
partially privatized prior to 2004), thus this process is unlikely to change the validity of the results above.
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Figure 24-A Comparing the Sectors – Industrial Output

In this figure we plot total “industrial output” for State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) Sectors
combined and for the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 2000 to 2008. Data source for this table is the
Chinese Statistical Yearbook (2000 – 2009).
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Figure 24-B Comparing the Sectors – Employment
In this figure we plot total number of workers employed by the State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded
firms) Sectors combined and by the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 1990 to 2008. Data source for this
table is the Chinese Statistical Yearbook and CEIC database .

Figure 24-B presents the number and growth of non-agricultural employees in the three
187

sectors. The Hybrid Sector is a much more significant source for employment opportunities
than the State and Listed Sectors. Over the period from 1990 to 2010, the Hybrid Sector
employs an average of over 77% of all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of the Hybrid
Sector) have been the most important employers providing (non-agricultural) jobs for residents
in the rural areas, while (non-agricultural) privately owned firms employ more than 40% of the
workforce in the urban areas. Moreover, the number of employees working in the Hybrid Sector
has been growing at 1.5% over this period, while the labor force in the State and Listed Sectors
has been shrinking. 72 These patterns are particularly relevant for China, given its vast
population and potential problem of unemployment.

3.5.2 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors
Much of the information concerning the Hybrid Sector comes from surveys. We focus
on evidence in AQQ (2005) and Cull and Xu (2005). The most significant findings of these
surveys regarding financing channels are the following. First, during the startup stage, funds
from founders’ family and friends are an essential source of financing. Banks can also play an
important role. Second, internal financing, in the form of retained earnings, is also important.
During their growth period financing from private credit agencies (PCAs), instead of banks, as
well as trade credits are key channels for firms in AQQ’s sample. As documented by Tsai (2002),
PCAs take on many forms, from shareholding cooperative enterprises run by professional money
brokers, lenders and middlemen, to credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs
(raising money from group members and from outsiders to fund firms; zijin huzushe), from
pawnshops to underground private money houses.
72

Our calculations of the total number of workers employed by the Hybrid Sector actually underestimate
the actual work force in the sector, because the Chinese Statistics Yearbooks do not provide employment
data for all types of firms (by ownership structure), especially small firms, in the Hybrid Sector.
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As far as corporate governance is concerned, when asked about what type of losses
concern them the most if the firm failed, every firm’s founders/executives (100%) included in
the AQQ study said reputation loss is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic
losses are of major concern. Competition also appears to be an important factor ensuring firms
are well run.
Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on courts to resolve less
than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on
courts in coastal and more developed areas. One reason that firms go to courts to resolve a
dispute is because the courts are authoritative so that the dispute will be resolved even though
the resolution may not be fair (e.g., Clarke et al. 2008).

3.5.3 Discussion on How the Non-standard Financial Sector Works
In this subsection we first discuss mechanisms within the non-standard financial sector
in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector. We then compare these alternative institutions
that operate outside the legal system with the law and legal institutions that have been widely
regarded as the basis for conducting finance and commerce.

There are two aspects to

alternative financing channels in the Hybrid Sector. The first is the way in which investment is
financed. The second is corporate governance. We consider each in turn.
Once a firm is established and doing well, internal finance can provide the funds
necessary for growth. AQQ (2005) find that about 60 percent of the funds raised by the Hybrid
Sector are generated internally. Of course, internal finance is fine once a firm is established but
this raises the issue of how firms in the Hybrid Sector acquire their “seed” capital, perhaps the
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most crucial financing during a firm’s life cycle. AQQ present evidence on the importance of
alternative and informal channels, including funds from family and friends and loans from
private (unofficial) credit agencies (see also Tsai (2002)). There is also evidence that financing
through illegal channels, such as smuggling, bribery, insider trading and speculations during
early stages of the development of financial markets and real estate market, and other
underground or unofficial businesses can also play a critical role in the accumulation of seed
capital.
Perhaps the most significant corporate governance mechanism is competition in
product and input markets, which has worked well in both developed and developing countries
(e.g., McMillan 1995, 1997; Allen and Gale 2000b). What we see from the success of Hybrid
Sector firms in WenZhou and other surveyed firms recounted in AQQ, suggest that it is only
those firms that have the strongest comparative advantage in an industry (of the area) that
survived and thrived. A relevant factor for competition in an industry is entry barriers for new
firms, as lower entry barriers foster competition. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (DLLS hereafter, 2002) examine entry barriers across 85 countries, and find that
countries with heavier (lighter) regulation of entry have higher government corruption (more
democratic and limited governments) and larger unofficial economies.

With much lower

barriers to entry compared to other countries with similar (low) per capita GDP, China is once
again an “outlier” in the DLLS sample given that China is one of the least democratic countries,
and such countries tend to have high barriers to entry. Survey evidence from AQQ (2005)
reveals that there exist non-standard methods to remove entry barriers in China, which can
reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts.

190

Another mechanism is reputation, trust, and relationships. Greif (1989, 1993) argues
that certain traders’ organizations in the 11th century were able to overcome problems of
asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because
they had developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and
coalitions.

Certain aspects of the growth of these institutions resemble what worked to

promote commerce and the financial system in China prior to 1949 (e.g., Kirby (1995)) and the
operation of the non-standard financial sector today (AQQ (2005)), in terms of how firms raise
funds and contract with investors and business partners. In addition, Greif (1993) and Stulz and
Williamson (2003) point out the importance of cultural and religious beliefs for the development
of institutions, legal origins, and investor protections.
The above factors are of particular relevance and importance to China’s development of
institutions. Without a dominant religion, some argue that the most important force in shaping
China’s social values and institutions is the set of beliefs first developed and formalized by
Kongzi (Confucius). This set of beliefs clearly defines family and social orders, which are very
different from western beliefs on how legal codes are formulated. Using the World Values
Survey conducted in the early 1990s, LLSV (1997b) find that China has one of the highest levels
of social trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries. 73 We interpret high
social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian beliefs. Throughout this chapter and AQQ
(2005; 2008) we have presented evidence that reputation and relationships make many
financing channels and governance mechanisms work in China’s Hybrid Sector.

73

Interestingly, the same survey, used in LLSV (1997b), finds that Chinese citizens have a low tendency to
participate in civil activities. However, our evidence shows that, with effective alternative mechanisms in
place citizens in the developed regions of China have a strong incentive to participate in business/economic
activities.
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There are other effective corporate governance mechanisms. First, Burkart et al. (2003)
link the degree of separation of ownership and control to different legal environments, and
show that family-run firms will emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in
countries with weak minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed firms
are the optimal form in countries with strong protection. Survey evidence on the Hybrid Sector
in AQQ and empirical results on the Listed Sector, along with evidence in Claessens et al. (2000,
2002) and ACDQQ (2008), suggests that family firms are a norm in China and other Asian
countries, and these firms have performed well. Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if
cooperation among different suppliers of inputs is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the
firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no external governance is possible, as internal,
mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome. AQQ (2005) and ACDQQ (2008) present
evidence on the importance of trade credits as a form of financing for firms in the Hybrid Sector.
Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure payments (as long as funds are available) among
business partners despite the lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement. The
importance of trade credits is also found in other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on
India) as well as in developed countries (Burkart et el. (2011) on the U.S.).
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome
problems associated with government corruption. According to proponents of institutional
development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions,
weak government and powerful elites can severely hinder China’s long-run economic growth.
However, our evidence shows that corruption has not prevented a high rate of growth for
China’s firms, in particular, firms in the Hybrid Sector, where legal protection is perhaps weaker
and problems of corruption worse compared to firms in the State and Listed sectors.
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A potentially effective solution for corruption is competition among local
governments/bureaucrats from different regions within the same country. Entrepreneurs can
move from region to region to find the most supportive government officials for their private
firms, which in turn motivates officials to lend “helping hands” rather than “grabbing hands” in
the provision of public goods or services (e.g., granting of licenses to start-up firms), or else
there will be an outflow of profitable private businesses from the region (Allen and Qian 2009).
This remedy is typically available in a large country with diverse regions like China.
Complementing this view, Xu (2011) reviews China’s unique institutional foundation of
“regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” in which the sub-national governments have
considerable autonomous power over regional economic decisions and at the same time remain
under the control of the central government. Under this structure, local governments play a
major role in supporting TVEs, allocating bank credits to firms, choosing good firms to get listed.
This system alleviates the information problem that regulators face, and creates incentives for
sub-national governors though personnel control and regional competition. Xu argues that this
governance structure is responsible for the spectacular economic growth of China, despite weak
enforcement of formal laws.
To summarize, the extraordinary economic performance of China in recent decades,
especially that of the Hybrid Sector, raises questions about the conventional wisdom of using
the legal system as the basis of commerce. Most observers would characterize the economic
performance in China and India as ‘successful despite the lack of western-style institutions,’ and
the failure to adopt western institutions will be one of the main factors to halt the long-run
economic growth. By contrast, Allen and Qian (2010) argue that China’s economy has been
successful because of this lack of western-style institutions – in that conducting business outside
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the legal system in fast-growing economies such as China can actually be superior to using the
law as the basis for finance and commerce.
Focusing on dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms based on the law
and courts vs. alternative mechanisms operating outside the legal system, Allen and Qian (2010)
argue that despite many well-known advantages, there are disadvantages in using legal
institutions. First, recent research on political economy factors, and in particular, work by Rajan
and Zingales (2003a,b) shows that rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups can turn
legal institutions into barriers to changes. We expect these problems to be much more severe
in developing countries and the costs of building good institutions can be enormous.74 One way
to solve this problem is not to use the law as the basis for commerce but instead to use
alternative mechanisms outside the legal system. Evidence presented in this chapter and other
related work on China and other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on India) suggests
that these alternative mechanisms can be quite effective.
Second, in democracies there can be a lengthy political process before significant
changes can be approved (by the majority of the population and/or legislature), and the people
in charge of revising the law (e.g., politicians and judges) may lack the expertise of business
transactions and have limited capacity (time and effort) to examine the proposed changes. 75 In

74

A frequently talked about and controversial topic is intellectual property rights including patents and
copyrights. The practice of enforcing intellectual property rights by courts is much more vigilant and
prevalent in developed countries than in developing countries such as China. An extensive literature in
economics has found mixed evidence on the relationship between patent/copyright protection and the pace
of innovations. While exclusive property rights provide strong incentives for innovations and do lead to
more innovations in a few industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, excessive protection deters
competition, which is another important factor in spurring innovations.
75
A good example is the U.S. payment system. At the beginning of the 21st Century the U.S. had a 19th
Century system: Checks had to be physically transported from where they were deposited to a central
operations center, then to the clearer and then back to the banks they were drawn on. Despite repeated calls
for changes from the banks and businesses, the U.S Congress did not act on this simple yet costly problem,
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the context of a fast-growing economy with frequent changes such as China, Allen and Qian
(2010) show that there is an additional advantage of using alternative institutions because this
type of system can adapt and change much more quickly than when the law is used. In
particular, competition can ensure the most efficient mechanism prevails and this process does
not require persuading the legislature and the electorate to revise the law when circumstances
change.
To conclude, we argue that while legal institutions along with formal financing channels
are an integral part of developed economies’ institutions, alternative mechanisms and financing
channels play a much more prominent role in emerging economies, and can be superior to legal
mechanisms in supporting business transactions in certain industries or entire economies.
Therefore, the development of alternative dispute resolution and contract enforcement
mechanisms alongside the development of legal and other formal institutions can promote a
broader base of economic growth that is also more sustainable in emerging economies. The
coexistence of and competition between alternative and legal mechanisms can also exert
positive impact on the development of legal institutions, so that they are less likely to be
captured by interest groups and become more efficient in adapting to changes.

3.6 Financial Crisis
Financial crises often accompany the development of a financial system. Conventional
wisdom says that financial crises are bad. Often they are very bad, as they disrupt production

until after September 11, 2001. After the terrorist attack all commercial flights were grounded for several
days, completely halting the check clearing process. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act was
signed in October 2003, allowing electronic images to be a substitute for the original checks, and thus the
clearing process is no longer dependent on the mail and transportation system.
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and lower social welfare as in the Great Depression in the U.S. Hoggarth et al. (2002) carefully
measure the costs of a wide range of recent financial crises and find that these costs are on
average roughly 15-20 percent of GDP. It is these large costs that make policymakers so averse
to financial crises.
It is worthwhile to point out, however, that financial crises may be welfare improving for
an economy. One possible example is the late nineteenth century U.S., which experienced
many crises but at the same time had a high long run growth rate. In fact, Ranciere et al. (2003)
report an empirical observation that countries which have experienced occasional crises have
grown on average faster than countries without crises. They develop an endogenous growth
model and show theoretically that an economy may be able to attain higher growth when firms
are encouraged by a limited bailout policy to take more credit risk in the form of currency
mismatch, even though the country may experience occasional crises (see Allen and Oura (2004)
for a review of the growth and crises literature, Allen and Gale (2004a) who show that crises can
be optimal and Allen and Gale (2007) for a review of the crises literature).
In this section, we consider financial crises in China. Given China’s current situation with
limited currency mismatches any crisis that occurs is likely to be a classic banking, currency or
twin crisis. It is perhaps more likely to be of the damaging type that disrupts the economy and
social stability than of the more benign type that aids growth. The desirability of preventing
crises thus needs to be taken into account when considering reforms of China’s financial system.
First, we examine how China can prevent traditional financial crises, including a banking sector
crisis and a stock market or real estate crisis/crash. We then discuss the impact of different
types of financial crises, such as the “twin crises” (simultaneous foreign exchange and
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banking/stock market crises) that occurred in many Asian economies in the late 1990s, on China.

3.6.1 Banking Crises and Market Crashes
Among traditional financial crises, banking panics, arising from the banks’ lack of liquid
assets to meet total withdrawal demands (anticipated and unanticipated), were often
particularly disruptive. Over time one of the most critical roles of central banks came to be the
elimination of banking panics and the maintenance of financial stability. To a large degree
central banks in different countries performed well in this regard in the period following the
Second World War. However, in recent years, banking crises are often preceded by abnormal
price rises (“bubbles”) in the real estate and/or stock markets. At some point the bubble bursts
and assets markets collapse. In many cases banks and other intermediaries are overexposed to
the equity and real estate markets, and following the collapse of asset markets a banking crisis
ensues. Allen and Gale (2000c) provide a theory of bubbles and crises based on the existence of
an agency problem. Many investors in real estate and stock markets obtain their investment
funds from external sources.

If the providers of the funds are unable to observe the

characteristics of the investment, and because of the investors’ limited liability, there is a classic
risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Risk shifting increases the return to risky
assets and causes investors to bid up asset prices above their fundamental values. A crucial
determinant for asset prices is the amount of credit that is provided for speculative investment.
Financial liberalization, by expanding the volume of credit, can interact with the agency problem
and lead to a bubble in asset prices.
As discussed above in Section 3.3, if NPLs continue to accumulate and/or if growth slows
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significantly then there may be a banking crisis in China. This may involve withdrawal of funds
from banks. However, given the government’s strong position regarding the low level of debt
(Table 21-A), it is feasible for the government to prevent this situation from getting out of
control. Since the real estate markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen (largest volume and most
developed) and other major cities have already experienced bubbles and crashes (see China
Industry Report, http://www.cei.gov.cn, http://house.focus.cn and Cao and Liao (2008) for more
details), it is quite possible that similar episodes in the future could cause a banking crisis that
will be more damaging to the real economy. With booming real estate markets, there will be
more speculative money poured into properties with a large amount coming from banks. The
agency problem in real estate lending and investment mentioned above worsens this problem.
If the real estate market falls significantly within a short period of time, defaults on bank loans
could be large enough to trigger a banking panic and crisis. The size of the stock market during
the first decade of its existence was small relative to the banking sector and the overall
economy, and hence a crash in the market could hardly put a dent in the real economy.
However, given the quick growth of the stock market (as shown in Table 23-A) and the fact large
and small investors may borrow (from banks) to finance their investment, especially during a
bubble period, a future market crash could have much more serious consequences. Overall, a
banking crisis triggered by crashes in the real estate and/or stock markets represents the most
serious risk of a financial crisis in China.
Having said that, we also want to point out that the Chinese government has
maintained strong control over the big banks through their (nontradable) shareholdings. While
government control may have a negative effect in more developed countries in terms of
efficiency, it may be beneficial in countries with less developed financial markets. In particular,
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the government can help to control the risk taking behaviors of the banks by regulations and
direct interventions as a shareholder. Moreover, in the case of a crisis, the government has the
ability to speed up the recovery and maintain the stability of the market by loan expansion if it
has control over major banks. In fact, the Chinese banking sector and financial markets were
not affected much by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Though we recognized earlier in the
paper that government’s dual roles as regulator and as majority owner can be problematic, this
can also be beneficial both in terms of preventing and coping with a crisis.

3.6.2 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, a different breed of
financial crisis emerged. Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) found that three quarters of the
IMF’s member countries suffered some form of banking crisis between 1980 and 1996, and their
study did not include the subsequent Asian financial crisis in 1997. In many of these crises,
banking panics in the traditional sense were avoided either by central bank intervention or by
explicit or implicit government guarantees. But as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find, the
advent of financial liberalization in many economies in the 1980s, in which free capital in- and
out-flows and the entrance and competition from foreign investors and financial institutions
follow in the home country, has often led to “twin” banking and currency crises. A common
precursor to these crises was financial liberalization and significant credit expansion and
subsequent stock market crashes and banking crises. In emerging markets this is often then
accompanied by an exchange rate crisis as governments choose between lowering interest rates
to ease the banking crises or raising them to defend the home currency. Finally, a significant fall
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in output occurs and the economies enter recessions.
3.6.2.1 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion
Capital account liberation can attract more foreign capital, but large scale and sudden
capital flows and foreign speculation significantly increase the likelihood of a twin crisis. The
first key question is, when and to what extent a country opens its capital account and financial
sector to foreign capital and foreign financial institutions?

With a model of endogenous

financial intermediation, Alessandria and Qian (2005) demonstrate that an efficient financial
sector prior to liberalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful financial
liberalization. Applying these ideas to China, even though the overall efficiency of China’s
banking sector (especially state-owned banks) is still low compared to international standards,
banks can have a stronger incentive to limit the moral hazard concerning borrowers’ choices of
investment projects through monitoring and designing of loan contracts (e.g., adjusting interest
rates and/or maturities) following a capital account liberalization. Therefore, the efficiency of
the banking sector improves and the liberalization can generate a large welfare increase, since it
leads to both a larger scale of investment and a better composition of investment projects. This
is more likely to occur with low interest rates in international markets (so that cost of capital for
domestic banks is also low). A financial sector liberalization, which allows foreign financial
institutions to enter China’s lending markets, can further improve welfare as more competition
provides stronger incentives for all banks to further discourage moral hazard in investment.

3.6.2.2 Sterilization of Foreign Currency Reserves
China has experienced a large increase in its foreign exchange reserves since 2001, due
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to a continuous inflow of capital and the commitment to maintain a fixed rate against the US
dollar initially and then a crawling peg exchange rate regime after 2005. Figure 25-A plots the
exchange rate of RMB against US dollar. The RMB kept appreciating against US dollar until mid
2008, when the exchange rate stayed flat again at around 6.83 RMB/US$. It resumed the path
of appreciation in June 2010 and the exchange rate further dropped to 6.5 RMB/US by April
2011. Figure 25-B plots monthly foreign reserves as shown on the balance sheet of the PBOC; a
clear trend emerges as the reserves increased rapidly since 2003.76 On the balance of payments
side, the current account surplus grew from $37 billion in 1997 to $305.4 billion in 2010; net
export grew from 2.5% of GDP in 2004 to 8% of GDP in 2008 and then dropped to 3.1% in 2010
due to a decrease in net exports. The capital account was mostly positive during the period 1995
to 2009, implying a net capital inflow. The current account surplus has come mainly from trade
surpluses, while the capital account surplus mainly comes from FDI. It has long been recognized
that a large stock of foreign reserves has both pros and cons. Abundant foreign reserves enable
a country to maintain a stable exchange rate and to meet its foreign debt obligations. It can also
be used to cushion the sudden shocks on a country’s current and capital accounts. However, an
increase in foreign exchange reserves leads to an accumulation of foreign assets, a component
of the monetary base. Thus an increase in foreign reserves, ceteris paribus, causes monetary
expansion and puts inflationary pressures on the economy, resulting in an appreciation of the
real exchange rate. This experience is not unique for China. Many East Asian countries have
experienced similar problems induced by large (private) capital inflows starting in the late 1980s.

76

The PBOC has made use of its foreign reserves in ways other than investing in low risk assets such as
long term government bonds. As discussed above, some foreign reserves were used to recapitalize the
large state owned financial institutions.
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Figure 25-B China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves

To offset the expansionary effect of the increasing foreign reserves, the central bank can
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sterilize the foreign assets by taking opposite actions with domestic assets, or implement other
contractionary monetary policies. In China’s case, the major sterilization tools are open market
operations (OMO) and raising required reserve ratios. These two methods affect the liability
side of the central bank’s balance sheet in a similar way. Generally the cost of sterilization using
required reserves is lower than open market operations, since the central bank pays minimal
interest on required and excess reserves. OMOs in China mainly include central bank bill
issuance and short term repurchases operations (repos, usually within 91 days). Since February
2003, the central bank has engaged in two or more OMOs each week. The total PBOC bonds
outstanding as percentage of foreign reserves has been increasing consistently from 2000 to
2010, implying an increasing trend in sterilization. 77
Moreover, China has been gradually raising the required reserve ratios since the third
quarter of 2003, corresponding to an increase in foreign reserves inflows. The required reserve
ratio rose from 6% to 21.5% in June 2011, an historical high. Since Chinese commercial banks
tend to maintain a high excess reserve ratio due to a lack of alternative investment channels,
the PBOC has decreased the interest rate on excess reserves from 1.62% in 2003 to 0.72% in
2008 to discourage the hoarding of excess reserves. To make sterilization effective, China also
has to impose tight capital controls. As the famous “trilemma” implicates, with a fixed exchange
rate and free capital flows, the sterilization process will be immediately offset by further capital
inflows. Though it has been documented that capital controls in China are somewhat porous
(Prasad and Wei (2007)), it is still widely believed that China has successfully sterilized at least
some of its rising foreign reserves (e.g., Prasad and Goodfriend (2006), Ouyang, Rajan and
77

There are also non-market tools such as transferring the deposits from the commercial banking system to
the central bank. In recent years, the PBOC also started making foreign exchange swaps with big
commercial banks as a tool for controlling liquidity.
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Willett (2007), He. at el. (2005)). Moreover, due to a combination of rapid increases in foreign
reserves and low interest rates on domestic bonds, the PBOC’s income from foreign reserve
investment is likely to exceed the sterilization cost stemming from central bank bill issuance and
high required reserve ratios, enabling China to carry out sterilization to a large extent.
Nevertheless, possible appreciation of the RMB may have a profound negative impact on the
PBOC’s income from foreign reserves in domestic currency terms.

3.6.2.3 Currency Crisis and Banking Crisis (A Twin Crisis)
A currency crisis that may trigger a banking crisis is a possibility. The rapid increase in
foreign exchange reserves in recent years suggests there is a lot of speculative money in China in
anticipation of an RMB revaluation. If there is a significant future revaluation or if after some
time it becomes clear there will not be one then much of this money may be withdrawn. What
happens then will depend on how the government and central bank respond. If they allow the
currency to float so they do not use up the exchange reserves then any falls in the value of the
RMB may occur quickly and this may limit further outflows. If they try to limit the exchange rate
movement then there may be a classic currency crisis. This is in turn may trigger a banking crisis
if there are large withdrawals from banks as a result. Quickly adopting a full float can help to
avoid a twin crisis, and thus reduce the overall economic costs of the currency crisis. 78

78

Chang and Velasco (2001) develop a model of twin crises based on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
model of bank runs. Money enters agents’ utility function, and the central bank controls the ratio of
currency to consumption. In some regimes, there exists both a “good” equilibrium in which early (late)
consumers receive the proceeds from short-term (long-term) assets, and a “bad” equilibrium in which
everybody believes a crisis will occur and these beliefs are self-fulfilling. If the bad equilibrium occurs,
there is a twin crisis.
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3.6.2.4 Financial Contagion
Another phenomenon that has been present in many recent crises (e.g., the 1997 Asian
crisis) is that financial crises are contagious. A small shock that initially affects only a particular
region or sector can spread by contagion within the banking system or asset markets to the rest
of the financial sector, then to the entire economy and possibly other economies. Contagion
can occur in a number of ways. In the Chinese context with tight capital control and where
financial markets are relatively unimportant it is most likely they will occur either from
contractually interconnected financial institutions or large asset price movements that cause
spillovers to financial institutions.
Allen and Gale (2000d) focus on the channel of contagion that arises from the
overlapping claims that different regions or sectors of the banking system have on one another
through interbank markets. When one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a
loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value. If this spillover effect is strong
enough, it can cause a crisis in the adjacent regions, and a contagion can occur which brings
down the entire financial system. Allen and Gale (2004b) show how large price falls can come
about as a result of forced liquidations when there is a limited supply of liquidity in the market.
Cifuentes et al. (2005) show that contagion is likely to be particularly severe when these two
factors interact.
Table 25 Trading Volume of National Interbank Market
(RMB billion)
Maturity
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Overnight
103.88
201.52
641.89
283.34
223.03

7 days
560.69
852.34
1,456.31
1041.41
896.26

20 days
93.35
100.35
56.60
30.67
60.42
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30 days
35.28
29.17
44.11
18.93
29.91

60 days
9.40
10.78
10.14
9.20
7.51

90 days
4.73
4.76
10.18
5.84
14.09

120
0.87
11.81
2.81
2.57
1.54

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

635.21
8030.47
10651.36
16166.60
24486.20

1290.43
2178.01
3500.47

38.13
50.16
110.71
102.15
65.01

19.11
34.16
113.55
204.84
161.30

12.03
27.94
44.52
53.80
46.61

5.22
31.80
66.61
71.00

1.41
13.34
18.50
62.3
19.75

Source: The People’s Bank of China (2001-2010).

Given China’s current financial system, what is the likelihood of financial contagion
caused by contractual interlinkages as in the interbank market or because of a meltdown in
asset prices if there are forced sales? China’s interbank market grew very quickly since its
inception in 1981; in fact, the growth of this market was so fast, with the participation of many
unregulated financial institutions and with large amount of flows of funds through this market
to fixed asset investment, that it exacerbated high inflation in the late 1980s. Since then the
government and PBOC increased their regulation by limiting participation of non-bank financial
institutions and by imposing restrictions on interest rate movements. In 1996 a nation-wide,
uniform system of interbank markets was set up. It contains two connected levels: the primary
network, which includes the largest PBOC branches, large commercial banks, and a few large
non-bank financial institutions, and the secondary network that includes many banks and nonbank institutions and their local branches (see China Interbank Market Annual Reports for more
details). Table 25 documents the growth of the interbank market during 2001-2010: while the
trading volume of long maturity contracts (20 days or longer) is low, the volume of short-term
contracts (overnight and week-long) has been high (reaching RMB 10 trillion to 20 trillion, or
$1.5 billion to $2.9 billion). Therefore, the increasing interlinkages can potentially create a
contagion if a crisis develops in one area or sector.
With regard to a meltdown of asset prices, this can happen because of a limited supply
of liquidity if there is a rapid liquidation of assets. It seems unlikely that this can occur and cause
a serious problem in China’s securities markets. A more serious threat is real estate markets if
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there are bankruptcies and forced selling. This could potentially interact with bank interlinkages
and cause a systemic problem. As mentioned above, a crash in real estate and/or stock markets
could quite possibly be the cause of a financial crisis in China.
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
One of the most frequently asked questions about China’s financial system is whether it
will stimulate or hamper its economic growth. Our answer to this question, based on examining
the history and current status of the financial system and comparing them to those of other
countries, is in four parts. First, the large banking sector dominated by state-owned banks has
played a much more important role in funding the growth of many types of firms than financial
markets. While the problem of NPLs has been under control in recent years, continuing the
improvement of the efficiency of major banks toward international standards will allow growth
to continue. Second, the stock market has been growing fast since 1990, but has played a
relatively limited role in supporting the growth of the economy. However, with rapid growth
that is likely to be sustained in the near future the role of the financial markets in the economy
will become increasingly more significant.
If we can summarize that the role of the banking sector and financial markets
has been that they have done enough not to slow down the growth of the economy, our third
conclusion is that alternative financing channels have had great success in supporting the
growth of the Hybrid Sector, which contributes most of the economic growth compared to the
State and Listed Sectors. The non-standard financial sector relies on alternative financing
channels including internal finance, and on alternative governance mechanisms, such as those
based on trust, reputation and relationships, and competition in output and input markets to
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support the growth of the Hybrid Sector. It is possible that these alternative institutions are
superior to western-style legal institutions in supporting a fast-growing economy such as China’s.
We conclude by pointing out that economic stability is crucial for the continuing
development of the Chinese economy, and the stability of the financial system relates to
economic stability in three dimensions. The continuing effort by banks to reduce NPLs and
improve efficiency can help to avoid a banking crisis, while the efforts to improve the regulatory
environment surrounding the financial markets (including governance and accounting standards)
can help to prevent a crash/crisis in the stock and/or real estate markets. If China further opens
the capital account, there will be a large inflow of foreign capital, but large scale capital flows
and speculations also bring the risk of a twin crisis (foreign exchange and banking/stock market
crisis), which severely damaged emerging economies in Asia in 1997.
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